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**INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.
NEW REALITIES AND APPROACHES**

Monograph



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The monograph presents features and trends in the development of modern international relations and approaches to defining the concept of the socio-political environment. The main components of the socio-political environment are singled out and substantiated. A model of the relationship between the subjects of social and political relations has been built. The study proposes an analysis approach, evaluation and forecasting of the socio-political environment in the region or state; the technology of influence of intelligence agencies on the social and political environment, and the algorithm of its implementation. Developed: a functional model of intelligence agencies as a complex organizational system; functional and cybernetic models of the management system of intelligence agencies; a model of the influence of the special purpose units of the intelligence agency on the social and political environment and situation. Conceptual principles of the use of private military companies and methods of conducting special influence operations are also considered.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TERMS, ABBREVIATIONS AND SYMBOL.....	5
FOREWORD.....	7
INTRODUCTION.....	9

CHAPTER 1

PECULIARITIES AND TRENDS OF THE CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.....

1.1. The Tendencies of Modern International Relations	12
1.2. Conceptual Approaches to the Transformation of Actors of International Relations in the Current Context.....	15
1.3. Intelligence Activities as a Phenomenon of Modern International Relations..	17
Conclusion to the Chapter One.....	30

CHAPTER 2

INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE IN TRANSFORMING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE CONTEXT OF MODERN HYBRID MILITARY-POLITICAL CONFLICTS.....

2.1. Intelligence Agencies as Complex Organizational Systems.....	31
2.2. Management System of the Intelligence Agency and Its Models.....	36
2.3. The Place and Role of Special Forces of Intelligence Agencies in Modern Realities.....	43
2.4. Organizational Weapons as an Element of Hybrid Warfare.....	51
2.5. Special Hybrid Forms and Methods of Modern Warfare.....	55
Conclusion to the Chapter Two.....	58

CHAPTER 3

POLITICAL INTERACTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ACTORS UNDER MODERN CONDITIONS.....

3.1. The Influence of New Actors on the Transformation of the System of International Relations.....	61
3.2. The Socio-Political Component of International Relations.....	63
3.2.1. Existing Approaches to Defining the Concept of Socio-Political Environment.....	63
3.2.2. Identification and Justification of the Main Components of the Socio-Political Environment.....	73
3.3. Techniques of Influence of Intelligence Agencies on the Socio-Political Environment.....	84
Conclusion to the Chapter Three.....	107

CHAPTER 4	
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE USE OF PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES.....	109
4.1. Private Military Companies as a Convenient Tool for Special Operations.....	109
4.2. Advantages and Drawbacks of Using Private Military Companies.....	112
4.3. Experience and Features of the Use of Private Military Companies as a Means of Influencing the Socio-Political Environment.....	115
Conclusion to the Chapter Four.....	119
 CHAPTER 5	
METHODS OF CONDUCTING SPECIAL INFLUENCE OPERATIONS.....	121
5.1. Organization of Support for Separatist Movements and Opposition.....	122
5.2. Organizing Support for a Resistance Movement.....	124
5.3. Organizing Support for Radical and Terrorist Organizations.....	126
5.4. Agent-Based Information and Psychological Influence Operations.....	128
5.5. Political Technologies of Influence Through the Media.....	131
5.6. Organizing Agent-Based Hard Power Technologies.....	132
5.7. Organizing Strikes and Protests.....	135
5.8. Organizing a Coup D'état, Military Rebellion, Popular Uprising or National Revolution.....	136
5.9. Organizing Guerrilla and Underground Movements.....	140
Conclusion to the Chapter Five.....	142
 CONCLUSION.....	143
AFTERWORD.....	144
LIST OF REFERENCES.....	145

LIST OF TERMS, ABBREVIATIONS, AND SYMBOLS

4GW – The 4th Generation of Warfare.

Actor – an acting subject (individual or collective); an individual, social group, organization, institution, or community of people performing actions that influence others.

AF – Armed Forces.

AF of Ukraine – The Armed Forces of Ukraine.

AR Crimea – Autonomous Republic of Crimea.

CIA – Central Intelligence Agency.

CC – Central Committee.

DA – Direct Action.

DI MoD of Ukraine – Defense Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.

EC – European Community.

FBI – Federal Bureau of Investigations.

GW – Guerrilla Warfare.

GS AF of Ukraine – General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

HVI or HVT – High-Value Individual Targeting.

IA – Intelligence Agency.

IA MoD of Ukraine – The Intelligence Agency of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.

IAG – Illegal Armed Groups.

IC – The Intelligence Community.

IW – Irregular Warfare.

MA – Military Assistance.

MID GS AF of the RF – The Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

MM – Mass Media.

MoD – The Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.

NGO – Non-governmental organization.

NIS – National Intelligence Strategy.

OW – Organizational Weapons.

PAG – Political Action Group.

PMA – Professional Management Activities.

PMC – Private Military Company.

PMCs – Private Military Companies

PMR – Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (Transdnistria).

PRC – People's Republic of China.

RSA – Republic of South Africa.

RF – The Russian Federation.
SAD – Special Activities Division.
SIS – Secret Intelligence Service.
SOG – Special Operations Group.
SOF – Special Operation Forces.
SPE – The Socio-Political Environment.
SSU – Security Service of Ukraine.
SR – Surveillance and Reconnaissance.
TNA – Transnational Actors.
TNC – Transnational Corporations.
TSS – Terrorist Semi-State.
UN – The United Nations.
UNDP – United Nations Development Programme.
UNICEF – United Nations Children's Fund.
UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
UPR – Ukrainian People's Republic.
UW – Unconventional Warfare.

FOREWORD

Significant changes mark today's global situation. It is so vastly complicated and vibrant that it requires a careful rethink and a comprehensive and in-depth analysis of all the factors and trends shaping the development of world society. At the present phase of the transformation of international affairs, one of the key priority areas is the analysis of the social and political processes among the subjects of the socio-political process. Today, the foreign policy of any state is based on the socio-political information it knows, the study of key problems in the political and societal sphere, the assessment of strategies and tactics, and the implementation of political and socio-economic transformations.

The widely held proverb that who owns information owns the world today is more relevant than ever. Among the main collectors and processors of information are IAs, which can perform specific activities to impact the socio-political processes of a particular state.

When looking at the origins of present-day conflicts and the complexity of addressing them, one should note the growing socio-political tensions within society and crisis manifestations in other areas. Given today's challenges and modern hybrid threats, it becomes critical to implement new approaches to international affairs and the influence on socio-political processes.

A considerable part of the results presented in this publication were obtained for the first time. A model of the interaction between the subjects of socio-political relations is formed. The following have been proposed: an analytical technology for assessing, evaluating, and forecasting the socio-political situation in a region or state, a technology for influencing the socio-political situation by intelligence agencies, and an algorithm for its implementation. The following have been developed: a functional model of the IA as a complex organizational system, functional and cybernetic models of the IA management system, and a model of the IA special purpose units' influence on socio-political conditions. A structural model of the IA hierarchy is outlined, and the conceptual framework for the application of PMCs and special influence operations is examined.

The publication contains an overview of the key features and tendencies of modern international affairs, existing approaches to the definition of socio-political conditions, and the research and introduction of new models, tools, and techniques of the influence on socio-political conditions before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation on February 24, 2022.

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INTRODUCTION

In the context of current threats, particularly in light of the Russian Federation's continuous implementation of hybrid warfare strategy in its new forms, not only the military but also socio-political risks to our country require special attention.

Ukraine has learned firsthand about the veracity of the thesis that the socio-political situation in the country plays a crucial role in its national security system and is one of the leading factors ensuring stability in the country. It is a proven fact that the aggressor acts quite actively on the territory of our country, sparing no resources to create a favorable environment for hybrid warfare. Information of a socio-political kind forms the reality, and the proper information forms the reality suitable for confrontation in contemporary hybrid warfare. The study of information on socio-political processes is impacted by the presence of novel forms of influences caused by hybrid conflicts on the socio-political interests of a particular state, for which special operations (actions) are conducted by various agencies and interagency bodies (services). The statement about the necessity of building up the national capability to influence, assess, and forecast the socio-political situation is a relevant and imperative condition for countering our country's aggressors.

The close correlation between the socio-political context and emerging forms of warfare, as well as the current domestic situation, requires a reexamining of the existing approaches to defining the concept of socio-political situation, as well as the clarification and justification of their components with respect to the IA's influence. All these factors contribute to the relevance of the study presented in this monograph.

The first chapter examines the tendencies in contemporary international relations, reviews conceptual approaches to the transformation of international relations actors in the current conditions, and intelligence activities as a phenomenon of contemporary international relations.

The second chapter provides a science-based perspective on IA as complex organizational systems and develops its functional model. A structural model of the IA hierarchy is also defined, and functional and cybernetic models of the IA management system are developed. The author presents the place and role of IA in hybrid warfare, examines organizational weapons as an element of hybrid warfare, and the specialized hybrid forms and methods of modern warfare.

The third chapter addresses the role of new actors in transforming the system of international relations, and provides an analysis of the existing approaches to defining the concept of socio-political situation, selecting and justifying its components. Additionally, the chapter suggests a model and

technology for influencing the socio-political situation by the Special Forces units of the IA.

Chapter 4 reviews the conceptual framework for the use of PMCs for special operations, their benefits and drawbacks, the creation of cover stories for the subjects of influence on the socio-political situation, as well as the features and experience of using MCs as a means of influencing the socio-political situation.

The fifth chapter describes the methods of conducting special operations to influence the socio-political situation in a foreign country or region.

The conclusion summarizes the main results of the study.

CHAPTER 1

PECULIARITIES AND TRENDS OF THE CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Before we move forward, let's take a look at the generally accepted, most commonly used definitions and terms.

Methodology. A doctrine about strategies, methods, and ways to study a subject.

Conception. A set of ideas about certain things, their mutual effects, about ways to perceive and interpret a phenomenon, subject, or process.

Conceptual framework. A set of theoretical foundations to define the logic, structure, and principle of how the system works.

Principle. A guiding parameter that defines how a person behaves or judges about the surrounding world.

Method. A set of actions to solve a particular task or achieve a specific goal.

Technology. A set of methods and tools that achieve the desired result.

Algorithm. A set of consecutive steps that bring a desired outcome.

Mean. Technique or a way of making an action to achieve something.

Way. An opportunity, an action to realize or to achieve.

Model. An abstract representation of the real thing in a particular form (mathematical, natural, symbolic, pictorial, or descriptive), allowing us to obtain the data for the research objectives.

Structural Model. System elements, internal connections between the elements, and the connections of certain elements with the surrounding environment.

Functional Model is designed to explore the system's purposes and operational specifics in relation to the internal and external elements.

Cybernetic Model is a model standing in functional semblance to the modelled object.

The system is a group of interrelated elements designed to achieve a certain goal [1]. Various authors provide a reasonably extensive range of how to define a system. The main emphasis is placed on the interaction of its constituent elements [2-6]. The current study assumes the definition proposed by M. Z. Zgurovskyi and N. D. Pankratova [7].

System. An ordered set of structurally interrelated and functionally co-dependent elements.

The *Complex System* is an orderly set of structurally interrelated and functionally co-dependent systems.

The *Open System* is a type of a system that implies a dynamic interaction with the surrounding world [8].

The *Dynamic System* is a system that alters its state in time over external or internal forces.

The *Organizational System* is a system whose managing object comprises people (teams of people) [9].

Management is a process of the targeted and constant influence of the managing subject on the managed object, aimed at altering the states of objects and/or subjects by a pre-designed action plan [10]. It is about bringing an objective process to a subjective outcome. Management is always based on expediency.

Functions of Management are a special type of managerial activity, specific forms of managerial influence on the organization's activities, which determine and define the content of business relationships. Typically, five main management functions are distinguished: foresight and planning, organizing, commanding, coordinating, and control [11].

The *Management Structure* is a group of orderly and closely interrelated elements that ensure the maintenance and development of an organization as a unified whole [12].

Situationality means that actions are determined by the context in which they are performed [13]. The concept serves as a foundation for the situational theory of leadership, which studies the effectiveness of management methods depending on the position in which the organization that applies them is currently situated. The situational theory of leadership argues there can be no single universal set of governing principles that are equally effective at any time and in any place, for the best possible performance is achieved by applying different strategies in different situations.

The term *Intelligence Agency* refers to the government bodies specifically mandated to conduct intelligence activities, which can function both as a separate state agency or as part of an executive branch [14].

1.1. The Tendencies of Modern International Relations

At present, International Relations are characterized by a flurry of changes associated with yet another attempt to redraw the political map of the world and, specifically, Europe. After the collapse of the socialist system, the Soviet Union, and the emergence of independent states across Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, claiming its successorship to both the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation is engaged in a revanchist policy aimed at regaining "lost spheres of influence." The forcible redefinition of the borders of the sovereign European states, such as the temporary occupation of Crimea and its annexation

to the Russian Federation, initially in the capacity of a federal member state, and later followed by revocation of the status is a precedent that evidences the deep crisis of the modern system of international relations. The precedent that has put the UN Charter's principles in question.

Here are some of the key components of the "new reality." The limited efficiency of collective security systems amid the rising trend of the use of force in International Relations, along with the disregard for the norms of the International Law. Attempts to revise free trade economy principles; the challenge to traditional financial systems posed by blockchain technologies. The "spin master" approach of some regional players, such as Russia that trades on the tensions between the world's leading players and keeps using raw natural resources as a tool of geopolitics.

Some of the global and regional players trying to use this to aggressively promote their interests in the areas of their strategic priority. In such activities, they are not above fomenting crisis phenomena in some countries further to drag them into their orbit of influence and create preconditions for new local or regional crises (conflicts) in the future [15].

Understanding these global tendencies, processes, and crises that determine the current state of international relations and will impact their future formation is essential. These tendencies include [16]:

- A total erosion of the mutual trust: voters, with few exceptions, have little trust in political parties and national governments, nations – to one another, and members of the international community – in global organizations. As a result, nationalist, right- and left-wing populist movements are on the rise at the national political level, even in countries with strong democratic traditions. In international policy, the role of global institutions, as well as regard for internationally undertaken commitments, is diminished;
- A compromise of the respect for the norms and principles of international law, disregard for compliance with agreements and treaties, which leads to the transformation of the system of international legal order, especially in the context of security guarantees;
- The crisis of global leadership. In particular, we can observe competition in different parts of the world for regional leadership and a decreasing level of trust in the United States and other global players.
- An unprecedented rise of inequality both within individual societies and between countries and regions, resulting in protests and violent confrontations that may lead to the change of ruling regimes;
- A new cycle of the fight for resources (Africa and the Arctic). Among the key players are China, the United States, the EU, Russia, and Turkey;
- Technological advancement that, on the one hand, provides a transition to a new industrial order. On the other, it opens up a new field for hostile actions bordering on war and, in social terms, virtualizes individual lives, societies, and countries.

Among the processes that are currently shaping international relations are:

- The return of the United States of America in its role as a leader of the democratic world, a global force that stands for the ideals of freedom and human rights;

- A notable rise in the global role of China. A country that has experienced an evolutionary transformation from a Third World country to the second-largest global economy in terms of nominal GDP over the past thirty years, posing a challenge to the US economic, military, and political dominance;

- The increase in cases of Russia's aggressive policy in different regions of the world, actual aspiration to regain the status of global power with imperial ambitions;

- The weakening of the role of multilateral institutions, including the UN, the WTO, and the OSCE;

- Growing instability in Latin America. In particular, this refers to Mexico, Bolivia, Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Brazil;

- The militarization of the certain parts of the world.

The following crises have an impact on international relations:

- In addition to the constant threat of an economic decline that could follow the model of 2008 due to trade disputes between the US and China and the US and the EU, the world is facing an inequality crisis when an absolute minority of the world's population owns the absolute majority of the public riches;

- The crisis of the European project, which is conditioned, in particular, by the problem of refugees, Brexit, the growing influence of populist movements and right-wing politics, and the lack of coordination in positions on EU enlargement and the deepening of cooperation inside the European Union;

- Middle East security crises, in particular in Syria, Libya, and Yemen, the confrontation between the Sunni monarchies of the Gulf and Iran, and the continuation of the Arab-Israeli confrontation;

- The escalation of the Karabakh conflict and the deterioration of the security situation in the Caucasus as a whole;

- The security crisis over North Korea and its nuclear program;

- Iran's nuclear program, the renewal of the US sanctions regime with the actual resumption of the uranium enrichment process in this country;

- The Hong Kong crisis and threats in the South China Sea due to the PRC's policy;

- Political crisis in Belarus as a result of the 2020 presidential elections;

- The escalation of the regional tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean and the confrontation between Greece and Turkey;

- Global healthcare infrastructure crisis;

- Economic slowdown due to the Covid-19 pandemic and global lockdown.

1.2. Conceptual Approaches to the Transformation of Actors of International Relations in the Current Context

For a considerable period of time (XVII—XX centuries), the Westphalian system of International Relations was based on the principle that only state actors could be active participants in international interactions. However, in the second half of the twentieth century, new actors stepped up within this system, and along with the traditional ones, they emerged as influential players in world political processes.

In *Turbulence in World Politics*, J. Rosenau distinguishes two main "worlds" within International Relations: the "state-centric," which he considers dominant, and the "sovereignty-free actors," which comprises non-sovereign international actors such as international organizations, TNCs, national movements, ethnic groups, territorial communities, bureaucracies, and individuals [17].

The interactions between these actors are controversial. They act under the state's jurisdiction but not in its interests. Their actions stabilize the international system but destabilize International Relations simultaneously. In his analysis of the structure of international actors, in addition to the state, the researcher determines the subsystems of the "state-centric world," such as local executive authorities that have a certain autonomy in the international sphere, as well as transnational organizations (e.g., the European Silicon Structures chipmaking company), cohorts (ethnic groups, churches), and movements.

Other researchers who specialize in International Relations hold similar positions, associating the emergence of "new" actors on the world stage with the processes of globalization, which claim, if not priority, then at least equality with the "traditional" actors of International Relations - the states.

In the meantime, a new group of international actors has emerged - the intrastate regions, characterized by the accumulation of academic, scientific, commercial, and other types of institutions. As a result, they are becoming a kind of "nodes" interconnecting different networks, opening up new opportunities for them and serving as a "gateway" to the global world of the post-Westphalian era. Such territories include New York, London, Tokyo, Washington, Southern California, Miami, Vancouver, etc. Such territories are developing exceptionally dynamic. Even more, it is getting increasingly difficult to classify and quantify the amount and types of resources they possess.

The goals of the new TNAs (transnational actors) also depend on the time parameters. While states usually act on the grounds that they are "indefinite" (there is no time limit for them), other actors have "limits of existence."

In general, the activities of modern TNAs pose a serious challenge to states and the entire state-centric view of the world. However, the relationships that are established between traditional and new actors on the world stage are by no means simple. We can often observe the cooperation between states and new

TNAs, resulting in the emergence of not only multilateral diplomacy, which means that more than two states are involved in addressing a problem but also multilevel diplomacy. Within its framework, various state and non-state actors deal with issues jointly. Sometimes, TNAs are more flexible and less bureaucratized than state actors.

The actors of International Relations are diverse in many respects, prone to internal tweaks, enter into most relationships and types of interactions, and influence each other. This makes world events difficult to predict and account for. The study of global policy actors and their interactions is not only a scientific but also a practical task. Essentially, it is about developing the principles of "global governance," not in the meaning of a "world government," but the creation of a kind of "rules of the game" that would take into account the interests and capabilities of various actors. American scientists J. Rosenau and E. Czempiel framed this as "governance without government."

Among all TNAs, TNCs are undoubtedly the most influential, thanks to the constant increase in investment and the intensive growth in the value of goods made by their foreign branches. For this reason, the rise of a genuinely unified international system based on technological innovations is predicted [18].

In the modern context, private military companies (PMCs) are worth a separate note. Non-governmental entities that perform a wide range of services, from training and education of military personnel to military operations and intelligence activities, have become a widespread phenomenon. In addition to the definition of "private military companies," the terms "privatized military firms" and "military contractors" are also in use.

First developed to protect energy production and transportation facilities, private armies originated primarily within energy TNCs. Nevertheless, PMCs quickly acquired the role of tacit armed forces that can seize resource areas without official authorization.

To conclude, the global development in the 21st century will focus on education, infrastructure, and the struggle for competitiveness in international markets for computer science, microelectronics, biotechnology, telecommunications, space technology, computers, and energy resources. Innovation and modernization will become integral to national life for years to come.

1.3. Intelligence Activity as a Phenomenon of Modern International Relations

Since ancient times, IAs (services) have been considered an instrument of power that can effectively solve a number of problems in the state's interest. The former head of one of the French Intelligence services, Count A. de Maranche, said: «...intelligence is there since the time of caves. It does not do anything

offensive. It aims to learn, understand and inform politicians. But what is different between a politician and a statesman? A politician does not like bad news, only good ones. If he only tells bad news to the people, to the voters, they won't vote for him. A statesman needs and wishes to learn everything» [19].

The tasks of intelligence include not only the quest to "know everything," meaning the collection of intelligence data but also the analysis and processing of certain scenarios, solutions advisory, development of geopolitical projects, active participation in their implementation, etc.

IAs are therefore becoming active participants in foreign and domestic policy processes.

The sixteenth century is considered the beginning of intelligence as a military tactical element. The Bible, however, tells us that during the Flood, Noah, while staying at the base of Ararat, sent out a raven, then a dove, and then another dove until it returned with an olive leaf. That's how Noah knew the water had receded from the earth. A biblical story describes Moses leading the Jewish people out of Egyptian slavery in the Book of Numbers (chapter 13). Through the desert of Faran (Paran), they searched for the "promised land." "And the Lord spoke to Moses, saying: "Send men to scout out the land of Canaan, which I am giving to the children of Israel; send one man at a time from the tribe of your fathers..." So Moses sent them out to explore the land of Canaan, and he said to them: "Go southward from here, and go up into the mountain, and see the land, what it is, and the people that dwell therein; is it strong, or weak, or small, or great? And what is the land that is in it, whether it be good or evil? And what are the cities in which he dwells, whether in camps or in strongholds? And what is the land like, whether it be rich or dry? Is there a tree in it or not? And be bold, and take of the fruit of the land; for these are the days of the first fruits of the vine." Moses, however, made the information he obtained public, resulting in the failure of the reconnaissance operation.

History records the work of intelligence in ancient chronicles. Aeneid, Virgil's classical Greek poem, describes the circumstances leading to Troy's fall through the efforts of an agent. Thutmose III (1457 BC) and Ramesses II (1274 BC) reignings are particularly noteworthy periods for the study of ancient intelligence. Intelligence was widely used by the rulers of the ancient Assyrian state: Tiglath-Pileser III (approximately 745-727 BC), Sargon II (722-705 BC), and Ashurbanipal (668-627 BC).

There are seven ancient Chinese books on military strategy known in the modern world: *The Art of War* by Sun Tzu; *Wuji*; *The Methods of the Sima*; *Questions and Replies between Emperor Taizong of Tang and Li Weigong*; *The Wei Liaozi*; Huang Shigong's *Three Strategies*; and Jiang Shang's *Six Secret Teachings*.

The Art of War by Sun Tzu has traditionally been regarded as the greatest achievement of Chinese military thought. However, recent textual studies and relatively recent archaeological discoveries show that Taigong's (one of the names

attributed to Jiang Shang) *Six Secret Teachings* were already known several centuries before Sun Tzu. This was a book that advocated and preached for the overthrow of the ruling Shang dynasty. Taigong has been revered throughout Chinese history as the first general and founder of military strategy [20].

Over the course of the 20th century, intelligence activities underwent considerable changes. National security priorities became closely intertwined with the tasks of the international security system. A number of local or regional international security structures were created during this time to coordinate joint actions in the security sphere. At present, not a single national security service can work effectively anywhere in the world on its own, so it is both logical and useful for special agencies to cooperate within various organizations and forums. The most well-known of them are the TREVI Group, Kilowatt Group, Le Group Informel Europeen dans le Domaine de la Lutte Contre Le Terrorisme (GIECLCT), Cross-Channel Intelligence Conference, etc. They are united with the fight against terrorism, international violence, emigration, and asylum issues. They are also concerned with curbing the number of weapons of mass destruction, countering Islamic fundamentalism and organized crime.

Realities of the 21st century (conflicts in the Caucasus, the Balkans, the Middle East, Asia, Russian aggression against Ukraine) indicate the global trend towards the worsening of the current situation, its unpredictability, instability, and fluidity, especially in the security field at all levels: global, regional and national.

Global problems have intensified in recent years, including food, water, and energy insecurity, climate change, environmental pollution, and dangerous diseases. Illegal migration, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, drug trafficking, and network terrorism have become widespread problems. The gap between the "golden billion countries" and other countries has widened. An international system is being created on the planet, where economic problems come to the fore. Gaining advantage in this system is primarily determined by the state's ability to quickly adapt to its requirements and changes, become integrated into it, and possess advanced intellectual, information, and communication capabilities.

Modern approaches to organizing national and state security systems in the world's leading countries are drastically changing. In particular, the competencies and missions of the IAs are considerably amplified.

Conducting an intelligence activity is one of the critical components of the state's national security.

As per the Law of Ukraine "On Intelligence", the intelligence activity is a system of intelligence measures implemented by the Intelligence Agency of Ukraine to fulfill the tasks and functions assigned to these bodies as defined by this law [21].

Intelligence Agencies of Ukraine are state bodies authorized by this law to carry out intelligence activities in order to protect the national interests of Ukraine from external threats.

Intelligence measure is a set of actions and decisions made by the IA and/or, in cases specified by this law, by another subject of the intelligence community involving the use of intelligence methods, means and assets.

An Intelligence Agency's key functions include:

- 1) The collection, analysis, management, and provision of intelligence data to its consumers in compliance with the procedures set forth by this law;
- 2) The implementation of measures aimed at facilitating Ukraine's national interests, ensuring security, and ensuring involvement in the formulation and implementation of state policies in the areas determined by law, enhancing state defense capability, and economic, scientific, and technological progress;
- 3) Detection and assessment of the scope and degree of external security threats to Ukraine, including in cyberspace, to its citizens' lives, health, and state property abroad. Moreover, IAs manage and carry out special (active) measures to counter these threats and prevent other external threats to the country.
- 4) Within the legal competences, participate in ensuring the security of foreign diplomatic missions of Ukraine, including by arranging and executing corresponding measures by the authorized representatives of these missions;
- 5) Provide assistance to the specially authorized state body in the field of counterintelligence in the implementation of counterintelligence support for foreign diplomatic missions of Ukraine, the security of employees of these missions and their family members in the host state, citizens of Ukraine who are aware of the national security information, as well as the protection of classified data in these missions;
- 6) Participate in the fight against terrorism, countering intelligence and subversive activities against Ukraine, transnational organized crime and other criminal activities that pose an external threat to the national security of Ukraine;
- 7) Participate in measures of state control over the international movement of military and dual-use items, in particular, with a view of preventing and counteracting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery, and illegal trafficking of military and dual-use items;
- 8) Ensure its own security;
- 9) Engage in cooperation with foreign competent bodies and international organizations;
- 10) Exercise other statutory functions to ensure Ukraine's national security.

World leaders constantly speak out about the importance of intelligence and the need for timely perfection [22]. As an example, the US National Security Strategy once stated that an effective intelligence service is crucial for protecting the country by issuing threat alerts, supporting military and political leadership in overcoming such threats, and finding ways to promote national interests diplomatically [23].

Civilizational advancement constantly generates new realities that affect the functioning of any country's state mechanism and political system. In January

2017, the US National Intelligence Council prepared a report, "Global Trends: The Paradox of Progress," which, in particular, draws attention to the fact that in recent years, there have been fundamental changes in the global landscape and that the achievements of the industrial and information ages have shaped a more dangerous world [24].

Intelligence services tasked with responding adequately to new challenges cannot ignore these factors. The problems of their activities in the current conditions are being addressed not only overseas. The Polish think tank "Institute for Security and Strategies" has prepared a special report, "Intelligence 3.0, or intelligence services in times of global acceleration[25]." The document notes that information has always been the sphere of intelligence activity. It was considered "raw material," typically mined from hard-access or highly secured "deposits." Upon processing, this information took on the form of a finished item representing a selected piece of reality. Historically, intelligence activities were arranged according to the so-called "knowledge chain" principle: one goes from primary data through processed information and holistic knowledge to the "wisdom" of officials who set intelligence goals and utilized acquired knowledge. Logical and cognitive activities serve as a guiding basis for understanding reality and for predicting and forecasting the future as well.

The classical "knowledge chain" is now falling apart and perhaps even becoming more and more confusing, sprawling, and split. Each of its elements faces changes due to three key factors: speed, scale, and complexity. Data, in the form of codes that represent the structure of reality, is generated at an ever-expanding rate in an environment that is getting more and more artificial (virtualized, emulated). Information is generated by mechanized data processing systems controlled by artificial intelligence more and more often. The knowledge about reality combines factual and fictitious (imaginary) elements, yet they are not verifiable by using any independent criteria that would determine their veracity. State wisdom of decision-makers gives way to ideological conditions and political expediency. Increasingly, it is subject to helplessness with making decisions based on incomplete or unverified data. The pace at which information is generated by digital means and introduced globally online and through social media is overwhelming for ordinary consumers. It is also a source of headache for decision-makers. Its scale and variety represent a true "digital tsunami." Every second, the Internet is added by 90 GB of content. No one can assess the proportion of "fake news" or unverified data falsified or altered for misinformation purposes.

The bold visions from half a century old past about the growth of cybernetics, digital telecommunications and computer science are now turning real. ICTs are developing at a breakneck pace, leading to radical changes in the state, society, economy and culture. Tech does not solve safety problems; it only magnifies them due to growing interconnectivity, and the scanty of individual solutions. To add to the problem, ignorance or lack of specialized expertise among

their consumers further exacerbate the issues and risks related to civilization's transformation into an "infospheric community" [26].

The following problems are brought to the fore: intelligence services are also subject to the transformation, even if they do not notice the shift or, even being well informed, count on a smooth and seamless adaptation to the changing environment. Meanwhile, public agencies face numerous challenges, mainly related to various security aspects: social, economic, informational, etc. As cybersecurity risks are growing, the scale of criminal threats is also widening, especially in its organized and cross-border forms. Despite the declining incidence of terrorist attacks, their potential is far from being vanished. In all its intricacy, the world is getting harder to track, measure, and understand in terms of the stability and instability drivers generating security risks and threats. With these challenges in mind, the intelligence services should redesign themselves into a next generation intelligence, able to meet modern realities:

- The growing complexity of the current security environment, which makes threats spread easier;
- "Digital tsunami" – the information flow generated by Internet users at a constant volume up; the data flow speed increasing; data mingling with pseudo-information distanced from reality or, to a certain extent corrupting it;
- The improvement of the data acquisition, processing, and analysis technologies. The invention of new content-generating algorithms, the spread of artificial intelligence systems and deep machine learning systems based on neural networks, the widespread use of bots, smart assistants, and crowdsourcing;
- Increasing use of technologies supporting artificial intelligence-based knowledge creation, especially in large-scale data exchanges (big data), information processing, and the generation of synthetic knowledge;
- The rise of the dark net and deep web segments linked to increasing criminal activity, which constitutes an immediate threat to the state and its citizens;
- Multilevel nature of decision-making bodies (both at the domestic and international levels); growing number of decision-makers or participants in decision-making processes acting at different levels (the state, international organizations, expert groups, society); and overlapping of decision-making processes at the domestic and international (including supranational) levels;
- The commercialization of the security sector; more offers from private "intelligence" companies (such as Stratfor) to provide analytical expertise; and outsourcing, meaning that certain types of intelligence activities will be commissioned to private parties.

Considering the aforementioned emerging realities and new challenges that modern societies and states face, intelligence services must undergo fundamental changes in organizational, technical, and mental areas in line with the key state and national interests defined by the National Security Strategy.

Similar to next-generation warfare, replacing earlier forms of warfare but adopting many of their characteristics, third-generation intelligence combines existing functions, goals, and organizational solutions with new technologies. The first generation of intelligence focused on acquiring secret information through clandestine networks, passing this information on to a narrow ring of decision-makers. Second-generation intelligence was based on a broad institutional structure and various rational tools and methods for obtaining and processing information. Third-generation intelligence is a sophisticated data management system that incorporates artificial intelligence technologies to manage communication "chaos" and reduce potential errors in assessing reality. It combines conventional methods of gathering classified data with large-scale production and processing of data from open sources (OSINT). The third generation of intelligence combines intelligence and counterintelligence activities aimed at protecting critical infrastructure and sensitive data managed by both public and private entities. It works in constant interaction with the market for informational services, particularly entities that offer information obtained based on their own human and hardware assets (private "intelligence" companies), as well as analytical products based on open-source data. The key goal of third-generation intelligence is to improve the capability to predict the behavior of individuals and collective objects and identify potential, possible, and probable threats to a country's national security [27].

1. The definition of the strategic priorities and key areas of the intelligence operations, adapted to the provisions of the National Security Strategy.

First of all, there must be a set model of real and effective assistance to decision-making processes at the national level, aligned with the National Security Strategy. Priority areas for the intelligence services (and the entire system of special services) based on a detailed analysis of the domestic political situation and international context would allow us to organize this system appropriately, ensure it has the necessary human, technical, and financial resources, and clarify the necessities for its development and improvement.

2. Creation of a national system of integrated situation assessment.

Enhancing the ability to recognize internal threats to strengthen the ability to take effective actions to predict those threats and neutralize negative phenomena and processes is a crucial area of activity. The creation of an integrated situation assessment system at the national level will make it possible to drive up the monitoring mechanisms of the Strategy implementation and to adjust its provisions in view of developments in the security area. An effective response to dynamic political, economic, social, and technological shifts is a criterion for the performance of the domestic security system in terms of detecting, identifying, and preventing threats and risk sources. It also directly impacts the fight against criminal activity, given the integration of criminal-oriented intelligence data into the situation assessment.

3. Building the ability to identify external sources of risk and security threats.

One more priority area is the external dimension of national security, which concerns the sources of the risk, threats, and opportunities originating from outside the state or with a supranational nature. In the modern interconnected and interrelated world, where many international, national, and non-state actors co-exist, the risk of the dynamic appearance, spread, and impact of security threats is exceptionally high. For this reason, public authorities must keep track of the global situation in the context of challenges and threats. Enhancing intelligence capabilities in this area is a prerequisite for effective state administration in achieving the main goals of national foreign policy and preventing and combating external threats.

This proposed system of integrated situation assessment should be based on modern technological solutions enabling to fully optimize the process of data acquisition and processing through the use of artificial intelligence-based systems that support the drafting of analytical products for decision makers.

4. The development, application, and improvement of tools, methods, and techniques in the field of information and communication technologies.

The image of the world born in the mind of a modern person is increasingly shaped by electronic media. Online media and the web affect all kinds of behaviors, including those that disrupt public order or threaten national interests. Today's media chaos and information flow can be partially managed by large-scale automated artificial intelligence-based IT systems. The deep web and dark net network segments of the net should be the subject of special focus for special services. This implies the development of systematic and organizational solutions to ensure effective intelligence activities in the informational and cyberspace.

5. Building awareness and a sense of responsibility among decision-makers.

The intelligence services serve the people, which is represented by the top state officials. For their part, such officials take their commitment not only to the careful implementation of their legal duties but also to the proper application of intelligence estimates, assessments, and other information provided by the intelligence services. Even the finest accurate intelligence information can be wasted if neglected, misused, or manipulated by decision-makers. As a result of a lack of respect, an expectation to see the situation simplistically and to apply analytical data to decisions based on straight forward conclusions, and the conformist approach of intelligence leadership to state leaders, efforts to build third-generation intelligence may be undermined. Cooperation between state authorities and intelligence services must be built on mutual respect and understanding. They must avoid imposing their personal viewpoints on each other to the detriment of the nation's safety interests. A key condition for this cooperation is the complete depoliticization of the system of governance over

intelligence services, such that national interests are recognized as superior to partisan, clan, or other interests.

Therefore, intelligence's role in foreign policy has undergone significant changes, from irregular wartime activities to a meaningful foreign policy component. Its role has become even more pronounced in the current era of globalization and information technologies. Espionage gained an effect in foreign affairs and strengthened its value in military operations, which helped it to become a priority area of activity.

In January 2019, the updated National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America was presented, in which the IC provides its assessments of current threats to the United States and proposes measures to address them [28]. Such a document first appeared in the United States in 2005, and in 2009 and 2014 respectively, the NIS has been revised and updated to reflect changes in the foreign policy context.

The NIS contains rather general provisions, and it states that only information and plans the disclosure of which could not damage the national security of the United States.

In the opening remarks, the Director of National Intelligence of the United States, Daniel Coats, emphasized that the U.S. is facing significant changes both at home and abroad, so the U.S. Intelligence Service must be prepared to cope with the challenges of the 21st century, timely identify and mitigate the threats, using new opportunities. He said that to be at the top of the game in such a complex strategic environment, many things need to be done differently today, and this requires, among other things, increased funding for the IC to improve its performance.

The NIS sets out the key tasks posed by the political leadership for the next four years to the US intelligence services, in which their activities should comply with the following basic principles:

- Facilitate the implementation of the National Security Strategy;
- Advance the national economic strength and technological superiority;
- Deliver a distinctive, timely, objective understanding of the enemy's intentions and capabilities;
- Maintain the US government's extensive knowledge of the situation in the international arena by gaining unparalleled access to protected data.

The geopolitical situation is changing rapidly, and the United States is constantly facing a complex and uncertain world in which threats are becoming even more diverse and interconnected, the document says. To meet them effectively, the IC must become more agile, innovative, and resilient. The complex, interconnected, and transnational character of these threats also requires that the IC to improve its information and outreach activities and cooperation with international partners and allies.

Traditional adversaries of the United States (which primarily include the Russian Federation) will continue to try to gain and assert their influence by taking advantage of the weakening of Western democratic ideals, the weakening of the post-WWII international order, the strengthening of isolationist tendencies in the West, and shifts in the global economy. The actions of these adversaries pose challenges within the traditional, non-traditional, hybrid, and asymmetric military, economic, and political spheres. Russia's efforts to expand its influence in some regions of the world may conflict with the priority interests of the United States [29].

The modernization of the Chinese Armed Forces and Beijing's desire for economic and territorial dominance in the Pacific region and beyond is a matter of concern for Washington. Yet, there is still a room for cooperation with Beijing on issues of mutual interest, such as North Korea's aggressive actions and its ongoing efforts to develop nuclear technology and ballistic missiles.

Despite its 2015 commitments to the peaceful nature of its nuclear program, Iran is trying to advance its own missile and military capabilities, continues to support terrorist groups, militants, and other U.S. opponents, and thus continues to threaten the U.S. interests.

Multiple U.S. opponents continue to pursue the acquisition of the technologies of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which includes biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. In addition, they are increasingly leveraging rapid advances in technology to pose new and evolving threats. Technological advances enable a wider range of actors to acquire sophisticated capabilities that were previously available only to well-resourced states.

No longer is outer space a monopoly area of the United States, which poses significant challenges for the United States. Adversaries are increasing their presence in space, planning to reach or exceed parity. Russia and China continue developing a full range of anti-satellite weapons as a means to reduce U.S. military effectiveness and overall security. Increasing commercialization of space allows private individuals to acquire spacecraft – a capability that was once limited to global powers. Many aspects of modern society, including the U.S. ability to conduct military operations rely on access to and equipment in space.

Cyber threats are challenging public confidence in global institutions, imposing numerous economic costs domestically and globally. Growing cyber capabilities of U.S. adversaries increase vulnerabilities to U.S. security, including critical infrastructure, public health and safety, economic prosperity, and stability.

Emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence, automation, and high-performance computing are advancing computational capabilities that can be economically beneficial. However, these advances also enable new and improved military and intelligence capabilities for U.S. adversaries. Advances in nano- and bio-technologies have the potential to cure diseases and modify human performance. Still, without common ethical standards and shared interests to govern these developments, they could pose significant threats to U.S. interests

and security. In addition, the development and spread of such technologies remain uneven, increasing the potential to drastically widen the divide between the countries that have it and those that don't.

Advances in communications and the democratization of other technologies have enabled the ability to create and share exponentially growing amounts of data on a larger scale and at higher speeds than ever before. This abundance of data creates significant opportunities for intelligence, including the ability to use new channels to gather intelligence and better assess it. However, the insufficient number of analysts and their level of professionalism pose challenges to the ability of the Intelligence Community to collect, process, evaluate and analyze such huge amounts of data to provide the necessary degree of timeliness to provide the customers with properly processed, objective and useful information.

Advances in communications have created certain advantages for non-state actors, opposing the United States and will continue to exponentially expand the potential to influence people and events, both inside the U.S. and globally.

The ability of individuals and groups to have a larger impact than ever before – politically, militarily, economically, and ideologically – is undermining traditional governing institutions. This empowerment of groups and individuals is increasing their influence on ethnic, religious, and other social groups, changing the nature of conflict. All of this has a negative impact on the ability of legally elected governments to satisfy the increasing demands of their populations, increasing the potential for greater instability. Some extremist groups will continue to take advantage of these sources and drivers of instability to hold seized territory, further increase the number of insurgents, plan terrorist attacks, and inspire followers to launch attacks around the world.

The migration crisis and urbanization of populations are also further straining the capacities of governments around the world. It is likely to result in fracturing of societies, and the emergence of source groups for the further radicalization. Pressure points may occur in the areas of migrant influx, refugees, and internally displaced persons fleeing conflict zones; areas of intense economic or other resource scarcity; and areas threatened by climate changes, infectious disease outbreaks, or transnational criminal organizations.

All of these issues will continue to drive global changes on the planet on an unprecedented scale, and the US IC must be able to warn the relevant authorities about the strategic implications of these changes and be prepared to radically change the professional tasks facing the intelligence services in an increasingly unstable environment.

It is likely that significant intelligence support for domestic security may be required, due to terrorist threats, drug trafficking, the emergence of human trafficking networks, and threats to federal critical infrastructure. Intelligence support to counter these threats should be conducted under the control of the

senior leadership of the IC, with appropriate levels of transparency, protection for civil liberties, and preservation of American rights to privacy.

General guidelines for the Intelligence Agency of Ukraine are defined by the National Security Strategy of Ukraine, approved by the Decree of the President of Ukraine of September 14, 2020, No. 392/2020 [30]. It states, in particular, that "Ukraine will create an effective intelligence community, strengthening its role in the implementation of state policy in the areas of national security and defense, will strengthen the system of coordination and control of the intelligence agencies, and will develop its intelligence capabilities."

The Conceptual Framework for the Security and Defense Sector Development of Ukraine, approved by Presidential Decree No. 92/2016 on March 4, 2016, states: "Further development of Ukraine's intelligence agencies takes place through the implementation of the measures provided for by the national intelligence program and will be aimed at [31]:

- Focusing intelligence agencies' efforts on priority areas of national security;
- Removing the decentralization, overlap of functions and tasks in the activities of Ukraine's intelligence agencies;
- The strengthening of cooperation between the intelligence agencies and the coordination of their activities, in particular, by transforming the Joint Committee on Intelligence Activities under the auspices of the President of Ukraine into a coordinating body in charge of intelligence activities under the President of Ukraine with the establishment of the corresponding legal framework for the coordination body;
- The integrated application of the capabilities of intelligence agencies to address the priority tasks;
- The combination of specific advanced capabilities and technologies within the Intelligence Community of Ukraine;
- The engagement of consumers of intelligence information and other actors in the National Security and Defense sector in intelligence activities;
- The improvement of the state funding of the intelligence agencies of Ukraine;
- The strengthening of cooperation between Ukrainian intelligence agencies and partner intelligence agencies, mainly from NATO member states, building relations on the basis of mutual trust;
- The implementation of advanced democratic civilian control mechanisms over the activities of the Ukrainian Intelligence Agencies.

Conclusion to Chapter 1

The modern global crisis triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic has sharpened underlying tensions and escalated existing global threats to a new level,

prompting countries to reassess their national priorities in the international and national dimensions.

The theoretical comprehension and classification of the existing conceptual definitions of the transformation of the role of the state as a traditional actor in international relations provide sufficient grounds to say that the role of non-traditional actors, primarily TNCs, is increasing and the institution of the state itself is changing in the modern system of international relations.

Intelligence is an essential tool of a state's foreign policy. And in politics, as former British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston said, and later repeated by Winston Churchill, "there are no lasting friends or enemies, only lasting interests."

In the face of global political turbulence, the clash between the geopolitical interests of global powers and influential international organizations, the emergence of terrorist risks and armed conflicts, renewed challenges and risks for particular countries and regions, the role of the Intelligence Agencies in national and collective security is significantly increasing.

In this complex geopolitical environment, the implementation of an effective foreign policy, prosperous economic activity, capacity building of the armed forces, security sector agencies, etc., are impossible without the proper work of intelligence services.

CHAPTER 2

INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE IN TRANSFORMING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE CONTEXT OF MODERN HYBRID MILITARY-POLITICAL CONFLICTS

In the current context of changes in the nature of existing threats to national security, hybrid methods of armed conflicts, and the use of the latest technologies to influence the socio-political situation in states, the activities of the IA also warrant significant changes. Therefore, in order to solve this problem, it is necessary to form scientifically substantiated perspectives on IAs and study them as complex organizational systems using a system approach.

2.1. Intelligence Agencies as Complex Organizational Systems

Humanity lives in a world of systems, which are a set of interconnected elements designed to achieve specific goals. Systems exert a certain influence on the environment by changing the properties of entities that interact with them, and also experience the effects of the environment by changing the properties of the system elements [32]. Fundamentally, the description of any system is created by three slices:

- structural (elements, connections between them and their partners);
- functional (system operation and development);
- cybernetic (regulation of system behaviour).

In general terms, a system is divided into structure and function. Structure is the relationship that characterizes the construction of a system. Functioning is the operation of a system (subsystem, element).

Among all systems, the systems whose controlled object is people (collectives of people) are of particular interest. Such systems are called organizational management systems, or organizational systems. Controlling actions in them are aimed at organizing (coordinating) the behaviour of groups of people, i.e. they are informational. All of this fully applies to IAs, which certainly belong to complex organizational systems [33].

Hereinafter, the IA will be considered as an open organizational system that operates within the framework of the situational approach and is characterized by the following basic properties: uniqueness, non-stationarity, adaptability to external conditions, unpredictability of behaviour in specific conditions, ability to set goals and achieve them.

IAs collect and obtain intelligence information, summarize, analyse and

implement it in order to protect the national interests of the country. According to the Law of Ukraine "On Intelligence Agencies of Ukraine", an "intelligence agency" is defined as a body expressly authorized by law to carry out intelligence activities, which can function as an independent state body or as part of a central executive body.

The basis of any organization, including the IA, is comprised of people united in groups created to achieve a certain goal. Therefore, an IA as an organization is an intentional association of people characterized by the principles of systematicity, reasonable organization, and structure, and which aims to achieve certain goals to ensure the fulfilment of national and defense-related tasks. To achieve the goal, people in these organizations work together and their activities are managed in a certain way. The coordinated interaction of activities involves the creation of a formal organization, the definition of its structure, hierarchy and the order of functioning of its parts (structural units). The structural model of the IA as a hierarchical system is shown in Fig. 2.1.




Figure 2.1 – IA Hierarchy Structural Model

As a complex organizational system, IAs have professional and functional differentiation, which is expressed in the division into combat units of operational, logistical, and combat support, as well as a command-and-control apparatus with a certain functional structure. The functional model of the IA as a complex organizational system is shown in Fig. 2.2.

The unified IA system includes hierarchical, functional, and cybernetic subsystems. Based on the laws and principles of organization and development, general features, and characteristic properties of organizational systems, an IA is a set of functioning elements and links between them aimed at changing the forms and properties of incoming information and resources and producing certain types of information products (analytics, recommendations, scenario analysis, etc.), and belongs to the class of complex organizational systems [9].




Figure 2.2 – IA Functional Model

These systems are characterized by information and technological, organizational and functional unity, as well as administrative separation. Informational and technological unity means close interconnection and interdependence of all components of the IA's units, which are defined by the common processing of the received input data, use of tools and technologies for their transformation into results. Technological interconnection is complemented by auxiliary and support units.

Organizational and functional unity is characterized by the presence of:

- Single management bodies, single team;
- Administrative separation;
- Interconnection of the action plan with the forces and means that ensure its implementation; organization of these activities on the basis of administrative separation.

The closed system of organizational and administrative relations and connections of IAs ensures their relative organizational and administrative

isolation. The following characteristic properties of IAs as complex organizational systems can be identified:

1. Integrity: all parts of the system are subordinated to the overall goal of its functioning and contribute to the formation of the highest performance indicators for the selected criterion (set of criteria) of efficiency. Therefore, the system should be considered as an integral entity.

2. Multiparametric characteristics of the system's existence: a change in one parameter usually significantly affects the values of many other system parameters.

3. Emergent property: complex systems have properties that are not inherent in any of their individual elements. With the development of a complex system, the interconnectedness of its elements increases, and eventually emergence reaches a level where the properties of the system cannot only be described by the properties of individual elements, but can also be revealed by generalizing the properties of individual elements.

The scientific apparatus that describes the construction and functioning of organizations is the systems theory. One of the branches of cybernetics, systems science, deals with systems theory [34].

The basis of modern scientific research of IAs should be a systematic approach, which consists in applying a set of methodological principles and theoretical provisions that allow to consider each element of the system in its connection and interaction with other elements; to trace changes that occur in the system as a result of changes in its individual links; to study specific systemic (emergent) properties; to draw reasonable conclusions about the patterns of system development; to determine the optimal mode of its functioning, etc. [35, 36].

The system approach allows for a comprehensive assessment of any functional activity and management system activity at the level of specific characteristics, which helps to analyze a particular situation within a particular system, identify the nature of input, process and output problems [37]. The application of the systematic approach allows to organize the decision-making process at all levels in the management system in the best way.

When studying complex systems, including organizational ones, it is important to establish general connections between individual elements, i.e. to imagine the overall "picture" rather than dispersing attention over details [38].

In terms of organizational and management processes, a systematic approach means:

- Studying the state of the socio-political situation and interrelated objective factors that determine the nature and basis of planning;
- Determining the purpose of the development of this system from the standpoint of a more general system, of which the studied one is a part, in order to correctly formulate the criterion of planning optimality;

- Structural analysis of systems, which reveals the nature of the relationships and purpose of each subsystem (structural unit);
- Study of management features and feedback mechanism for the best implementation of tasks;
- Determining the nature and degree of influence on the system of the conditions of its operation (environment) to increase the reliability of achieving the planned results;
- Study of decision-making processes in each block of the system, considering the interaction of the latter with other subsystems and its place in the system as a whole.

A system approach is, first and foremost, the realization that any organization is a system made up of parts, each of which has its own goals and objectives.

The overall goal of an organization can be achieved only if it is viewed as an integral system, trying to understand and evaluate the interaction of all parts of this system and combine them on a basis that would allow the organization to effectively fulfil its tasks.

The essence of the system approach to the management of IAs lies in the following: first, to achieve the overall efficiency of each IA and to prevent the interests of individual units from becoming an obstacle to overall success; second, to achieve this in an organizational structure whose units always have conflicting goals. Therefore, in a system approach, the definition of the common goal of each IA and the setting of tasks should take into account these conflicting interests to achieve the overall efficiency of the entire IA.

Thus, modern threats to national security, existing hybrid methods of warfare, and the latest technologies of influence on the socio-political situation in the countries require transformation of the activities of the IAs, which is a rather difficult task. Therefore, in order to successfully accomplish this task, scientifically based perspectives on IAs as complex organizational systems have been formulated and a functional model of IA has been developed. Also, taking into account the peculiarities of IAs and the tasks assigned to them, it is proposed to use a system approach as a methodological basis for their research.

2.2. Management System of the Intelligence Agency and Its Models

In the current conditions of hybrid warfare, socio-political situation, active transformation of the system of international relations, new threats to national security, the content of organizational, managerial, socio-political relations in the system of state and military administration, as well as in the administration at the level of individual state bodies, is undergoing significant changes. Therefore, the tasks of building and improving the IA management systems, changing the

psychology of leaders, their behavioural style, reassessing their role and place in the management process are quite pertinent.

The concepts of building and improving the system of command and control of troops and weapons, military equipment, especially the automation of management processes in the AFU are the subject of works by such authors as S. Hatsenko, V. Korolenko, V. Syniavskiy, S. Vereshchahin, A. Tureichuk, O. Ustymenko, and others. [39-42]. At the same time, the issues of building and improving the IA management systems remain under-researched, which includes the methodological aspects of these processes.

Each unit and each position in the IA is created to perform a particular set of management functions or actions, is endowed with certain rights to manage resources and is responsible for the performance of the functions assigned to the unit. The organizational structure of the IA regulates: the distribution of tasks by units, their professionalism and competence in solving tasks and general interaction. Within the organizational structure of the IA, the entire management process takes place, and therefore the movement of information flows, in which managers of all levels participate [43].

Management is a purposeful and constant process of influence of the management agent on the subject of management, aimed at changing the states of subjects and/or agents (including oneself) according to a pre-designed action plan [44]. It is the bringing of an objective process to a subjectively chosen goal. Any management is necessarily based on expediency.

A management function is a special type of management activity, specific forms of managerial influence on the organization's activities, which determine and define the content of service relationships.

As for the quantitative composition of management functions, there is no consensus among scholars. Defining the concept of "management", the French mining engineer A. Fayol [45], the founder of the administrative (classical) school of management, identified five main functions (planning, organizing, commanding, coordinating, and controlling), S. O'Donnell [46] listed six (planning, organizing, directing, leading, staffing, and controlling), V. Zhuravel [47] defined ten (goal setting, organizing, coordinating, making managerial decisions, planning, regulating, controlling, staffing, leading, and administering), M. Mescon [48] – four (planning, organizing, motivating, and controlling) and decision-making as a cross-cutting interrelated function. The latter seems to be the most optimal, since the concept of organization is quite broad and inclusive, and therefore covers the functions that some authors distinguish.

Planning. This function determines the goals of the organization, the means and the most effective methods for achieving these goals. An important element of this function is forecasts of possible directions of development and strategic plans. At this stage, the organization must determine what real results it can achieve, assess its strengths and weaknesses, as well as the state of the external environment.

Organizing. This management function forms the structure of the organization and provides it with everything it needs. At this stage, conditions are created for achieving the organization's goals. The skilled organization of employees' work allows achieving more effective results.

Motivating is the process of motivating other people to work to achieve the organization's goals. In performing this function, the manager provides material and moral incentives to employees and creates the most favorable conditions for the manifestation of their abilities and professional growth. If properly motivated, an organization's staff performs its duties in accordance with the organization's goals and plans. The process of motivation involves creating opportunities for employees to meet their needs, provided they perform their duties properly. Before motivating staff to work more effectively, a manager must find out the real needs of his or her employees.

Controlling. This management function involves evaluating and analyzing the effectiveness of the organization's performance. By controlling, the organization assesses the level of achievement of its goals and makes necessary adjustments to the planned actions. Controlling involves setting standards, measuring the results achieved, comparing these results with the planned ones, and revising the original goals if necessary. Controlling combines all management functions together and allows maintaining the desired direction of the organization's activities and correcting wrong decisions in a timely manner.

Management as a process of influence of the subject on the object of management is unthinkable without a management system, which is usually understood as a mechanism that ensures the management process, i.e. a set of interdependent elements that function in a coordinated and purposeful manner. The elements involved in the management process are combined into a system through information links, and more specifically, on the principle of feedback (Fig. 2.3).

Feedback is any transfer of influence from the output of a system to its input. In management systems, feedback can be defined as an information link through which the managing part receives information about the consequences of managing the subject, i.e. information about the new state of the subject that has arisen under the influence of management actions.




Figure 2.3 – Feedback

When building and improving IA management systems, it is necessary to account for the basic laws of cybernetics [49].

Law of Requisite Variety. It justifies the need for multivariate planning and development of optimal solutions. Management based on consideration of only one plan option cannot be recognized as scientifically sound.

Law of Emergence. This law implies that a system has integral properties that are not inherent in its constituent elements. When synthesizing management systems, it is generally accepted that general (emergent) interests are concentrated in the center of the system, in the central body, at the top of the hierarchy, and individual, inherent (immanent) interests are localized in the respective elements of the system.

Law of External Supplementation. In complex systems, forecasting the state of the environment and developing management actions using formal methods can only be done approximately. As a result, it is always necessary to meaningfully monitor the operation of the formalized control scheme and adjust it by making additional informal decisions. We call the set of informal procedures for adjusting the formally obtained management influences and setting various parameters an external complement, and the theoretical need for such informal compensation is called the law of external supplementation.

Law of Feedback. It requires building a system using closed loops.

Law of Anti-Entropy. Its essence is that system management is always aimed at reducing uncertainty in knowledge about the structure and behavior of the managed system by enhancing information support for decision-making.

In any management process, there is both a subject to be managed and a management body. In the process of management, this body receives certain information about the state of the external environment where the subject is located. All this information is perceived by the managing body, which develops management information on its basis (makes decisions). Based on the decision, a certain executive body (management apparatus) exerts management influence on the managed object. We note three components (together with information links) that form a management system [50].

A management system is a systematized set of means of influencing a managed subject to achieve a certain goal.

A management entity is a structurally defined association of people and managers at the personal level who carry out management activities and have the authority to do so.

A management subject is an individual or a group of people who are targeted by organized, systematic, planned actions of the management entity.

Management is always carried out with a certain goal, which is always specific to a given management subject and is related to the state of the subject and the environment in which it is located. The degree of achievement of the management goal is determined by the management objective function. Thus, the IA management system can be represented as a set of two parts (subsystems): managed and managing. The functional model of the IA management system is shown in Fig. 2.4.




Figure 2.4 – Functional Model of the IA Management System

The analysis of the functional model of the IA management system shows that to achieve optimal management, it is not enough to have a target management function and the constraints set for it [51]. Information about the state of the management subject and the external environment and the set of possible states of the management system elements is also required. The most complex element in the figure is the managing body, as it has to process large amounts of information coming to it in a timely manner. Without information, there is no management. Moreover, management is a continuous process of information processing: based on one piece of information, another is produced, which, in turn, becomes the input for obtaining new information, and so on.

Therefore, from the cybernetic point of view, the IA management system is a set of all elements, subsystems and communications between them, as well as processes that ensure the specified functioning of the IA and consists of four subsystems: methodology, structure, process, and management equipment (Fig. 2.5).

The management methodology includes goals and objectives, principles, laws and patterns, functions, and methods of management.

The management process is a system of communications, management technology (development and implementation of management decisions), and information support.

The management structure includes functional and organizational structure, organizational relations scheme, specific schemes of interaction between the senior management bodies, and staffing structure.

Management equipment includes computer and organizational equipment, communication networks, internal and external communication links, the Internet, and document management.




Figure 2.5 – Elements of the IA Management System

In turn, the methodology and process of management shape management activities, and the management structure and equipment shape the management mechanism. The state of the elements of the organization's management system directly affects the efficiency of its functioning as a whole. The main task of the management system is the development of PMA, which can be considered both a process and a phenomenon.

As a process, PMA is a set of actions (performing functions, using methods, etc.) that lead to the emergence and improvement of relationships between parts of the whole.

As a phenomenon, PMA is a combination of elements (goal, program, means, etc.) to achieve the organization's mission based on certain rules and procedures. Legalized or generally accepted rules and procedures develop into standards.

In management theory, PMA is seen as a combination of the science and art of management, where science is pragmatism and art is creativity (Figure 2.6).




Figure 2.6 – Components of the Professional Management Activity

As a result of the advantage of art of management in PMA, a number of publications call it a special or specific type of work. In management theory, it is difficult to find a line separating science from art. A standard for a particular process or phenomenon in PMA may become such an indicator.

At the same time, the general public does not embrace a firm system of standardization in the activities of a social system, although the formalization of many processes and phenomena in the organization's management system will continue, as it is an inevitable process of scientific development. A good example of the above is the cybernetic model of the management system shown in Fig. 2.7.




Figure 2.7 – Management System Cybernetic Model

This model is a formalization of the relationship between the managing entity, the management subject, the management object, and the relationship with the external environment.

The input to the cybernetic model is represented as a vector of input variables $x(t)$ for each time period $x(t)=[x_1(t), x_2(t), \dots, x_n(t)]$ and is characterized by the set of all resources used in the subject [20].

The output parameters (types of products) are described by the vector $y(t): y(t)=[y_1(t), y_2(t), \dots, y_n(t)]$.

The parameters of management influences are described by the vector $z(t)$ (orders, instructions, standards, norms, and regulations): $z(t)=[z_1(t), z_2(t), \dots, z_k(t)]$, which describe the process conditions and can have stabilizing and destabilizing effects.

The management system processes a lot of incoming information from the external and internal environment, sorts it, selects the relevant information, analyzes it and uses it as input data for making decisions and actions necessary for the effective work of structural units and individual employees to develop and achieve the goals of the organization as a single system.

Important concepts that characterize the management system are the following connections, the quality of which cannot be indifferent to the system and, most importantly, to the results of the organization's activities as a whole.

Even a cursory glance at the above model shows how vulnerable the management system is to unforeseen situations and the possibility of inappropriate actions depending on the state and conditions of any component of this system and its environment.

Therefore, the IA management system is the principles and mechanisms of decision-making, information flow, planning, as well as motivation and incentive systems, a form of real implementation of management relationships based on three main components: information support for the processes of developing and implementing decisions; a set of standard procedures for solving tasks; and a system of employee engagement.

The main purpose of the IA management system is to develop and implement management decisions to shape the required behavior of the management subject under various environmental influences and to achieve the goals set to protect the national interests of the country. In order to achieve this goal, the forms, methods, system, and style of management of the IA should change significantly depending on the goals, strategy, resources, and objective external conditions.

Thus, the current socio-political situation and new threats to national security require significant changes both in the system of military management as

a whole and in the management systems of individual structural units of the AFU, including IAs. Therefore, to solve this problem, the author proposes a scientifically based approach to building and improving the IA management system as an open organizational system operating within the framework of a situational approach. The author also presents the functional and cybernetic models of the IA management system.

2.3. The Place and Role of Special Forces of Intelligence Agencies in Modern Realities

Based on the analysis of academic and reference literature, recent studies of military conflicts in different regions of the world, it has been determined that the beginning of the twenty-first century is characterized by the developed countries' desire for new forms and ways of achieving national interests and policies, which can be accomplished through special forces of national and departmental special services.

Changes in the nature of threats, which began to be recognized in recent decades, methods of armed conflict and unconventional means of influence allow analysts to focus on a new form of use of special forces intended for special measures. One of today's most active concepts is the assessment of special operations in the context of possible forms of use of special units of national and departmental special services.

Special operations are now widely used in warfare and in solving a range of tasks on behalf of the highest military and political leadership of countries in the absence of a formal declaration of war. There are events happening in this or that country that, on the one hand, cannot happen, but on the other hand, do happen. Dictators disappear, otherwise healthy people suffer a sharp health decline, airplanes carrying the country's leadership crash, allied countries suddenly begin to conflict with each other, refugees turn out to be agents, arsenals with weapons and ammunition explode, and border populations demand more rights, separatism grows in a matter of days, extremist organizations gain momentum with unofficial financial support, illegal armed groups appear, terrorists withdraw their demands, and uprisings and revolutions spontaneously arise. Who carries out all these coordinated activities that cannot occur on their own? Certain aspects of these cases have not been sufficiently researched and disclosed. In particular, the place and role of the special unit of the IA of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine in the implementation of special measures in special operations has not been disclosed.

Many studies have been conducted that examine the theoretical and applied aspects of the active use of special forces in conflict regions worldwide. The growing threats from terrorist, criminal and guerrilla groups, the development of weapons and military equipment, and changes in the geopolitical situation in

the world have led to the expansion of their place and role and the transformation of their tasks.

The main form of application and peculiarities of special purpose units of national and departmental special services of any state are special events called special operations.

Today, few people fully understand what special operations are. Their role and importance were best characterized by American President John F. Kennedy in 1961: "This is another type of warfare, new in its intensity, ancient in its origins, war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration instead of aggression" [52].

Since the 1960s, there has been a fashion for various special forces in the armed forces of countries around the world: paratroopers, marines, saboteurs, rangers, scouts, etc. In some countries, the creation and development of special forces was constructive and motivated.

According to NATO standards, the term "special warfare" refers to a set of planned combat actions of the units and subunits of the Special Forces to support the policy of the bloc countries: direct force, special intelligence, use of special weapons and tactics, psychological operations, anti-terrorist operations, humanitarian assistance, search and rescue operations behind enemy lines, etc. [53].

In the legislative framework of our country, in particular, the Law of Ukraine "On Defence", a "special operation" is interpreted as a set of special actions of the Special Forces units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, coordinated and interconnected by purpose, tasks, place, and time, aimed at creating conditions for achieving strategic (operational) goals, which are conducted according to a single plan independently or in cooperation with military units, other units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, other military forces, law enforcement agencies of Ukraine, and other components of the defence forces for the purpose of fulfilling the objectives [54].

A comprehensive analysis of the emergence of the concept of special operations and actions in the Russian Federation in military theory and practice has made it possible to understand that this is a set of measures that are coordinated in terms of goals, tasks, place, and time of special actions of troops (forces); are carried out according to a single concept and plan to achieve certain goals and measures; are conducted by designated, organized, trained and equipped forces, manned by carefully selected personnel, using special methods and techniques of warfare that are not typical for conventional forces (reconnaissance and sabotage, subversive, counterterrorism, counter-sabotage, counter-intelligence, guerrilla and anti-guerrilla, etc.) [55].

NATO's current classification of special operations makes it possible to distinguish between three main types of such operations: direct action (DA), special surveillance and reconnaissance (SR), and military assistance (MA) [56]. However, this classification is not fully disclosed. There are unconventional (non-

standard) tasks that have particular significance and level of physical and political risk. It is these atypical tasks that fall to the special purpose units of the special services, performed undercover and bearing the peculiar name of HUMINT (covert actions/operations) [57, 58].

In his writings, O. Vorona refers to Executive Order 12333 of 1984 by US President Donald Reagan, entitled "United States Intelligence Activities", where the term "special activities" refers to a set of covert actions, both political and military, from which the US government can plausibly dissociate itself and which are implemented in the form of national intelligence operations [59].

The above gives reason to consider that special operations are a common feature of any country. It is quite obvious that in the context of the escalating global situation and given the rapid implementation of special operations, the Ukrainian MOD's IAs have their own special forces units [60]. According to the Law of Ukraine "On Intelligence Agencies of Ukraine" the Ukrainian MOD's IA carries out intelligence activities in the military, military-political, military-technical, military-economic, informational, and environmental domains. To perform atypical (non-standard) tasks, the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine has its own special purpose units. These units have the most motivated, competent, physically and professionally developed professionals with special training to perform unconventional special actions in unfamiliar, hostile environments or politically unstable situations in order to provide intelligence information to the state authorities defined by law, to facilitate the pursuit and protection of national interests, and to counter external threats to Ukraine's national security outside Ukraine.

In this case, the next questions arise: what tasks are assigned to similar special units of special services in other countries and what knowledge, skills, and abilities must such specialists have. If we analyze the structure of various national security systems of most developed countries, we can conclude that such a unit performs "delicate" tasks, which, in turn, depend on the individual and general training of the unit, as well as the current situation. Such units do not have a proper name and operate covertly.

Based on the US experience, covert operations consist of both political and military actions. As evidenced by the analysis of the experience of special actions of developed countries, political actions have a more prominent emphasis and a clear separation from military ones. An important issue when summarizing all options for special actions is that they can be grouped into two categories according to the method of influence: soft (informational and psychological) and hard (physical) influence [61]. It is the small number of personnel with unique capabilities and dedication that can be involved in such covert operations.

There is no exact description of the tasks assigned to such distinctive and small units. Even when it exists, it is a general statement without any specifics. Fiction and media contain enough information about the unorthodox nature of such missions (e.g., sabotage, subversion, physical influence on officials,

participation in the fight against terrorism, illegal migration, etc.) [62] They can operate both plainclothes and uniformed in any part of the world. One of the arguments for this is that most of the emblems depict the globe, which is proof that a small unit can operate around the world. Such a unit is an effective tool and performs the very "delicate" operations that require unconventional operational skills, suddenness, meticulousness, secrecy, and the absence of signs of national affiliation.

It should be emphasized that such units are not an "attribute" of developed countries. Today, most countries cannot afford to have large armies and provide them with modern weapons and equipment. Therefore, small, mobile, and well-equipped special forces are preferred, allowing countries to offset their military potential.

Real operations involving such special services units are, of course, not reported in the media, and if they are, it is a confirmation of mission failure or an attempt by the other side to exert informational influence on the world. Therefore, such operations of such intelligence units will be covert, cautious, and low-profile. When studying the specific nature of covert special operations and the search for accurate information, it can be noted that there are few works by domestic and foreign analytical companies that have the ability to conduct an independent investigation.

The analysis of research results, as well as the dramatic evolution of the military-political situation in the international arena, make it possible to identify key points that characterize the same tasks. The key point will be the implementation of special measures aimed at supporting the national interests and state policy of the state, obtaining intelligence information, ensuring the safe functioning of state institutions, security of citizens, participation in the fight against terrorism, international crime, drug trafficking, illegal trade in weapons and their production technology, illegal migration, taking measures to counter external threats, and more.

Thus, in the current conditions of the aggressor's and other international actors' actions against Ukraine, the depletion of its financial resources, threats to energy security, information security, cybersecurity, information resources security, critical infrastructure security, and environmental security will be the very tasks that will be assigned to special forces by the top leadership. Of course, the priority in these areas will be to repel armed aggression in the context of providing intelligence information to the state authorities and military command and control bodies established by law. Other questions arise: who can join such a special unit and what competencies should a specialist of this unit have?

Joining a special unit like this is difficult. The candidate selection process is focused on the professional qualities of the potential applicant, and the special services themselves select the specialists they need. Usually, candidates for such a unit are chosen from among the members of the Special Operations Forces, airborne assault units, or marines. As an exception, such units can be recruited

from the regular armed forces or after graduating from specialized educational institutions.

First of all, the specialists of this special unit must be citizens of the country and have the usual constitutional features (build, parametric data, type of appearance), and must be without any unusual features. Developed physical skills are welcome, but it is more important to be enduring and agile. To perform particular operations, the specialists of this unit have several related military occupations (e.g., sniper, radio operator, sapper, chemist, paramedic, driver, engineer, analyst, programmer, IT specialist, etc.).

The moral and psychological condition is equally important. A specialist in this unit must be creative, motivated, emotionally balanced and mature, sociable, disciplined, not prone to anxiety, able to remain calm in extreme situations, have control of his/her mind and be reasonable, have a critical attitude to any information, be able to take risks and be able to respond to threats quickly, be able to correctly and appropriately assess the situation, and be able to perform tasks under any conditions. The specialists must have nerves of steel and possess specific psychological qualities, i.e. they must be comfortable with confined spaces, different heights, depths, and fire. The specialists must be able to perform tasks under great strain and stress. It is imperative that the specialists of this special unit have a variety of skydiving experience and specialized diving training.

Equally important is the specialist's ability to work in a team and individually, and to have leadership skills. Good visual memory, high intelligence, optimism, a desire for self-improvement, and a proactive mindset are also required of specialists in this department.

As a rule, all specialists undergo intensive and specialized training (fire, topographic, medical, communication, mountain, tactical, demolition, tactical and special training, extreme driving skills (light and heavy armored vehicles) and other special training modalities), which is constantly improved throughout their service. Servicemen of such special units know how to act in the field, in the city, in the forest, how to survive and exercise self-control in extreme conditions. Firearms training includes firing from various types of light small arms of domestic and foreign production, as well as the use of heavy weapons. Specialists also have the skills to fire from various static positions, as well as while moving, practice various tactical techniques used during influence activities, as well as tactics of security measures in high-risk conditions. Often, such specialists are involved in the protection of high-ranking officials who are privy to information constituting a state secret.

In addition to their physical characteristics and strong character, specialists of such special units know at least two languages (in addition to their native language). Due to the fact that covert (delicate) operations are carried out undercover, most specialists undergo an agent training course, since they may be temporarily put in charge of agents during agent intelligence operations.

Theorists distinguish such a phenomenon as "agent special forces" or "intelligent special forces", which, for all intents and purposes, possesses a significant set of qualities of specialists of special forces of special services. This is a kind of hybrid - a blend of a special forces officer and an intelligence operative. The visualization of this term is shown in Fig. 2.8.



Figure 2.8 – Visualization of the Term "Special Forces Agent"

In his work, Спеціальні заходи впливу (Special Measures of Influence), O. Vorona compares them to famous literary characters: an agent special forces officer is James Bond, who worked as an operative in MI6 (SIS) in the UK, and a Special Operations Forces officer is John Rambo, who served in the US Army Special Forces.

For a vivid example of the term "intelligent special forces", we can cite the data of the international publications Bellingcat and TheInsider on the poisoning of the former Russian military intelligence officer S. Skripal and his daughter. The operation of special measures (physical influence) was carried out by a group of six people, where the key role was played by two officers of the GRU special unit of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces O. Petrov (Medical Service Colonel O. Mishkin) and R. Boshirov (GRU Colonel A. Chepiga), who carried out the poisoning (the physical element of the influence operation). This group of employees was responsible not only for poisoning the target, but also for organizing the operation, setting up the operation area, including the transportation of a false perfume bottle with the Nina Ricci Paris label with a specialized container with the Novichok poisonous substance (Fig. 2.9).

There is also information that O. Petrov (O. Mishkin) and R. Boshirov (A. Chepiga) participated in the seizure of the Belbek airfield during the annexation

of Crimea and were spotted in Donbas, where they were involved in the seizure of government institutions [63].



Figure 2.9 – Specialized Container for Novichok Toxic Substance

Another possible example of this phenomenon is the creation of the Liga PMC (old name Wagner) under the leadership of A. Troshev, personal number M-2315 (unit commander D. Utkin, personal number M-0209, officer of the GRU of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces). This particular PMC took part in the annexation of Crimea, shot down an IL-76 with Ukrainian paratroopers during the assault on Luhansk airport in eastern Ukraine, and took an active part in the war in Syria [64].

The third example is the covert actions of the Israeli special forces on October 26, 1995, in Malta (Sliema). Special measures were taken to assassinate the leader of the Islamic Jihad organization, Fathi Shaqaqi, in his apartment. To establish the Mista'arvim special unit ("Arabized") to carry out covert operations in the areas of mass residence of Arabs, special forces with Arabic appearance and Arabic dialect were used.

After analyzing the term "agent special forces" and examples of special operations of special services, we can understand that "agent special forces" is not a theory, but real people acting in the interests of their country. Most analysts conclude that specialists of special units of special services are a completely different category of people who are responsible for conducting special operations (covert actions). They are the ones who can be involved in sabotage, sow chaos, and instigate resistance movements.

Various and specific methods and means are used to fulfill the tasks assigned to the IA of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine to obtain intelligence, ensure the security of intelligence activities, and protect its forces, means, and sources of intelligence. Further intensification of work on improving the forms and methods of unconventional warfare depends on the aspect of planning and conducting special operations by special forces. The views of foreign experts on

the possibility of conducting special operations by special forces units of special services and personal experience make it possible to conclude that current development trends require a rethinking of the place and role of special forces units within all security agencies.

2.4. Organizational Weapons as an Element of Hybrid Warfare

The history of the development of various types of weapons to destroy the enemy is as long as the history of mankind. From neutron weapons of the 70s (the "clean" bomb) to modern definitions of warfare methods that have become more prominent since the beginning of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation (RF) against Ukraine, such as undeclared, psychological and informational, unconventional, network-centric, hybrid warfare. This diversity is caused by the actualization of various aspects of this phenomenon.

In recent years, this paradigm has been supplemented by another definition of modern warfare - organizational, and thus emerged a new term, "organizational weapons."

"Everything that Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Gerasimov came up with in 2010-2011 is outdated. There have been some major changes. The Russian Federation has other 'luminaries', as they believe. Surkov has recently come up with the so-called 'organizational weapon', which is a whole range of means in the energy, information, and other fields to do everything to undermine and destabilize the internal situation in Ukraine," said Academician of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine Volodymyr Horbulin during the presentation of the collective monograph "The World Hybrid War: Ukrainian Forefront" [65].

The tools of Russia's hybrid aggression include a set of "traditional" means of influence - political and diplomatic pressure (including the active use of international institutions), economic measures, and the active use of "energy weapons" (an effective lever of influence, especially in the post-Soviet space). At the same time, the Russian leadership makes active and extensive use of methods and measures from the arsenal of special services. First of all, these include operations to form a pro-Russian lobby through corruption schemes, bribery, and blackmail. This also includes various types of assistance (primarily financial) to pro-Russian political forces.

In recent years, there have been a number of studies by domestic and foreign experts that examine certain aspects of organizational warfare and the use of organizational weapons, among others [66-73].

However, despite the availability of a certain number of research papers on this issue, it should be noted that there is a need for a systematic analysis of the concept of organizational weapons as an element of hybrid warfare, as well as

a study of the peculiarities of the use of these weapons in the context of the Russian Federation's hybrid war against Ukraine [74].

One of the first authors to use the term "organizational weapon" was Philip Selznick in his book "The Organizational Weapon: A Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics" published in 1952 [75]. He writes, in particular, that "organizational weapons exploit a source of power that is latent in every group enterprise. This is the capacity of almost any routine activity to be manipulated for personal or political advantage."

Thus, manipulation is the key word, and thus the key element of OW.

The modern theoretical framework of OW began to take shape in the 20th century, based on works in tectology, the field of study of organization and self-organization that aims to systematize organizational experience. The idea of applying OW arose on the basis of Anglo-Saxon political mythology - the idea of the "other", a less bloody way of transforming society, as a reaction to the revolutionary upheavals of the early 20th century, and the emergence of nuclear weapons, which posed a real threat of total annihilation.

It originated in 1967, when F. Emery, then director of the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations [67], while developing the idea of the diversity of forms of organizational weapons, noted that the "synergy" of the "teenage swarm" at rock concerts could be effectively used to destroy nation-states by the end of the 1990s.

In the archives of the Human Relations journal published by the Tavistock Institute, there is a report by F. Emery "The Next Thirty Years: Concepts, Methods and Anticipations" in which the potential of "angry youth" is seen as a weapon of psychological defeat — the "rebellious hysteric".

According to the researchers, the first test of OW took place in France, where in 1958 the regime of personal power of General Charles de Gaulle was established. Having received extraordinary powers as Prime Minister and later President, he carried out reforms of the state system that became the basis of the Fifth Republic. The President-General also achieved considerable success in the economic sphere. During his rule, French industry grew rapidly, and the franc, the national currency, strengthened significantly. But the most notorious were de Gaulle's foreign policy steps, as he dreamed of France's dominant role in the new Europe. In February 1966, the president announced the country's withdrawal from the NATO military organization.

The global oligarchy took an extremely negative view of the reforms and launched an organizational war against Charles de Gaulle with student protests. Their demands were chaotic: from higher education reform to social revolution. On May 1, 1968, more than 100,000 people took to the streets of Paris under peculiar slogans: "It is forbidden to forbid!", "Be realistic - demand the impossible!", "Everything - and immediately!", "Forget everything you have been taught - start dreaming!".

Many people not of student age were scurrying between the groups of young rioters, giving advice on building barricades and tactics for fighting the police. The excitement of the youth was growing increasingly aggressive. Dozens of barricades were erected in the Latin Quarter, Molotov cocktails were exploding, and shots were fired. The rioters seized not only the Sorbonne but also the Odeon Theater, which became the headquarters of the so-called Revolutionary Action Committee.

By the way, the "yellow vests" protests in 2018-2019 in France were very similar to the events mentioned above.

The term "organizational weapon" gained considerable development in the 1980s in the works of Soviet scholars, developers of military organizational management systems S. Nikanorov and S. Solntsev. They called organizational weapons false-target programming, which reflects their deep essence: the aggressor country creates and sets false program settings in its relations with the victim country in advance, the implementation of which strengthens its position and weakens the enemy. The victim country does not consider these actions dangerous, they seem neutral or based on universal values.

Since the late 90s, the use of organizational weapons and the conduct of organizational warfare has been viewed in the Russian Federation as a reaction to the new military-strategic situation [68].

However, the problem of OW in the Russian Federation became really important at the beginning of the 21st century.

Russian sources describe this type of weapon, its definition, features, methods, and countermeasures most comprehensively on the Izborsk Club website [69]. In particular, the club's website states that "organizational weapons are a system of organizational (coordinated in terms of goals, place and time of intelligence, propaganda, psychological, informational, etc.) influences on the enemy that force him to move in the direction desired by the other side."

It should be noted that the emphasis is on "forcing it to move in the direction desired by the other side". That is, while many people think they are moving in the right direction, they are moving where the "invisible hand" is leading them.

Another Russian researcher, a member of the Presidium of the Russian Criminological Association, I. Sundiev, notes: "The use of organizational weapons reflects the historical trend of transition from wars with the destruction of the enemy to wars focused on its 'self-disorganization' and 'self-disorientation' to preserve the existing resource base. In practice, this is done through the use of a system of organizational (coordinated in terms of goals, place and time of intelligence, propaganda, psychological, information, etc.) influences on the enemy that force it to move in the direction desired by the other side. It can be used to direct the enemy's policy to a strategic dead end, exhaust its economy with ineffective (unfeasible) programs, slow down the development of weapons, distort the foundations of national culture, and create a 'fifth column' among the

population. As a result, the state creates an environment of internal political, economic, and psychological chaos" [70].

On the other hand, another researcher from the Russian city of St. Petersburg, P. Yunatskevich, argues that OW should be understood as certain social processes created by some social actors to influence other social actors [71,72]. Moreover:

- Influence is the ability of a social actor to create and prevent a threat (managing threats and by means of threats). It provides different types of domination, determines dignity, self-esteem, self-respect, etc.;
- A social process is a *modus vivendi* of a social entity, its activities carried out in interaction with other social entities (in behavior management models, it is convenient to represent a social entity as a process);
- A social entity is an individual, groups of people and their associations, organizations, enterprises, states, corporations, etc., and humanity as a whole.

Thus, we can state that the task of the OW, given our realities, is [73,74]:

- Creating an atmosphere of godlessness and immorality, and a negative attitude towards cultural heritage;
- Manipulating the mindset of social groups to create political tension and chaos;
- Destabilizing relations between political movements to provoke conflicts and escalate political struggle;
- Lowering the level of information support of state and military authorities, negative impact on the strategic decision-making process;
- Disinforming the population about the activities of state bodies, discrediting them and undermining their authority;
- Provoking social, political, national and religious clashes;
- Initiating strikes, riots and other social and economic protests;
- Undermining the international authority of the opposing state, discrediting its cooperation with other countries;
- Causing damage to the vital interests of the opposing state in various spheres.

Thus, the basis of OW is formed by special technologies of organizational management reflection [75]. These are ordered sets of methods (models, programs, strategies, procedures, forms) for implementing management decisions that are constantly being improved, introducing innovations, supporting information, ideological and other necessary structural links, recruiting and training personnel, planning, reporting, and controlling, etc.

Since the basis of any organizational system is made up of people whose motivation is based on physiological, social, and informational needs, the productive, properly calculated use of OWs in a certain organizational environment (primarily in the government) has a direct impact not only on the level of security of the state's organizational system but also on the very possibility

of its existence. Prolonged large-scale destructive informational, moral, and psychological influence, passing through the psyche of every citizen, poses a real threat to the existence of the nation as a whole due to the transformation of basic worldview, cultural and ideological attitudes, i.e. changes in the internal organizational environment that determines the system of the nation's functioning.

2.5. Special Hybrid Forms and Methods of Modern Warfare

In its confrontation with Russia, Ukraine has experienced the vast majority of special hybrid forms of warfare. The situation that developed in 2013 is not changing today, but is only gaining momentum in terms of special influence operations against Ukraine. Additional neighboring countries are joining the conflict, trying not only to influence the socio-political situation in the country, but also to extract benefits for themselves. As an example, we can mention the corresponding peculiar actions of the Hungarian and Romanian sides, which secretly hand out citizenship and passports to Ukrainian citizens, support and finance relevant communities and organizations that promote separatist sentiments among the population, provide administrative resources that conduct aggression among the population to annex part of the territory of our state.

In order to start implementing concrete actions to influence the socio-political situation in a foreign country or a particular region, it is necessary to determine the appropriate methods and tools to be used. Obviously, only a nation with a certain military and economic potential (a special stable political system that will allow long-term consolidation of efforts within certain limits) is able to influence the course of hybrid wars.

Foreign researchers and practitioners are seeing an undeniable connection between hybrid warfare and the socio-political events that have been taking place on the territory of Ukraine since its independence. The strategic goal of hybrid warfare on the territory of our country remains the same as it was in the 20th century, but with the new smart technologies of the 21st century. Through the use of conventional and unconventional forms and methods of warfare, namely: the integrated use of regular units of the Russian Armed Forces, economic pressure (using the energy factor), an unprecedented propaganda campaign, diplomatic blocking of the legal mechanisms of international organizations to resolve the conflict, etc. [76].

On November 30, 2016, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, which stated that the socio-political situation of the country is clearly linked to the influence of the participants in the socio-political process, which, in turn, interact with the financial leaders of the world market or special services of the respective countries. Their role and place remain hidden or undefined in public.

Congressman Jim Himes, a member of the Intelligence Committee in 2016, noted: "Today, there is a need to create a new committee composed of

representatives of various intelligence agencies that would deal exclusively with 'active specific actions' that are already affecting the socio-political game on the international stage" [77]. This influence includes manipulation of media outlets, financing of undercover groups, spreading disinformation, and, accordingly, physical influence on the main players in the socio-political process, and is a threat to international security.

In his publications on the new generation of asymmetric actions of the Russian Federation, Janis Berzinš, PhD, clearly stated that Russia has long been influencing socio-political processes in Ukraine and internationally. He identified a new generation of asymmetric actions of the Russian Federation, consisting of three components: eight stages of conflict escalation, unconventional tools, and a strategy of asymmetric actions [78].

It should be noted that Ukraine has its own experience of confrontation with the Russian Federation and has experienced the influence of another country on socio-political processes not only within the whole country but also in a separate region (the campaign in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea). However, this experience gives us a great advantage in understanding the essence and content, technologies used, methods and tools of influence used by the Russian Federation against our country, namely a combination of conventional and nonconventional methods of influencing the socio-political situation, as shown in Fig. 2.10.




Figure 2.10 — Flowchart of Measures to Influence the Socio-Political Situation in a Foreign Country or a Separate Region

This chart shows the instruments of influence that are capable of executing this combination of conventional and unconventional methods of modern warfare. This is a very sensitive issue, and there is no clear information on what kind of unit is such an effective tool of heavy influence. The historical experience of its use has given such actions the name "active measures of influence".

There is a large number of studies, historical and literary examples, etc. on the issue of measures of influence on a particular socio-political process. They were first used during the Trojan War, where, by influencing society and providing disinformation that the Trojan Horse was a gift from the goddess Athena, the Greeks seemed to admit defeat. The further historical development of events is well known to everyone, but the Trojan Horse has become a catchphrase and means treacherous actions, intentionally destructive gifts, and a hidden threat. It is no coincidence that computer programs written by malicious actors and disguised as useful or harmless are named after the Trojan horse.

Today, the "Trojan" danger is represented in unconventional wars, where active measures of influence are constantly being implemented, albeit without any knowledge of the source. The real recognition of the threats to Ukraine's national interests emerged only after the annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of hostilities in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Moreover, hybrid means of warfare (tools, technologies, and methods) were used both in times of war and peace, which provided significant room for maneuver in relation to Ukraine.

Taking into account the dynamics of global and regional conflicts, the issue of "instruments of influence" on the socio-political situation is becoming even more pressing. First of all, it concerns the way and form of preparing the nation to counteract the tools of "hybrid warfare" being waged against it. There is an urgent need to create a system to counteract such measures of influence, as well as to activate our own instruments of influence in foreign aggressor states or their individual regions.

It is difficult to directly assess the effectiveness of the use of an instrument of influence on the socio-political situation of a foreign state or a particular region, but given the interest of developed countries (the United States, Canada, and the EU), it can be assumed that this assessment is an important factor in today's confrontation in hybrid warfare. Hybrid warfare should be understood as both conventional and unconventional forms of warfare, where destabilization of the enemy's territory is achieved not through direct military intervention, but through economic and diplomatic support of disaffected segments of the population, illegal arms deliveries and provision of advice on holding protests and revolutions with the help of governmental and non-governmental special forces.

Overcoming this problem requires substantiation and development of appropriate models, technologies, methods and tools that will create the possibility of effective influence on the socio-political situation in foreign countries.

Conclusion to Chapter Two

Analyzing current threats to national security, the existing hybrid methods of warfare, and their features and differences, it should be emphasized that Ukraine is currently in a state of unconventional warfare, which combines a set of measures to influence the socio-political situation and military aggression.

Ukraine's IAs have all the necessary mechanisms to counter threats to national security, hybrid warfare and the latest technologies to influence the socio-political situation in the country. However, there is a need to transform the IAs to increase their efficiency. To fulfill this task, the author has developed a research-based view of IAs as complex organizational systems and developed its functional model. A structural model of the IA hierarchy has also been developed, as well as functional and cybernetic models of the IA management system. The author considers organizational weapons as an element of hybrid warfare, special hybrid forms and methods of modern warfare.

CHAPTER 3

POLITICAL INTERACTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ACTORS UNDER MODERN CONDITIONS

The issue of the transformation of modern armed conflicts in the era of globalization is extremely relevant. Its importance degree is determined by the main factor — the ability to impact certain processes of society's existence in the international arena. Understanding the processes and trends of large-scale armed conflicts, which occur as a result of the spread of relationships at all levels of the socio-political process, provides an opportunity for a more accurate assessment of how states need to position themselves in these armed conflicts.

Overall, the world has not become a calmer place in the last 20-30 years. The wars of the fourth, fifth, and sixth generations undermined the world and forever changed the appearance of many cities, leaving behind scorched earth and a large number of casualties among the civilian population of the planet. Famine, disease, artificial epidemics, and the lack of infrastructure for a normal existence forced people to become migrants and refugees. All of this is already changing the world and its environment. Subsequently, this implies the loss, to a certain extent, of the independence of some countries, national interests and adaptation to the general rules of modern wars conduct. Since the world community is much larger than the community of our state, has more authoritative advantages and sets the rules of the game in the international arena, we need to adapt to these rules.

Increased U.S. efforts to consolidate its military presence on all continents of the planet; NATO activities activation; consolidation of NATO's leading role in the European security system; development of EU military capabilities and expansion of their presence in crisis response operations; intensifying competition between Europe, the USA and the Russian Federation; non-traditional threats strengthening its impact on the European security — require our state to immediately respond and create appropriate mechanism to influence on all the above-mentioned processes.

The results of the use of military force indicate the ineffectiveness of building international coexistence based on the principle of "war as a continuation of foreign policy" [79] when unconventional and hybrid wars of a new generation are being waged. Today, war is waged by all available means: economic, political, diplomatic, religious, cultural, etc. Therefore, the creation of an effective mechanism to influence social and political processes of foreign countries is as relevant as ever.

3.1. The Influence of New Actors on the Transformation of the System of International Relations

At present, we can observe the emergence of a wide range of international actors that complement the state-centric system of international relations. These non-state actors include transnational organizations, multinational corporations, international associations based on religion and interests, scientific organizations, and private groups, particularly PMCs [private military companies].

TNAs are often called "new." However, they can be named as such only in the sense of relating to fundamentally different, larger scales of their activity and influence on world political processes at the end of the 20th – at the beginning of the 21st century.

The British "Watchguard International", created in 1967 by Colonel David Sterling (in 1942, he organized the British special forces — the Special Airborne Service) is considered to be the first PMC. The largest "old" PMCs were formed during the "Cold War" era under the patronage of the leading Western powers (primarily the USA, Great Britain, Israel, and the Republic of South Africa). They were created to perform various types of power functions, where the use of regular armies was considered impractical. Companies such as "Watchguard International" or "Winnel Corporation" (USA) participated in the training of military personnel of some states in the Middle East as early as 25-30 years ago. The demand for the services of such organizations began to grow rapidly in connection with the processes of globalization and once restraining factors of the inter-block confrontation period of 1945–1991 disappeared. Leading TNCs, whose activities are associated with increased local political and criminal risks, were also becoming the clients of private security firms [80].

The leading areas of PMC's specialization got distinguished:

- protection of diplomatic and other missions, airports, high-ranking officials, businessmen;
- cover support for the army and UN convoys, rear support;
- protection of oil fields, energy facilities, infrastructure;
- demining and destruction of ammunition;
- training of military and police personnel, instructor work, military translation;
- protection of ships from pirates;
- fire protection.

Gradually, PMCs became active in the intelligence sphere — the traditional entitlement of state special services. In April 2007 the officer for the Office of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence Ronald Sanders said that 25% of all intelligence operations are conducted under contracts with commercial organizations. Besides collecting information or conducting secret operations, PMCs also serve as the cover for the intelligence activities of the special services. At first, qualified mercenaries began to engage in technical intelligence, which

required that new intelligence and surveillance systems were supplied to the US Armed Forces — unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), “Global Hawk” and “Predator” types (now they are actively used as reconnaissance and strike aircraft to destroy rebel leaders’ formations and leaders of terrorist organizations, while many civilians became victims of the "erroneous" actions of these vehicles in the same Afghanistan). While UAV’s setup is managed by a full-time CIA or the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) of the United States employee, the rest of the staff consists mainly of representatives of UAVs manufacturing companies.

Collecting Internet data about terrorist and extremist organizations of the world became another area of information and intelligence use of PMC. Such services, in particular, were provided to the U.S. special services by the SITE institute, which conducts intelligence in electronic networks in order to reveal information about the organization, tactics of actions, financing and leaders of extremist groups. SITE's commercial clients include the FBI, CIA, DIA, Department of Homeland Security, Congressional committees, firms and organizations.

Participation in intelligence (intelligence and subversive) activities will remain a promising direction for states' use of PMC because it will allow states to remove the responsibility for doing the "dirty work" from their actual intelligence services.

In Russia PMCs are called unofficial military organizations. Wagner's PMC or Wagner's group is an unofficial military organization that is not part of the regular armed forces of Russia and does not have any legal status. PMC’s military units totalled — at different times and according to different data — 1,350 to 2,000 people. According to the German newspaper Bild and its sources in the Bundeswehr, the total number of Russian mercenaries reaches 2,500 people [81].

Russian Federation officials denied PMC Wagner exists. The Kremlin only admitted that Russians could privately participate in hostilities abroad. The use of mercenaries is prohibited by Art. 359 of the Russian Criminal Code. However, the State Parliament, the Duma, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation have proposed legalizing PMCs. Speaking about the goals of Russian journalists in the Central African Republic, the state media of the Russian Federation reported that they were "shooting a documentary film about the life of this country."

Wagner PMC is believed to have developed from the "Slavonic Corps" military company, that carried out combat missions in Syria as early as 2013. The future head of the PMC, Dmitry Utkin, nicknamed "Wagner", also belonged to the "Slavonic Corps". The first evidence of the activities of Wagner PMC was recorded by the Ukrainian special services in May 2014 in Donbas. In October 2017, the head of the SBU, Vasyl Hrytsak, announced that "Wagners" were involved in the destruction of the Il-76 military transport plane in eastern Ukraine

in June 2014, in the assaults of the Donetsk airport and combat engagements near Debaltsevo.

Therefore, the tried-out scheme was — the creation of the PMC as a division of the TNC, providing it with further autonomy and formal organizational independence; the introduction of the PMC through influential retired politicians, military commanders, and heads of special services into the sphere, where it could receive state orders; the transformation of contactors into participants in the armed conflicts and occupation services operating alongside state forces, as well as using them for covert operations to bypass legitimate authorities.

3.2. The socio-political Component of International Relations

3.2.1. Existing Approaches to Defining the Concept of socio-political Environment

The events related to the annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the Russian armed aggression in the East of Ukraine have revealed the need to modernize and adjust methodological approaches to understanding the socio-political environment and the theory of the system of influence of its actors in the national scientific discourse. The classical understanding of the socio-political environment proved to be insufficient in developing measures to ensure national security without taking into account such a phenomenon of modern international relations as hybrid warfare, which takes into account socio-political processes. Accordingly, determining the nature of the hybrid war phenomenon, with further consideration of the socio-political environment, is a priority task for the Ukrainian IA.

The main feature of the socio-political environment of any given state is that the environment can be artificially influenced by other states.

The idea of streamlining international relations, controlling socio-political sentiment, and influencing a foreign partner has been relevant since the emergence of society. As people enter into economic, political, trade, and other relations, customs of trade exchanges, wars and peace, and diplomatic contacts gradually take shape. The first "international orders" are formed - in ancient empires, the system of Greek polises, etc., i.e., persistent modes of the most important part of international relations for a given era, period. Over time, such periods acquire the character of a kind of international order, and with the formation of capitalist relations they become a world order. In this understanding of order, the socio-political processes of a given foreign state play an important role. It is the socio-political environment that is a stimulating factor for domestic political and socioeconomic reforms in all spheres of social life, harmonization of legislation with legal norms and democratic principles in the interests of the policy of a particular state or group of states.

The study of the problems of influence on the socio-political environment requires the definition of such concepts as "environment", "political environment", "military-political environment", "socio-political environment". It is the analysis of these concepts that will help to identify and justify the main components and levels of the socio-political environment.

The concept of "environment" has a very broad interpretation and many meanings, and sometimes even interpretations. However, it is quite clear that the actors interested in this concept are thinking in terms of influence. What will the environment be like in a given context? How to predict this or that environment? What should be used to influence a particular circumstance? What are the obstacles, threats, and risks in a given environment? How to create the necessary environment that will positively influence further developments? To answer these questions, it is necessary to identify the necessary conditions and factors that will characterize the environment. And there are some differences in this.

The concept of "environment" refers to the state of affairs, conditions and factors that determine the development of certain events, the importance and place in this process of various economic, political, military and other forces, their relations and position in the world, in individual states, in the region, oblasts, districts, organizations, institutions, etc. at a certain point in time [82].

If we examine this concept in more detail, it turns out that the original concept of "environment" is, first of all, the state and nature of production conditions; the importance, place and role of the interests of political forces in their competitive struggle; the arrangement of political forces in the international arena, in the country, in a particular region, organization, and at a certain point in time [83].

The Ukrainian dictionary defines the term "environment" as a phenomenon, event, fact that is related to something, accompanies or causes something, affects something; a set of conditions under which something happens; a set of circumstances; the environment at the scene of hostilities, the ratio of combat forces, their location [84]. The Cambridge Dictionary defines "environment" as the conditions in which you live or work and how they affect your actual performance [85].

In his publications, Alex Krol considers the concept of "environment" as a environment that must not only be understood but also be able to be changed. He cites examples from popular seminars on psychotherapy and training of intelligence officers to perform an illegal operation in a hostile environment. According to him, scouts are not told what is inside them. They are directed to specific environments and actions of a possible enemy, and accordingly, they are taught to act in no other case than in such circumstances [86].

In the analytical reference dictionary, the term "environment" refers to the state of affairs, circumstances, conditions of existence of something that must be assessed by the authorities when making a decision and implementing it in life. The environment can be characterized as modern, political, historical, business,

constructive, international, local, military, unfavorable, crisis, emergency, etc. [87].

Thus, scholars understand the concept of "environment" as a set of conditions and factors that determine the development of certain events, which must be constantly analyzed and evaluated, which subsequently sets the vector and motivation for decision-making. The main goal of any environment assessment is to identify these conditions and factors that may or may not significantly affect the unfolding of an event, as well as to determine the best way to neutralize these negative conditions.

However, the environment is undergoing many transformations in various directions and areas. If we consider the political sector environment, we can state the fact of different interpretations of this concept. The political environment is understood as one of the types of social activity associated with the term environment in the system of political life of a particular state. The political sphere uses a general assessment of the political and social environment of a particular state, society, activities and behavior of individual classes, social strata, and groups of individuals.

At the present stage of development of society and the political process, there is such a concept as "political environment". When considering various aspects of the socio-political process, the core of the political environment is the relationship between the social groups involved in the political process, and these relationships are formed under the influence of a wide range of factors of economic, social and political significance. All elements of the political environment are interconnected and require certain actions from political actors.

The political environment is, first of all, a set of specific circumstances in political life, in a certain period of political development of society; a dynamic picture of socio-political life, the state of the political system and a set of interactions between its actors for a certain period of time, the result of political activity. Analysis of the political environment is an important component of political forecasting and should be taken into account when making political decisions.

Russian researchers O. Demidov and A. Fedoseev understand the "political environment" as a property of a given time, place of interaction of objective circumstances that directly determine the possibilities and objectives of political activity, which is the cause of a political event [88].

A. Kovalenko notes that the political process manifests itself in a specific political environment: "the political environment is the state of the political system and a set of interactions between its actors in a certain period of time" [89].

V. Prykhodko emphasizes that each component of the political environment has its own potential to influence the course of its unfolding and thus creates significant difficulties in its miscalculation. The configurative variability of the ratios of the elements of the political environment can form a significant number of combinations, which creates certain difficulties in the practical

possibility of their consideration and determination, as well as limits the time of the analysis [90].

Thus, it can be concluded that the term "political environment" should be understood as an environment that contains a set of conditions and circumstances that create a certain political environment and cause certain political processes, relations between society and individuals.

Western scientists developed various typologies of conflicts based on their comprehensive research on conditions, causes, and factors that lead to conflicts, their specificity, stages of development, and functions in society. The most widely applied are the following: "General theory of conflict" (K. Boulding), "positive-functional conflict" (L. Coser), "conflict model of society" (R. Dahrendorf), "international conflict as a special kind of social conflict" (K. Deutsch, K. Mitchell, B. Brodie, R. Putnam, M. Hermann), "principled negotiation theories" (J. Burton, R. Dahl, R. Fisher). These concepts focused on factors and circumstances that lead to conflict situations. One of these factors is the state's military-political affairs.

If we consider the military sphere, one of the components of the state's domestic and foreign policy is its military policy. The implementation of military policy, plans and programs of military construction, and all daily military and political practice of states form the appropriate type of military and political relations that control and influence the balance of interests of states in these relations.

Given the fundamental changes in the external and internal security environment of Ukraine, a new Military Doctrine of Ukraine was approved - Presidential Decree No. 555/2015 of September 24, 2015, which clearly defines the military-political situation as the state of military-political relations at a certain moment (in a certain period). This decree also outlines the main trends affecting the military-political situation in the region around Ukraine [91].

It should also be noted that the term "military-political situation" is often used in the special literature and in practice, meaning the current state of military-political relations between military policy actors on a global or regional scale, in bilateral or multilateral relations, the main trends of which are determined by the correlation of interests and forces of states (groups of states).

In his publications, Yuriy Kyrshyn defines the military-political situation as the specific state of the political relationship between classes, parties, nations, states, and their coalitions, which is directly related to the preparation and possible use of means of armed action [92].

V. Barynkin holds a different view of this concept. He argues that the military-political situation should be interpreted as a history-specific set of conditions and factors related to the disposition of military and political forces, the nature of their action and the state of relations between them, and the use of military force for political purposes [93].

In his scientific works, O. Fedenko points out that while there is such a wide range of studies on defining the military-political situation, there is no single interpretation of the concept in theory and practice. Today, the military-political situation is the relationship between the states and the coalitions of states (nations, political parties), as well as the military organizations, formations, and groups controlled by them, reflecting the current alignment, balance of military, economic, political and other forces as well as the mode of interaction. It also characterizes the degree of tension in these relations in a given region (state) or the world as a whole [94].

The analysis and content of scientific works and legal frameworks evidences that the military-political situation is defined as a particular state of military-political relations at a certain moment (in a certain period) with politics, economy, social, diplomatic, legal, military, and humanitarian ties between its actors are the main indicators of these relations.

Unfortunately, when we look at the definition of the concept of "socio-political environment," modern domestic studies have practically ignored it to analyze it properly.

The political process in the international arena plays an important role, and the socio-political environment has specific features that are determined by the content, nature, and result of the analysis. The general aspect of understanding the term "socio-political situation" is presented in analytical dictionaries and scientific reference books. This term is understood as a specific state of socio-political life and interactions by political forces in actual historical circumstances at a particular moment of social development.

Among the main characteristics that determine the state of the socio-political situation are: the domestic and foreign political position of the state, its stability, relations with other states, war or peace status; the political interests and attitudes of the main social and national groups of society; the nature of political programs and activities of political parties; the current state of existing in society ideologies and their founders; public moods, sentiments (e.g., patriotism, nationalism, extremism, apathy, enthusiasm, etc.); media, periodicals, radio, publishing, and television that contribute to the mood and psychological state of society; the quality of political leaders, their willpower and willingness.

One should carefully distinguish the levels of the socio-political situation when all public bodies and political institutions are well-arranged or the other way around when the power is taken over as a result of the reckless scheming of individual policymakers.

The following actors are among key contributors, shaping the socio-political environment: state and local bodies of authority; political parties, public organizations, associations, movements, and alliances; mass media; religious, national, and other associations; social groups; individual military and civilian officers, bodies of military management, and law enforcement and special agencies; political and civil society leaders who advocate (or implement) the state,

public, political and personal interests, objectives, and goals by non-military (or military) means.

Recent years developments in the East of Ukraine, and its analysis indicate that our country has faced a war waged over the socio-political processes that are posing a threat to the integrity of the state and its national interests. Therefore, a proper assessment of the situation, and a careful forecast of its impact in the desired and necessary direction is the most important aspect of state and political influence. As a rule, the assessment of the socio-political situation is carried out by the military command. It is a set of actions to collect, analyze, and predict how the relations between the actors of socio-political life will develop in a given period so that the senior leadership has detailed and accurate information about various aspects and processes in socio-political life.

Moreover, different members of Ukraine's law enforcement and special structures have different and nuanced views of what the socio-political situation is. Let's examine various ways of defining the concept of the socio-political situation by some of Ukraine's law enforcement and special services.

An important issue for the Armed Forces of Ukraine today is the transition to a professional army, which will contribute to the highly efficient use of human resources, with special emphasis on the competence of future officers, their ability to act in new socio-political processes, in which it is necessary to predict the development of events, find non-conventional approaches to solving problems, etc. The very life makes the present generation of officers reshape their way of thinking, give up stereotypes decisively, take a creative stance in performing their tasks, extend and improve their capacity and knowledge of the general means and mechanisms of responding to present-day realities.

To enable an effective assessment tool for the socio-political situation in the Armed Forces of Ukraine during a special period, as stipulated in the Decree of the President of Ukraine dated May 26, 2015, "On the Decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine" and May 6, 2015, "On the National Security Strategy of Ukraine," [95] The Instruction on how to assess the socio-political situation in areas where troops are deployed during their assigned tasks has been developed.

According to this instruction, the term "socio-political environment" (situation) refers to a relatively stable (dynamic) set of foreign and domestic political (socio-economic, informational, religious, historical, cultural, interethnic, criminogenic) factors, conditions, and relations in a certain region of the country (area of deployment, operational zone) in a certain period of time that affect the performance of assigned tasks by military units.

Hence, the Armed Forces of Ukraine defines the socio-political environment as a specific set of factors that characterize society's development and directly or indirectly affect troop activities in a certain area, which must be constantly monitored and reviewed. The particular feature of the process of assessment and analysis of the socio-political environment in the Armed Forces

of Ukraine is the emergence of possible conflict situations with the involvement of the General Staff of the AFU, the Main Intelligence Directorate, and other command bodies of the Armed Forces and services of Ukraine, and their impact on the national interests of Ukraine.

I. Ilnytskyi and M. Seredenko focus their research not on the mere definition of the socio-political environment but on its levels. They distinguish four difficulty tiers of the socio-political environment: normal, complicated, critical, and emergency. The normal socio-political situation is marked by the absence of social tension in the political and socio-economic spheres and the solidarity between ethnic groups. There are no inter-confessional controversies in the religious realm, crime rates and offenses are average, and the populace is optimistic. The complicated situation is characterized by negative trends affecting citizens' social well-being. A crisis situation is characterized by domestic and external threats and temporary disruption of the operation of certain elements or entire political institutions. An emergency situation is characterized by disruption of normal living conditions and civil activities or significant property damage. The relationships between the actors are extremely tense, and the state authorities and local self-government bodies may be on the verge of losing control of society. The need to declare a state of emergency is imminent.

V. Moldavchuk and I. Lipatov refer to the socio-political environment as the "operational situation," and it is assessed and forecasted when making management decisions in service and combat [97].

Internal law enforcement agencies generally define the concept of "socio-political environment" in terms of the crime component and social tension. The crime component refers to a variety of public-threatening criminal manifestations that generate crime. V. Popovych says the crime component is a set of destructive, antagonistic factors leading to the deterioration of socio-economic and civil relations, which contribute to the reproduction of antisocial behavior by members of society [98].

E. Ferri in his scientific publications states that for each state, the criminogenic potential is determined by various conditions of the physical and social environment, the impact of which is combined in a certain way with the personal and social components of the potential [99].

It's worth noting that the criminogenic factor may reflect a certain part of the population with psychic and social abnormalities, genetic ones, or those unsatisfied with their financial situation. This is precisely what causes the social tension, characterized by the lack of trust among civilians in the ability of power bodies to defend their life interests, causing outlaw behavior.

Consequently, in every state, the crime component in the socio-political environment is a significant driver characterizing an unreliable class of population that violates the legitimate socio-political order of processes. The unreliable class of the population is considered the most dangerous, the breeding ground for all kinds of unlawful acts. The process of monitoring the socio-political environment

should draw attention to the mentioned factor, and properly grounded findings will help to make a rational decision.

The State Border Guard Service pays attention to the political and socio-demographic situation on the state territory and bordering states, segments of the border, etc. The demographic situation in a particular state characterizes the reproduction of the state's population in both time and spatial terms.

A stable, and secure economy depends heavily on the population factor to ensure its continued growth. Labor potential and, in turn, national income are directly linked to indicators and rates of demographic development, as well as the working-age population percentage among the population.

The socio-demographic situation in any state is formed in accordance to the replenishment of the population, migration processes, public health, the state of the environment, and the nature of society's activities, etc. In other words, a country's population is the basis that describes its socio-demographic situation and can affect its state. Unfavorable trends and negative shifts in the population structure are weighty factors at any time for any state.

There is also a term "demographic security," that represents a set of factors and threats central to the state's national security system. We distinguish between external and internal threats. Domestic threats include factors that originate directly from the demographic system and are described by quantitative and qualitative parameters. Social, economic, political, military, environmental, and informational influences are considered external threats that have both direct and indirect impacts on the socio-political environment of the state in the study.

Security Service of Ukraine defines the socio-political environment as one that involves economic, political, ideological, social, criminogenic, and other elements of a specific society, region, or state.

To summarize, the review of law enforcement agencies' practices regarding socio-political activities and processes demonstrates various interpretations of the meaning of the term socio-political situation. Positively, Ukrainian law enforcement and special structures investigate and monitor the socio-political situation in accordance with their interests and duties. Meanwhile, the examination results reveal that a particular ministry's (body's, service's) professional tendencies develop a system of views forming a departmental perspective.

In light of the abovementioned, it can be concluded that in a broad sense, the essence of a socio-political situation is the state of social relations between interstate and intrastate actors within a specific timeframe [100–103]. Furthermore, the socio-political situation, through its various manifestations, reflects the nature of the processes occurring both in the district or region of the state, as well as throughout the whole state.

From the definition of the socio-political situation above it follows that the main distinctive feature of this phenomenon is the mandatory presence of the socio-political actors that are involved in the socio-political relations between

them [104]. Such actors in socio-political processes should include state authorities and local self-government bodies, state institutions and establishments, political parties, associations of citizens, influential communities, business entities, mass media, religious organizations, and other significant organizations. The model of the relationship between the actors of social and political relations is presented in fig. 3.1.




Figure 3.1 – The Model of Interconnections Between the Actors of the Socio-Political Relations

All actors of socio-political relations should be considered in unity, interconnection, and interdependence; however, each of them will have its own properties and characteristics. For a complete and comprehensive assessment and understanding of the socio-political environment, it is important to know not only the relationship between the actors of the socio-political process but also its internal content, structural elements, and factors, in particular, the mood and behavior of the population and its attitude to the actions of that or another state. Also, there is a dynamic system of relations between the actors of the political process — dependence, subordination, collateral subordination, relative autonomy.

It is obvious that the main actor of socio-political life is the citizen, his activities in the socio-political community, and only then the organizations created by him. By the term "actor", scientists understand something that actively acts and knows, possesses the consciousness and will of an individual or a social

group. The actors of the socio-political process have a multi-level character: the primary level is represented by individuals, the secondary level is represented by political organizations and state bodies, the actors of a higher level are political elites and leaders.

In their scientific works, V. Moldavchuk and I. Lipatov comprehensively presented the actors of socio-political relations and their relationship [97]. They also emphasize that the study of the state of socio-political relations and trends in their development consists of analyzing and evaluating the activities of actors and their relations.

Actors in social and political life can also be distinguished through the prism of their openness and accessibility. Actors can be classified as open actors (direct participants in the socio-political process in the country), semi-hidden actors (lobbying and influencing socio-political processes through mass media, demonstrations, blackmail, bribery, etc.), and shadow actors (national security bodies, criminal structures, secret subversive organizations that influence social and political processes).

In light of the above, the comprehensive study of research works on the definition of the meaning of the socio-political situation, the regulatory and legal framework of all representatives of the law enforcement and special structures of Ukraine, and the political, social, and economic sphere have made it possible for us to define the concept of the socio-political situation as a set of factors, conditions, events, phenomena that have the greatest influence on social and political processes between the actors of interstate and intrastate relations. A detailed analysis of these factors, conditions, events, and phenomena, as well as the interrelation of the actors of socio-political processes, analysis and assessment, is a prerequisite for understanding the concept of the socio-political situation.

Once we have understood the essence of the concept of the socio-political environment, we can move on to distinguishing and substantiating the elemental composition of the socio-political environment.

3.2.2. Identification and Justification of the Main Components of the socio-political environment

A commonly accepted methodology for studying complex socio-economic and technical systems [105] is system analysis [106]. Taking into account the peculiarities of the research field, the methodological basis for analyzing and assessing socio-political situations should be a systematic approach [107], which involves applying a set of methodological principles and theoretical provisions [108] that enable:

- consider each element of the socio-political situation in its connection and interaction with others;

- trace and monitor the changes within the socio-political environment as a result of the shifts occurring in its components;
- to study the specific emergent properties of the socio-political environment;
- draw reasonable conclusions about the patterns of its development [109].

During the study of the socio-political situation, general and special methods and techniques of cognition were also used, such as:

- factor analysis [110];
- expert methods [111–113];
- theory of decision-making [114, 115];
- forecasting [116];
- prediction [117];
- comparison;
- generalization;
- analogy.

Based on the main provisions and methods of system analysis, it is determined that the elemental composition of the socio-political situation should contain information about the relevant sphere, the process of the state or a separate region that is studied. Elements structure of the socio-political environment consists not only of the passive display of information about events, this or that process description, but also the inner tendencies, layout of the possible developments, the perspective on the capabilities and orientations of political forces, managerial elite, institutions, etc. [118]. Hence, in order to systematically assess the socio-political environment in a certain state or region, the following elemental composition of the socio-political environment is proposed:

- foreign policy course of the state;
- domestic political situation in the region or state;
- political (military-political) leadership;
- the assessment of political norms; the analysis of the political culture of society;
- the state of the economy of the region or state;
- the state of the armed forces (including an analysis of the possibilities of waging a hybrid war); socio-psychological atmosphere in society;
- ethnic and religious situation in the region or state;
- demographic situation in the region or state;
- geographical location;
- ecological environment in the region or state;
- criminogenic situation in the region or state.

Additional factors can be added to these elements when analyzing the socio-political environment in a particular state or region. Analysis of the content of each component, the mechanism of their influence on socio-political processes, as well as their totality can be used as the basis of the factor method for the

assessment. When determining the components, the selection of indicators that most fully, in quantitative and qualitative terms, characterize each factor plays a critical role in the independent assessment. The main requirements include the quality assessment of the component, the complete quantitative intake, the possibility to provide analysis given the available data, and the professional skills of an officer performing the action.

When evaluating the state's foreign policy course, it is necessary to take into account the strategic approach of a state to foreign relations, and cooperation with international institutions, promotion of its own national interests and protection of its citizens abroad. So, the main factors of the state's foreign policy include:

- the place and role of the state in the international community and interregional cooperation;
- the preparation and conclusion of bilateral and multilateral contracts and agreements;
- the degree of desire for integration and participation of the state in political, military and economic unions and blocs;
- the presence and depth of interstate controversies (contradictions);
- relations between the state and other foreign states.

Studying a region's or state's internal political situation requires attention to the structure and balance of powers and the stability of the political system. Main factors:

- the alignment of political forces;
- the level of stability of the political system (the main focus on the existing disagreements and the ways they manifest itself);
- the degree of social activity of the main classes and strata of the population;
- the impact scale of political parties, unions, groups and public organizations on socio-political processes in the state;
- the presence of the covert or outspoken political opposition, the level of its activity and leverage on the population (the key factors are the program, activities, leaders, the number of active proponents and who are main supporters, the level of severity of the confrontation with the ruling power, etc.);
- formal and shadow leaders;
- the role of mass media in the political life of the state;
- the degree of ethnic contradictions;
- militarization of the state;
- chauvinistic attitudes of society;
- social inequality in income distribution;
- separatist attitudes;
- the incoherence of political leaders in addressing political, economic, or social issues.

The assessment of such a component as political (military-political) leadership includes the study of:

- biographical data;
- educational level;
- intellectual potential;
- individual traits;
- strong-willed qualities;
- causes for delight;
- motivational focus on state interests;
- orientation to generally recognized moral norms during social and political activity;
- compliance with current legislation;
- leadership style;
- popularity;
- relationships in the team, in the family.

The assessment of the legal base is provided with regard to the following indicators:

- the effectiveness of the regulatory framework;
- the performance of the interstate and domestic regulation regarding any issue settlement.

When assessing the political culture of society, the following factors are probed:

- the culture of the subjects' attitude towards the political authorities;
- the culture of the electoral process;
- the culture of formation of political and socio-political institutions;
- the culture of political behaviors;
- the culture of political consciousness and communication, etc.

The evaluation of the state of the economy of the region or the state is studied according to the following indicators:

- level of the economic development;
- production growth rates;
- rates of decline in production;
- state of science and technology;
- state of transport and communication;
- level of development of the financial system;
- level of entrepreneurship;
- availability of competent specialists;
- availability of management staff;
- existence of crisis economic situations;
- the average standard of living of the population;
- the share of government expenditures in the gross national product;
- the share funds dedicated from the state budget for social protection of the population;

- the ratio between the cost of labor and its productivity;
- the state of the economy in the long-term;
- availability of important industrial facilities;
- volume of agricultural production, etc.

The assessment of the condition of the armed forces should be exhaustive and requires special attention. The analysis includes the review of the normative and legal frameworks, guidelines, forces, means of informational and psychological warfare, non-traditional methods of influence, etc. The state of combat readiness is being carried out according to the following:

- technical equipment;
- the system and level of the armed forces staffing;
- social and ethnic composition;
- moral and psychological readiness of the personnel;
- the degree of training in military and professional areas;
- the degree of possession of modern types of weapons;
- availability of combat experience;
- faith in the power of victory;
- the attitude of the civilian population to military personnel;
- presence of anti-war sentiments, state of military discipline;
- the degree of trust in allies; level of the development of the military and scientific progress;
- the degree of material support of troops;
- financial situation of military personnel;
- the degree of influence of political parties and public organizations in the army environment;
- psychological readiness of military personnel before the start of military operations, etc.

An important aspect of the socio-political environment is the socio-psychological atmosphere in society. The main indicators of the analysis are:

- civilian morale;
- social activity and community commitment;
- the degree of mental distress in the face of the economic crisis;
- the level of social relations;
- balance between social classes;
- the level of public concern;
- population readiness for direct action (protests);
- zones of possible collisions;
- support of the state order;
- attitude to state reforms;
- population's aspiration to control the government;
- social mood;
- attitude of the population to the foreign policy course;
- attitude of the population towards allied states;

- the population's attitude towards military personnel;
- the level of pacifist sentiments;
- content and dynamics of dissemination of information (data);
- the legal status of firearms possession by local residents at the state level, etc.

Assessment of the ethnical and religious situation depends on:

- the place and role of the church in society;
- religions of the middle classes of the population;
- the presence of different religious affiliations;
- characteristics of the focus of activities of the main denominations;
- nature of relations between state authorities and local self-government;
- the presence of various representatives of various faiths;
- the level of inter-religious conflict;
- spiritual, moral, historical values and the degree of their unity;
- locations of iconic religious buildings;
- negative aspects of religion;
- traditions, customs, ceremonies;
- ethnic factors.

The demographic situation assessment is highlighted by:

- the potentials of national minorities;
- population reproduction and migration;
- quantitative and qualitative composition;
- national composition;
- presence of dominant nationalities;
- places of compact residence of national minorities;
- the level of their national cohesion;
- presence of national and cultural associations;
- mutual relations between representatives of different nationalities and ethnic groups, the presence of contradictions;
- terrorist and extremist movements;
- religious and ethnic organizations;
- gender composition;
- level of education of the population;
- formal and informal leaders;
- influential persons;
- age composition of the population, etc.

The geographical environment of the state is described by the following key indicators:

- size and population of the territory;
- availability of useful resources;
- climate;
- soil quality;

- presence of positive flora and fauna;
- rivers and sea component;
- presence or absence of natural obstacles;
- location relative to allied states and the enemy, length and state of the border, etc.

When assessing the environment, the following is taken into account:

- possible areas of environmental problems (exclusion zones);
- the state of their protection;
- level of environmental pollution;
- thermal factor;
- radioactive factor;
- presence of toxic waste and landfills;
- positions of other states, etc.

The assessment of the criminogenic situation is carried out, as a rule, together with special bodies according to the following indicators: the degree of corruption of the top management of the state; crime in the financial sphere; presence of organized crime; distribution of drugs; average level of serious crimes; the right and degree of possession of firearms during the crime's commissioning (permit to possess weapons for the local population); the number of unregistered weapons in the population; the smuggling degree, etc.

Thus, it is crucial to consider all the above-mentioned elements of this or that particular instance of the socio-political environment, enabling us to understand the proper analysis, assessment, and forecast approach to all factors, conditions, events, processes, and phenomena that occur, have already happened and will happen in the studied area. By defining all the elements of a particular situation, one has the opportunity to coordinate multiple instruments of influence on the vulnerable points of a foreign nation's socio-political environment.

In the present day, the need to predict the future is driven by both the objective realities of general civilizational development and the problems of more specific, prospective regulation of economic, political, spiritual, and military relations. Forecasting has a complex, interdisciplinary nature, as it is at the intersection of political science, sociology, philosophy, psychology, history, economic theory, etc. Analysis of modern scientific literature devoted to the problems of forecasting shows that forecasting is a process that illuminates a certain aspect, which creates methodological prerequisites for further specification of actions [119]. The importance of forecasting the socio-political situation is related to the fact that in modern society, no social institution can arise and be formed outside of the relations that take place in the political sphere. A prognosis is a conclusion about the future of the political process under investigation based on the general trend of its development. Socio-political forecasting covers inter-state and intra-state relations, domestic political phenomena and other factors related to socio-political processes. A distinction is often made between domestic and foreign political forecasts. Global political

forecasting is focused on globalization in its historical perspective: the emergence of a single and interconnected world where nations are not divided by traditional protectionist barriers and boundaries that both limit their ability to communicate and keep them from disorderly external influences. The scope of domestic political forecast includes the entire content of domestic politics. Additionally, there are two aspects: the first concerns predictive assessments of specific political events, and the second covers the activities of political institutions in society. Foreign policy forecasting addresses the "general atmosphere" in the world, region, country, examines the trends, nature and course of developments, factors influencing them, and attempts to assess new possibilities for development. K. Simonov defines that the objects of political forecasting are political systems and the political process [120].

Therefore, in view of the above context, and summarizing the definitions and generalizations of theorists and practical experts, forecasting in the system of socio-political processes should be understood as a probabilistic, stochastic in nature, science-based opinion on the future prospects of a process or phenomenon and on the alternative ways and timing of its implementation, based on impartiality, consistency, alternativeness, proportionality and science. And this is the very same estimate of the degree and character of the socio-political environment, performed with a view of delivering specific data to the top state leadership to help them make an informed decision.

The socio-political process is always dynamic and therefore cannot have a constant level. To determine the level of the socio-political environment, it is necessary to comprehensively and deeply study the properties and regularities of the main elements of the content of the socio-political environment. The structural elements of the socio-political situation should include not only the activities of the actors of the socio-political process, but also socio-political interests and goals and real socio-political events, processes, and phenomena. It is the very impact of these factors on the socio-political environment that determine its level (Fig. 3.2).




Figure 3.2 – The Main Structural Elements of the Socio-Political Environment that Determine its Level

The normal socio-political environment implies the level of stable balance in socio-political processes, the absence of real threats and challenges, the ability of the state to quickly respond to changes in public attitudes, the stable functioning of the state through the institutions of society in accordance with the constitutional order, the lengthy functioning of the government, the existence of legitimate power and its recognition in the international arena, the absence of structural changes in the socio-political system, a stable balance of political forces, a stable balance of interests of social groups and the authorities; the religious situation is determined by the absence of inter-confessional controversies; criminal activity is within average statistical indicators; social cohesion around political power; the state guarantees peace and security for the population, etc.

It is necessary to stress that a failure of the stable level of the socio-political system does not immediately result in a shift to the subsequent level. The actors of socio-political life are always trying to "struggle" to preserve stability and oppose radical changes. Yet, any system, being open in its development, goes through transition phases of fragility, while successful use of certain practices to establish a brand new social order may not guarantee the sustainable operation of the system.

I. Lykhanova investigates two trends in the development of the socio-political system [121]. She writes that in the course of its existence, the social system experiences two opposite tendencies: on the one hand, these are the processes of disorganization, and on the other, the processes of self-organization and organization. The growth of internal problems and contradictions makes society unstable. If society is in a state of transformation, significant restructuring, then its unstable state is, in a certain sense, inevitable. If society is transformed, it cannot be stable to the same extent as before.

Thus, a normal socio-political situation is defined as a stable process of functioning, stable interconnection between actors of social relations, and an absence of social tensions.

In an aggravated (complicated) situation, the social and political process become more complex. Socio-political relations between actors feature the same content, structure, and characteristic features as ordinary relations. However, the political process takes place in a tense socio-political environment.

Moreover, the situation is accompanied by a lack of stability in the relationships between actors. Actors in politics and economy strive for purposefulness, organization, and consolidation around themselves. The socio-political environment seeks certain development and goals; actors of socio-political relations form a new policy, political system, power structure, political relations, political organization of society; there are no threats and challenges; the state is able to respond to changes in public attitudes quickly; there is stable functioning of the state through the institutions of society in accordance with the constitutional order; the legitimate government is recognized in the international

arena, there are structural changes in the socio-political system, the balance of political forces is unstable; unstable balance of interests of social groups and authorities, yet the state guarantees peace and security for the population, etc.

National economic indicators reveal difficulties. Consequently, the population mistrusts government institutions. Indicators of social well-being reveal a growing working poverty rate and the increase in debt owed to budget sector employees. It becomes obvious that the current government is unable to properly organize social and political processes in the state.

A crisis situation is understood as a situation in a foreign country or region that has developed as a result of illegal and deliberate actions related to encroachment on the normal, regular and safe activities of the actors of the socio-political process. It is primarily characterized by a disruption in the balance in the functioning of state institutions (the disruption of the normal conditions of life and activity of society) as well as significant material and economic losses; real threats and challenges posed to the functioning of state and civil enterprises; the state is unable to respond to changes in public attitudes quickly; the stable functioning of the government requires power intervention; the legitimate government does not function and cannot influence the social and political processes in the state; unstable balance of political forces, the unstable balance of interests of social groups and power, society is not united around political power; a state cannot guarantee the security and peace of its citizens.

Accordingly, due to the above-mentioned characteristics, it is possible to add a conflict that destabilizes the normal functioning of socio-political processes in the state or region. The crisis can be characterized by the temporary halt of certain elements and institutions of the political system, a significant disruption of the process of reproduction in the economy, in particular goods production, the reduction and destruction of monetary and loan relations; the bankruptcy of industrial enterprises, trading companies, and banking institutions, the growth of mass unemployment; the crime factor is increased by all indicators.

Inter-ethnic relations are marked by hostile confrontation, the religious situation is determined by inter-confessional conflicts, and problems regarding some border areas are intensifying.

An extraordinary socio-political environment exists when all processes within a state or region are disrupted from normal functioning conditions. The relations between the actors of the socio-political process are marked by high levels of social tension, which have reached the point where state and local governments no longer have any control over them.

Opposing forces' socio-political processes, interests, and goals are aimed at seizing state power. Illegal change of constitutional order, violation of the state's territorial integrity with the use of force, threatening the death of a significant number of people. The existing government is not recognized internationally. International relations worsen to the extent of adversary conflict between nationalities. The religious situation is marked by the emergence of inter-

confessional conflicts. The criminal situation and the nature of offenses become order-threatening. The creation of illegal armed groups and public order maintenance bodies face sharp opposition. Active and negative informational and psychological impact the mass media deliver on the public, particularly on the power component of the state, etc.




Figure 3.3 – Structural and Logic Diagram of the Technique of Analysis, Assessment and Forecasting of the Socio-Political Environment (SPE)

The overview and generalization of the theoretical approaches allows us to conclude that the main objective of the assessment of the socio-political environment is a reflection of the situation (level) and the definition of factors, conditions, events, and phenomena that need to be constantly analyzed for further influence on socio-political processes. To this end, it seems necessary to understand the content of the socio-political situation assessment as the composition of the elements of the socio-political situation. It is also necessary to single out and pay attention to the major players, their impact on the vulnerabilities of the socio-political process, which can intervene in an entire socio-political environment of a foreign country. The respective technique for the analysis, assessment and forecasting of the socio-political environment in a foreign country or a particular region can be presented in the form of a structural and logical diagram (Fig. 3.3).

Thus, a comprehensive analysis and assessment of the socio-political environment includes the establishing of the key relationship factors between the actors (players) of the socio-political process, directly or indirectly shaping the socio-political process in the state or a separate region. The analysis enables the state leadership to act in a specific manner (to conduct special operations of influence) for stabilization or destabilization of the situation both in the international arena and within a foreign state or a separate region.

3.3. Techniques of Influence of Intelligence Agencies on the Socio-Political Environment

The new world order has nearly eliminated the risk of global military conflicts, but the threat of local conflicts has grown sharply, with most of those conflicts involving national and religious overtones, in which socio-political processes play a critical role. Global instability and international security have been significantly threatened by an increase in internal and international conflicts since the beginning of the 2000s [122]. Scientists, theoreticians and practitioners of international law, politicians and diplomats began to think about the legality and possibilities of old and at the same time new means of regulating armed conflicts, such as "military intervention for humanitarian purposes", "humanitarian intervention," "the use of military force to prevent conflict escalation," etc. [123].

In the modern realities of growing conflict in international relations, the problems of international intervention in conflicts with the aim of their resolving, settlement and leveling of negative consequences come to the fore, since conflicts carry a threat and a destabilizing factor both for certain neighboring states and for certain regions. When it comes to intervention in a conflict by anyone (except its participants) for the purpose of settlement, the general term "third party" is used.

The struggle for power, a modern form of influence on a country or region, has led to the emergence of new ways of achieving strategic goals. With all this activity and new ways of conducting international politics, a number of confusing concepts have arisen: gray zones, hybrid threats, nonlinear and traditional ways to conduct armed confrontation, sanctions, etc. [124].

Sanctions are one of the present-day methods to influence the aggressor state. They are an effective tool of influence in the international arena. However, the existence of double standards in modern hybrid conflicts poses the greatest threat to the functioning of this tool for responding to international conflicts and crises. While sanctions are considered a softer and bloodless tool for coercion for peace and are comparable to military intervention in terms of the transformation of the international security system, they often fall short of expectations and result in negative international political consequences. It is, therefore, seems appropriate to have another tool that can strongly influence the socio-political environment in one or more states.

The analysis of historical experience and the modern role of active, dynamic processes taking place around conflict situations allows us to assert that the existing theoretical developments regarding the assessment and forecasting of the socio-political situation have not yet been brought to the level of practical recommendations and use. Until today, attempts to assess and forecast the socio-political environment as a decision-making practice into exerting special measures for the purpose of influence have not been the topic of a separate scientific study. Only some aspects of this problem have been highlighted in previous research. However, the need for its in-depth study and the development of a toolkit for decisive influence on the socio-political environment has been relevant since the proclamation of Ukraine's independence.

The socio-political environment is a component of the operational environment that must be examined and forecasted for decision-making. It is also important to realize that the level and complexity of the socio-political process in a region or state cannot be clearly defined. The degree of complexity of a socio-political environment depends on the presence of socio-political tension in the region or state, i.e., strikes, protests, terrorist acts, or revolutions. Here is the very moment when the tough tool involving experienced specialists to carry out a special operation (action) to influence the socio-political environment joins the "operational game."

Intelligence Agency (IA) - is the first line of defense of the state, and today, they are an important and integral part of the national security system and one of the effective tools for influencing foreign policy [125]. This was due to the strengthening of the role of information. Today, in the political arena, there is a fierce struggle for the ability to influence the socio-political situation through the provided true or false information. Information received by society triggers many public processes that affect decision-making by state leaders, affect the psyche of individuals and society at large, and define life priorities, views, and so on [126].

The age of information presents societies with the challenge of solving interdependent and, at the same time, contradictory tasks. Wide opportunities opened up by technological progress, such as access to information about power structures' activities, come into conflict with the provision of state secrets or the confidentiality of any information [127].

Analyzing the manipulative capabilities of mass media, it is important to understand their nature and general reasons that determine their ability to influence social and political processes in a foreign country [128, 129].

Considering the nature of the information and its significance in the context of the Law of Ukraine "On Intelligence Agencies of Ukraine," we can conclude that it is both verbal and documented physical media information about real and potentially possible plans, intentions, and actions of foreign states, etc. One of the main factors influencing any decision-making is the outcome of processing and evaluating information. This determines the relevant elements of the situation that have developed (or can develop) at a specific moment in time in the specified area. Only timely reporting to the state leadership about the situation in the world and possible changes in socio-political processes and existing and potential risks can guarantee correct, balanced decision-making in internal and external security fields, national defense, and international relations [130–133]. But this is only one of the tasks assigned to IAs.

Another important task of the IA of Ukraine is to take special measures aimed at supporting national interests and state policy in the economic, political, military, military-technical, environmental, information, and other spheres [134, 135]. As we can see, all the listed elementary components are identical to the socio-political environment components. In addition, the Ukrainian IA is tasked to take action to counteract external threats to national security [136].

On the basis of the defined tasks of the IA, it becomes clear that it is entrusted not only with the collection and analysis of relevant information but also with the implementation of special measures that can affect socio-political processes in another state to counter external threats to Ukraine's national security [137, 138].

A study of internal political threats in states where conflicts arise indicates there is a risk of domestic political conflicts if other states interfere (actively, financially). As a result, both at the border and inside the state, domestic conflict escalates into state-level armed conflict [139] arising from interference in the state's internal affairs by other states. This is, in turn, impossible without impacting the socio-political environment, the socio-political processes in the state, and the actors in socio-political relations.

The study of trend in external conflicts around Ukraine suggests that as they develop, conditions are created for actors in socio-political relations to achieve their goals through strikes, rallies, and separatism. The increased opposition between political forces and the large number of weak parties,

movements, and their leaders who present their ambitions as a reflection of "the will and interests of the people" all contribute to negative consequences.

Therefore, at the current stage of Ukraine's IA development, it would be appropriate to develop a regulatory mechanism setting the criteria for influencing the socio-political environment of foreign countries [140]. This would contribute to enhancing national security and an appropriate degree of resilience to foreign special services.

From the foreign perspective, we can cite the experience of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which has a Special Activities Division (SAD). This unit conducts covert (hidden, delicate) special operations throughout the world, also known as "special activities" by the forces of paramilitary units. It should be noted that the special purpose unit became the Center in 2016 as a result of the modernization and reorganization of the CIA, and before the corresponding changes it was called the Division [141]. Whenever diplomatic measures cannot be openly implemented or incorporated into socio-political processes, the Center provides action options for the top state leadership of the USA.

The CIA's Special Activities Center consists of two divisions: the Special Operations Group (SOG) and the Political Action Group (PAG). According to some sources, the center has up to 150 employees (operational officers, pilots and other specialists). When performing tasks, they work in a team consisting of six or fewer people, but their individual training allows performing a significant range of tasks by one employee independently [142]. Let's review each subdivision separately.

The Special Operations Group is a unit that is designed to perform the tasks of the most important covert (sensitive) special operations, primarily associated with high risk in a sensitive political or military environment, where the open use of force methods is impossible or undesirable from the point of view of international law

The organizational structure of the Special Operations Group consists of an air unit, naval operations, ground operations (with the use of armored vehicles), and a unit for special industry programs. The last branch is responsible for logistical support and support of special operations (covert operations). The main architect of this strategy for the operation of the special operations group was Michael G. Vickers, who, in the 1980s, actively participated in operations in Afghanistan (training, equipping, and leading Mujahideen forces) against the Soviet troops [143].

The most important feature of this unit is the staffing of personnel who already have combat experience, specialized knowledge, skills, and abilities. Also, the specificity of such a unit is the factor of the absence of any signs or attributes by which it is possible to identify belonging to the CIA. In case of operation failure, the US government tries to smooth out all special forces actions. According to the Special Operations Group, clandestine security requirements are

high, and the CIA officially refers to this group of employees as paramilitary agents.

The main distinguishing feature between such workers is combat experience and adaptability to any situation. These workers, as a rule, conduct direct action operations in remote locations behind the front line, carrying out the following tasks: carrying out raids and sabotage, providing support to agency intelligence, conducting counterintelligence, engaging in guerrilla warfare or warfare using unconventional forms of warfare, operations to release hostages [144]. Each operation of influence affects or significantly impacts a foreign country's socio-political situation.

Therefore, the main technologies of influence on the socio-political environment are special operations of influence, carried out exclusively by an authorized special body with the appropriate tools.

In the practical activity of the USSR against the USA in 1987, several technologies of influence of the Soviet Union were revealed. The FBI report "Soviet Active Measures in the United States in 1986-1987" presents the following techniques of influence: document forgery, influence on arms control and disarmament movements, influence in trade unions in the United States, campaign to influence religious organizations (subtopics: Soviet religious organizations; Christian Peace Conference), influence through the Soviet press (topics, trends, for example, accusations against the USA regarding the of political prisoners), creation of cover organizations on the territory of the USA (activities of the National Council on American-Soviet friendship; the World Peace Council and the American Peace Council), the influence of the USSR in the UN (especially through the activities of NGOs, Soviet operations of political influence (in particular, the contacts of the USSR embassy with companies engaged in PR) [145].

On November 30, 2016, the House of Representatives passed the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, which clearly defined "active measures" as "actions to influence individuals or governments that are carried out with the cooperation or at the request of political leaders or secret services of the Russian Federation, the role of which remains hidden or not publicly recognized, and include: the establishment or financing of front groups; covert (illegal) broadcasting; media manipulation; misinformation and records forgery; financing agents of influence; provocations and offensive counterintelligence; politically motivated murders; terrorist acts" [146].

As we can see, the "active measures" meet the basic requirements, technologies of influence on the socio-political environment by carrying out special operations of influence on the actors of the socio-political process.

A special attention should be paid to the topic of the present study by the Ukrainian government as it addresses the possibility of conducting special influence operations by the national IA through the relevant Political Action Groups (PAG). It is this specialized unit, which is designed to conduct covert

activities related to political influence, psychological operations, economic operations, and cyber operations. This will provide an opportunity to control modern information technologies in the right direction. Based on the experience of the CIA, the corresponding unit is small in number, but it performs only organizational functions. This small unit attracts a large component of the toolkit (various experts, operatives), which can act in all directions at the same time to influence foreign policy or a certain situation in a foreign state or a separate region.

In modern publications, the concept of "black propaganda" is equated with psychological operations that affect the actors of the socio-political process. The PAG is responsible for such operations, which are carried out in line with the influence of the socio-political environment. The main forms of such influence are propaganda tools: disinformation, use of cover parties and organizations, illegal (covert) radio broadcasting, influence on foreign media, use of agents of influence, forgery of documents, covert broadcasting, use of new media resources, financing of promising candidates (leaders), parties, opposition movements, advertising campaigns, friendship communities; social movements, cultural societies, and foundations, religious organizations, etc.

PAG Group employees consult companies that hire local citizens to work as journalists, influencers, media platform managers, and bloggers to influence public opinion. For this purpose, the mass media may publish information that attracts the public's attention, is denied or discredited, or is already in the public domain; information that is already in the public domain is not beneficial. Employees apply a set of "active measures" methods that have different characteristics.

In all propaganda activities, the term "black operations" refers to those activities where the audience has no idea what the information source is. "White" operations are those in which the initiator (author) openly marks himself as the source of information, and "gray" operations are those in which the source of information is partially but not fully recognized.

One of the great examples of the PAG group activities was the provision of appropriate funding to the "Solidarity" trade union after the 1981 imposition of martial law in Poland. In addition, the PAG group conducted covert operations in Indonesia. The PAG group creates an important fundamental base for the hybrid warfare. This is the logical conduct of active measures involving a special operations group where diplomatic and direct military intervention is impossible.

Today, IAs of developing countries are becoming an effective toolkit and mechanism for maintaining (or undermining) the peace and security of the world community at the global, regional, and national levels.

The nature of IAs and its mechanisms of influence on the socio-political environment in foreign countries are hot topics today. It is evident from the lack of data and information about how such a body has been used in the social and political spheres; the lack of normative and regulatory unification of such a

concept as an active measure of influence; countering or financial support of any actor in the socio-political process through front groups and consulting firms; activity of PMCs in conflict regions, which not only perform security functions, but also exert influence on the actors of the socio-political process, etc.

It is worth noting that even a brief analysis of modern armed conflicts is sufficient to show that conflicts pose a significant threat to humanity in the circumstances of globalization. They can rapidly escalate into large-scale wars with tragic consequences [147]. Studying the experience of the USA in waging a hybrid war by the CIA and the experience of waging hybrid wars by the Russian Federation [148] allows us to develop a number of recommendations regarding the essence and mechanism of influence of domestic IA on the socio-political environment of a particular region or state under study.

Considering the fact that there is a special purpose unit (which is able to carry out active influence measures) in the IA of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, there is no need to create another unit similar to the CIA special operations group. From a professional point of view, it is enough only to increase the economic and technical resources of the existing special unit of the IA of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and to pay close attention to its employees' high-quality and reliable operational cover. The high level of legend-making determines the quality of tasks that will influence the actors of the socio-political process since a significant part of practical activity consists not of full-scale actions but of non-traditional forms of influence, which cannot be identified in the international arena.

A significant marker of political regime and political culture is the autonomy of civil society structures. Also, their effective influence on the political process. Therefore, the need to create a unit, such as a group of political actions, becomes especially critical. This unit is a key player in shaping the socio-political landscape. This unit will be assigned a wide range of tasks - from monitoring the elemental composition of the socio-political environment to determining the forms of influence. There is no single algorithm of coordinated actions to influence the socio-political situation in a region or state. It is the analysis, assessment, and forecasting of the process between the actors of the social and political processes that provide the opportunity to determine the technology of influence and the object of influence itself.

Furthermore, classic methods of influence, paramilitary influence operations, or political influence operations can only be employed after the state has adopted its strategic plan. It is about the presence of a clearly developed decision embraced by the highest state leadership. The *de facto* moment of making such a decision can be interpreted as an "act of war." Such a decision must trigger the appropriate technology of influence on another state or a separate region with the necessary methods and means of operation. Consequently, the technology of IA impact on the socio-political environment in a foreign country or a separate region can be described in the form of an algorithm containing the following steps:

1. The Center approves actions of influence on the socio-political environment in the region or state.
2. IA employees generate ideas of influence on one or another actor of the relations of the socio-political process based on the set directions.
3. The Center analyzes, assesses and offers recommendations to the state top leadership.
4. The main impact plan is approved with the participation of relevant groups and IA employees.
5. The elemental composition of the influence on the socio-political environment, methods and means are determined.
6. Influences are carried out in the appropriate directions, a set of measures is implemented that indirectly affect the social and political situation.

A diagram of the technology of the IA influencing the socio-political environment in foreign countries is presented in fig. 3.4.




Figure 3.4 – Diagram Techniques to Influence the Social and Political Environment

This technology forms an unconscious desire to accept the proposed mindset, ways of actioning and deeds among citizens of the foreign states, which will be the tools for IS influence on the socio-political environment. It is, therefore, the IA that is most capable of influencing socio-political environment in a given region or state since it can conduct special influence operations (special activities), as well as the secret use of provocative political actions to create the conflict. It is also necessary to focus attention on the fact that operations of political influence on socio-political processes can distract, bring confusion, and maze, thereby facilitating strategic special operations.

Approaches to justifying the technologies of influence are set through the establishment of indicators of the conflict situation between social and political values with the help of the organizational structures of the operational cover: NGOs, public organizations, community groups, associations, non-profit organizations, the third sector, promotion and lobbying entities, public paramilitary associations, PMCs, recruitment institutions for the cover, etc.

That is why, for the successful performance of the special tasks and effective use of the technology of influence of the IA on the socio-political environment in foreign countries, it is therefore necessary to pass a number of relevant regulatory mechanisms to expand the opportunities of the respective units for them to be able to involve additional units.

Analysis of the views of leading military scientists and real events in the world makes it possible to state the fact that traditional war and the conduct of combat operations in armed conflicts are conditioned by the parties desire to defeat the enemy with minimal destruction of domestic infrastructure and population isolation. Yet when waging non-conventional warfare the opposite is true. The fig. 3.5 presents the role of unconventional warfare in modern hybrid threats [149].




Figure 3.5 – Unconventional Warfare in Modern Conditions of Hybrid Threats

Unconventional warfare has the following characteristics: intensive use of Special Operations Forces, intelligence and special services forces, special purpose units; involvement of individuals, groups, organizations and parties, their capabilities, through open and covert manipulation of their views and beliefs; conducting a broad information campaign; the psychological and ideological influences on the population; the creation of separatist sentiments, both in political, economic, ethnic and religious spheres; extensive use of informants and agents; disruption of the economy; conducting trade wars and open-ended negotiation; providing financing, consultation, instructional and methodological support to dissatisfied citizens aiming to overthrow the current governing force; covert (with the help of Private Military Companies) combat operations; seizure of separate parts of the territory, regions of the neighboring state; support of illegal armed groups; plebiscites and referendums in destabilized areas; campaigning for the creation of "ethnic" aggression with the pseudo-goal of protecting the interests of certain population groups, etc.

One of the main advantages of unconventional warfare is that the perpetrators cannot be identified. Typically, these are small groups of 10-15 people with a single hierarchy and communication system. They all have operational intelligence training and adhere to the highest level of clandestine security, and are extensively experienced in combat and special training.




Figure 3.6 – The Focus of Influence of a Special Unit with Conventional and Unconventional Forms of Warfare

The perpetrators of unconventional forms of warfare typically focus their activities on matters related to social-political processes in foreign countries. In other words, they influence the population or those with authority to influence the internal situation within the country or region. For a more detailed understanding, see fig. 3.6 presenting the focus of the special unit's influence on the situation during conventional and non-conventional combat operations.

As we can see, unconventional forms of warfare place the greatest degree of influence on the actors in the socio-political process, with military organizations playing a key role in the action (Private Military Companies, terrorist or guerilla forces, criminals, irregular formations). The operational environment of the conduct of the unconventional war (conflict) is a set of spheres of the socio-political process closely linked between each other by their actors. Given the fact that unconventional warfare targets the population or individual officials who are able to influence any sphere of the socio-political environment in a foreign country or a separate region, they are all subject to a single goal.

Accordingly, to create the positive climate and conditions necessary to influence one or many socio-political spheres, a specially constituted Special Forces' task force unit is crucial. It is necessary to consider the appropriate model of the influence of IA's special purpose units on the social and political situation in a foreign country or a separate region. In addition, it is necessary to justify the relevant requirements for the presented model.

It is worth noting that even a brief analysis of modern armed conflicts shows that conflicts pose an increased threat to humanity in the age of globalization. They tend to escalate, evolving into large-scale wars with tragic consequences rapidly. The study of the CIA's experience in waging a hybrid war and the U.S. analysis of the asymmetric war waged by the Russian Federation [150] provides us with a set of recommendations regarding the nature and design of influence mechanisms on the socio-political environment of a particular region or state for national IA.

Different and specific (special) methods and means are used to fulfill the tasks assigned to the IA of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine regarding obtaining intelligence information, ensuring the security of intelligence activities, and protecting its forces, means, and sources of intelligence information. The further intensity of work on improving the forms and methods of conducting unconventional warfare (conflicts) depends on the aspect of planning and carrying out special operations (special activities) by special purpose units.

Analysis of late 20th and early 21st century wars shows that the main factors affecting the conduct of hostilities are operations in the military, economic, humanitarian, political, informational, cybernetic, and diplomatic spheres, which, in turn, are characterized by the use of hidden tools that will never be able to be identified.

US specialists' views and experience in conducting unconventional warfare make it possible to substantiate the appropriate model of conducting this

kind of special (secret, delicate) operations with their own special services. It is also necessary to pay attention to one's own experience of participating in unconventional wars with the Russian Federation, which also provides an opportunity to come to the conclusion that modern development trends require the use of a special tool that will be used by a special purpose unit to influence the socio-political environment in foreign countries or individual regions. The very model of application of such a tool of influence in a foreign country or a separate region is presented in fig. 3.7 and contains several levels (phases). Let's consider each of them separately.




Figure 3.7 – A Model of the IA Special Purpose Units Influence onto the Social and Political Environment

The first level (phase) will be a clandestine activity. This term is used in parallel with covert active measures. The main tool of this stage will be IA of the

Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, which conducts the analysis of the current shape of the socio-political environment in a particular country or a separate region through the relevant legitimate organizations. Those organizations that have the ability to identify sensitive and sometimes vulnerable areas of the socio-political environment at the strategic level in foreign countries or individual regions. It is traditional diplomacy, cultural events, participation in propaganda events, the study of corruption schemes and business-state interconnection schemes that will provide an opportunity to identify subjects of influence on one or another socio-political environment. If we consider covert foreign language speaking practices from a legal standpoint, it will provide an opportunity to identify the leaders of the opposition to the existing state power, and in the future — the possibility of minor financing of dissatisfied citizens or minorities. As an example, the dissatisfied Crimean Tatar minority on the territory of the annexed Crimea.

Special bodies of any state constantly study the socio-political environment of a foreign state, therefore they are always at the forefront of identifying vulnerable spots. Afterwards, they develop the primary stage and foundation of influence on the socio-political environment and study the main subjects of influence on the socio-political environment in a foreign country or a separate region.

Here, the main tool of influence on the socio-political environment enters the "operational game" — a dedicated task force divided into two equivalent units (special activities and political influence units). Using this unit and guided by the entire IA and special agencies system, the ways and components of the operational environment must be determined for the sake of further influencing them. The main influence variables affecting the foreign socio-political process should be identified to determine what kind of personnel should be deployed at the following stage of a covert operation (level II covert operation). This is where, namely, the understanding and accounting for the components of the operational situation makes it possible to exert leverage over the socio-political process.

The peculiarity of this stage is that it is necessary to identify non-traditional, weak objects or actors of the socio-political process, certain zones, and specific elements of impact requiring operational prepping, as well as to identify personnel to be involved in the next stage and to begin their additional training in the specified field.

At this point it seems relevant to reveal the summary of these very components, which will be influenced by the special purpose units of the IA of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine in the future. The main components include: determining the specifics of strategic operations in virtual space (formation of propaganda in our own and foreign mass media (a universal way to provide false information (disinformation), psychological influence on the population or the enemy's armed forces, creation of the idea of an invincible enemy, discrediting subjects of social and political processes, radio propaganda, sending provocative text messages, the use of sound effects, video propaganda involving psychological

operations with prisoners of war with the subsequent swap, etc.); the use of cyber attacks to involve all segments of the population; throwing out false strategic information on the plans of domestic forces, organizations (terrorist, religious), minorities of a foreign state; identification of relevant vulnerable actors of the socio-political process, financing of agents of influence in the political, economic, religious sector, etc.; identification of the future rally-goers, terrorist organizations, criminals, etc.; the use of cyber weapons to disrupt the stability of the infrastructure of a foreign state; corruption schemes in the state sphere; involvement of the unemployed population to stage rallies, protests and revolutions; the impact on the psyche of individuals who fell into the circle of influence (capture, investigative actions, etc.). This list is not exhaustive and cannot reveal all the specific actions that will be performed during the following phases.

The second level (phase) will be represented by specific covert operations of the level II. The main attention should be paid to the fact that all activities will be carried out through fictitious front organizations (companies). For example consulting, outsourcing, logistics, private, non-governmental companies, which will act as a specific center and conduct organizational activities for covert operations.

In this phase, the governmental special intelligence agencies of the state exercise the main tool of influence on the socio-political environment through the legal position, considered in the first stage of influence on the socio-political environment. All mass media platforms are involved (from printing provocative leaflets to statements by top officials at the international level), as well as all friendly organizations that are also interested in influencing the socio-political environment of a foreign state or a particular region.

The project of implementing level II clandestine operations will be managed through consulting, outsourcing, non-governmental, private, and logistics companies. Depending on the operation's name, the main tasks will include secret, specific, and sensitive operations that will not have any connection to the customer country.

This phase is marked by several features:

- sponsorship of non-governmental organizations, designated criminal groups;
- organization and staging of rallies, revolutions, riots, strikes;
- regulation of influence (moral-psychological, physical, social) on the actors of the socio-political interaction in a foreign state, etc.;
- search and selection of candidates to perform tasks of the level I;
- creation of favorable conditions for conducting level I clandestine operations, development of the operations of a new level, which can be detected only at the level II;
- control of the internal distribution of supplies and other resources, which is carried out through private companies that are fully controlled by the IA.

National security and policy issues in the international arena can be resolved by involving the private business without being identified.

One of the successful examples of conducting such level II special clandestine operations is providing educational counseling to the armed units of the Private Military Companies or illegal armed formations with the provision of not only theoretical but also practical knowledge, skills and abilities. There are many such successful examples in the history of armed conflicts. The positive aspect of involving PMCs is their promptness and efficiency, compared to the use of active officers in international organizations. It should also be noted that level II operations are carried out only by specialists of a special task force having appropriate training, forged papers of such a front company (private, logistics, security, etc.) and complying with the clandestine security measures.

Level III (phase) covert operations will be presented as a subset of first-level covert operations. Special emphasis should be placed on the fact that all activities will be carried out through the establishment of front organizations (companies), which will provide consulting knowledge, skills, and abilities.

During this phase, special state agencies support and assist the primary tool of exerting influence on social and political processes.

Consultants and instructors will be responsible for providing assistance, direct participation in special influence activities, physical influence activities, and increasing support for a country's internal environment. During this level I of covert operations, blackmail, intimidation, deception, intelligence gathering, organizing and supporting resistance movements, temporary removal, or extreme influence activities are conducted. It should be noted that in the third phase, special task force units play a vital role and are actively involved in influencing a foreign country's social and political situation. Their ability to understand the social and political processes taking place at any given moment and the availability of appropriate forces and means determine the effectiveness of Level I covert operations.

A suitable example of this type of Level I activity includes Russia's campaign to annex Crimea, Ossetia, and Abkhazia and create the TMR. Certainly, the so-called "green men" or "polite people," later found to be Russian Armed Forces personnel, were involved in Crimea's annexation. However, in parallel, a large number of civilians were involved through the very same private companies (Wagner, E.N.O.T., "Slavonic Corps"), non-governmental organizations (Afghan veterans, Cossack regiments), which acted as leaders of unrest and discontent among the civilian population. Another relevant example is the poisoning of former Russian intelligence officer Sergei Skripal and his daughter. Officers of the special forces unit fulfilled a special task with the help of falsified documents, namely, to inform the entire international community about the specific capabilities of the GRU of the Russian General Staff. The third example is the special forces' participation in Libya in 2019. The British non-governmental company "The Sun", which is an unofficial program of British strategic

intelligence, has provided information on the involvement of the Russian special units for creating favorable conditions for refugee migration to Europe with the further destabilization of the socio-political environment in the EU. Also, in Libya, Russian special units (PMC "LIGA") serve as instructors to create a fragile situation in the country, which will allow Russia to gain friendly and partner relationships in Africa, around the EU, and the ability to exercise pressure on strategic energy resources (oil) in the world.

Level IV (phase) marks the final point and intensification of unconventional warfare. During this stage, a special task force unit operates only remotely, supervising influence measures and taking an active role in the destabilization of a situation in a foreign country or a particular region. The personnel involved at this stage provide every comprehensive assistance, except for the physical presence. A remarkable example of such the unconventional operation was a case of Ukraine's territory (Donetsk and Luhansk regions). Relevant officials with special training arrived supervise the Illegal Armed Groups (IAG), performed a monitoring mission, built an agent network (both on the territory of the "DPR" and "LPR" and beyond), gathered reconnaissance data on the deployment of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, allocation of forces and resources, identified and trained appropriate actors of influence on the socio-political environment, etc.

As we can clearly see, the fourth phase combines all forms of warfare, including information, special and military operations. Its main performers are the same non-governmental organizations, movements, communities, and IAGs, while the control is carried out distantly by the clandestine specialists of a special forces unit under the guise of advisory firms or informal partners. It is during this phase that a strong information campaign is to be carried out to the maximum possible degree, creating an atmosphere of terror and constant threats in the shortest time. Additionally, the use of local residents as combatants is suggested.

In order for a Special Forces unit ("agent special forces") to be able to perform the special tasks of influencing the socio-political processes of a foreign state, thereby meeting the basic requirements of unconventional warfare, the said unit must have combat experience in traditional wars, combat operations, peacekeeping or security operations, be provided with relevant cover teams and experience in a foreign country. The involvement of Special Operations Forces ('agent special forces') in third-world countries will enable them to gain the relevant expertise, knowledge, skills, and training in conducting unconventional warfare at all four stages. It will also allow SOP units (agent special forces) to identify weaknesses and to find ways and means to influence the socio-political environment of a particular state or certain regions in a modern and timely manner using the IA information assets.

The unique features of the present-day unconventional conflicts also stem from the new communication requirements imposed by the 21st century, meaning warfare takes over such platforms as regular news, briefings, blogs, podcasts, talk

shows, debate programs, rallies, revolutions, and the mass media platforms Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, V Kontakte, Telegram, and more. All these platforms serve the purpose of influencing the population of a country or a particular region, as well as the actors of socio-political process, where the mass effect is a key factor for the success of a special operation. Then there is yet another tool of unconventional conflict that incites an unstable socio-political environment, provides expert guidance, methodological advice, financial support, instigates rallies, strikes, mass protests, and in some cases provides arms.

To summarize, among the many variables potentially affecting the socio-political environment in a particular foreign country or region, the set of tools and actors for further influencing is identified. This set of tools requires a clear hierarchy, graduation of tasks, capabilities, supervision by the top state leadership, and criteria for influence on a particular socio-political process in a foreign country or in a specific region, according to the designed degree of severity of the situation. It is necessary to consider that this kind of task is not new and is already present in both developed and underdeveloped countries. It is necessary to focus on the fact that such units exist in developing countries, as it is financially beneficial to have a small trained group that can influence the socio-political environment in a foreign country.

Quite obviously, without the involvement of special state bodies, it is impossible to accomplish complex tasks regarding the impact on the social and political situation — this has been proven by most countries for many years. Special purpose units of an influencing country IA is namely that tool able to exert influence on the socio-political environment, which performs these delicate and specialized missions in unconventional warfare of the new generation. The proposed model of influence on the socio-political environment of a foreign country or a separate region by the SOP units of the national IA is a cognitive process that is theoretically grounded. It has its own actors of interaction between the IA, front companies, and direct performers of unconventional warfare. Due to scientific research, all the components that can have a significant impact on social and political processes were revealed in the model, making it visual and easy to understand.

Each of the stages in the above model is responsible for a list of issues that will affect this or that socio-political situation in a foreign country or a separate region. Figure 3.8 details the IA's role at each stage (phase) of influencing social and political processes. Tied to the socio-political processes taking place in a foreign country or a separate region, the role of the IA remains one of the most effective tools of influence on actors that can influence foreign policy interests.

Figure 3.8 demonstrates that the 1st phase is the foundation of all processes that take place in a foreign country. Thanks to the analysis of the competent IA specialists, it is possible to both identify the operational situation, which can be influenced, and also gain the appropriate assessment and forecast of the further development of events under the condition of influencing this or that

situation. As an example, we can cite the special operation of the Russian Federation regarding the annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. We can assess the effectiveness of planning a special operation on the territory of Ukraine from the events of 2014.




Figure 3.8 – The Role of IA at Stages (Phases) of Influence on the Socio-Political Situation

However, the predicted consequences, international sanctions that affected the economy of the Russian Federation, were not taken into account. At this stage, further developments need to be monitored, provided that the special purpose unit successfully manages to influence a particular socio-political environment and the consequences are positive for our state's national interests and policy.

An artificially created situation in the future may have a negative impact on one's own state. As an example, artificially created conflict situations and their negative consequences can move onto one's own border situation or discredit the state's position in the international arena.

The very essence of the IA's role in phase I, its ability to analyze and assess the socio-political environment and situation based on research findings, lies in determining the development factors of the actors of the social processes that

directly or indirectly impact the events in a given country or region and in forecasting future events that can affect their own state.

In phase II, it is necessary to determine the agents who will be engaged in influencing the socio-political environment, and how and which components they will influence. It is at this stage the companies, "cover" organizations providing legends of IA employees, enter the "operational game". It is also necessary to pay attention to the fact that at this stage, special attention is paid to the selection of specialists who are able to perform a special task based on their willpower, moral, and professional qualities. Among the special qualities a specialist needs to possess are: moral and psychological qualities, namely honesty, decency, justice, sense of responsibility; willpower and qualities of a "strong personality" (determination, energy, the ability to make decisions independently and the ability and willingness to be responsible for the decisions made); intellectual and professional qualities; patriotism.

In the context of the above, the overall significance of the moral and psychological potential and patriotism of the persons involved in the second phase becomes more important. As evidenced by the best practices, stable and efficient specific tasks during the stay in a foreign country are carried out by specialists manifesting the following criteria: a developed sense of responsibility; the constant need to care for the success of a special operation; the ability to actively participate in the public life of a foreign country; the desire to use one's knowledge, skills and abilities for the benefit of the national interests of Ukraine; the ability to constructively solve complex problems without the intervention of a senior boss. This means that the selection procedure for the IA special purpose unit, which will be involved in the second stage of influence on the socio-political environment and situation in a foreign state or region, must meet the above criteria.

Solving a complex and controversial problem, namely the ability to identify vulnerable moments in the socio-political process of a foreign state or region, and how exactly it is necessary to exert the influence, will depend both on the specialists involved in the special operation, and on the central management of the IA, which was involved in the first stage. The further development of events will depend on the central IA's understanding of the competent abilities of the specialists to determine the details of the impact on the socio-political environment and situation, and on all kinds of assistance (informational, technical, financial, etc.) through front companies. In the event of a misunderstanding of the central IA and the constant control of the special purpose unit specialists, it will be impossible to proceed to the third stage.

The third phase, shown in the figure 3.8, depends on the specialists of the special purpose unit. The success of this phase depends on their ability to identify a successful tool for influencing the socio-political environment, as well as on all kinds of support and motivating actors of influence of the socio-political process in a foreign country. The most trained specialists and those who were in the

second phase are admitted to the specified phase. It should also be noted that any replacement or removal (arrest) of a specialist in the third phase can have fatal consequences. As an example, we can cite the detention of several "pseudo-journalists" of the Turkish branch of the Russian propaganda channel "Sputnik", who were accused of inciting separatism on the territory of the Republic of Turkey during the Turkish operation "Spring Shield" in 2020. In such a way, the Turkish side prevented the possibility of carrying out level I secret operations and supporting separatist sentiments in some parts of the country.

If we analyze the world practices of deploying various IA organizational structures, in particular the experience of the CIA [151], we can conclude that the operational cover institutions for operatives, who will carry out special operations of influence, should be both of official and unofficial (clandestine) type. The official type includes: promotional and lobbying institutions, various legal institutions, paramilitary patriotic institutions, PMCs, recruiting centers, logistics companies, subsidiaries, various branches, representative offices, etc. Unofficial organizations include operational cover institutions, which are called "front organizations," created with the aim of diverting possible threats directly from official institutions.

Business companies of this type are called "shell companies" or "ghost corporations", their main task of which is the protection of the parental company from legal (financial) liability for certain commercial actions.

The fourth phase is decisive and incorporates all progress that has been made so far during the previous three phases. This phase itself is characterized as unconventional warfare, involving all the possible actors of influence on the socio-political environment — ranging from the official diplomatic push to conducting revolutions in foreign countries and engaging dissatisfied, outraged segments of the population. This is all carried out in a variety of well-known areas: information, political, economic, military, financial, etc. The peculiarity of this phase is that IA specialists provide only consulting assistance and supervision. They are responsible for control over the influence on the socio-political processes to overthrow the current government or create as many difficulties as possible.

Conclusion to the Chapter Three

Based on the analysis of the impact of new actors on the transformation of the international relations system and the socio-political component of international relations, it is feasible to determine the most effective technology for influencing the socio-political environment in foreign countries and separate regions.

A key requirement for performing such a sector-specific function is the establishment of a special unit such as those already existing in advanced countries. This particular unit must have the ability and strength to perform tasks

in unconventional warfare (UW) and participate in guerrilla warfare (GW) and irregular warfare (IW). All these wars require subtle planning and management. In contrast, conventional armed forces are incapable of acting independently without the involvement of specially trained specialists with a creative mindset.

Therefore, the involvement of special units with the application of various types, forms, and methods of influence on the socio-political environment makes it possible to implement the state's geopolitical and economic ambitions, thereby becoming an efficient tool for addressing those important tasks. Influence on various strata of the population, governmental and non-governmental institutions, socio-political organizations, and national minorities both in certain regions and in the global arena are interesting examples of the application of unconventional forces and means that pose a potential threat to the national interests of a non-partner state. All this becomes possible by establishing an appropriate special unit, developing specialized methodological guidelines, and adapting them to modern requirements of unconventional warfare.

CHAPTER 4

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE USE OF PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES

Awareness of the situation in the international arena, the correlation of own and other people's interests and capabilities, the emergence of universal means of armed confrontation of the developed countries, a set of covert and overt measures aimed at destabilizing one or another element of the state system, necessitate a rethinking of the existing forms and methods of non-classical special influence operations.

Former Soviet special services, as well as their competitors, have undergone a radical restructuring in the form of privatization of power tools to use irregular armed groups (insurgents, guerrilla movements, terrorists, etc.) or private armies to perform specific tasks.

For this purpose, specially trained personnel are used, who will be involved in influence operations and will have an official legal status. In this context, it is advisable to consider PMCs in more detail.

4.1. Private military companies as a convenient tool for special operations

Many studies have been conducted that examine the theoretical and applied aspects of unconventional special operations that intelligence services can conduct in modern asymmetric conflicts. As a rule, the unusual nature of special operations, and sometimes their illegality, requires secrecy. Special operations take place not only during war, but also in peacetime. Such operations can be carried out both openly and covertly. American, Western European, and Russian special services had to adjust the main tools for performing special tasks in accordance with the new international realities.

O. Vorona in his monograph notes that to ensure the secrecy and cover-up of the agents of intelligence during the performance of their tasks, appropriate organizational cover is used by creating autonomous (independent) organizational structures or by reaching franchise agreements with the leadership of government departments or with the owners of private entities [152].

As is well known, unofficial cover positions are more secretive than official ones, as they are "not exposed". Private companies are a type of unofficial positions that will be able to perform specific influence operations using unconventional influence technologies. First of all, we are talking about a set of intelligence, counterintelligence, sabotage, information-psychological and other activities of varying duration and intensity carried out by special services.

Experts in the field of private military business emphasize the key difference between PMCs and mercenary groups. Private Security & Military Companies (PSMCs) were until recently considered non-governmental contractors providing professional security services and consulting services for demonstrations of force. Their tasks were mainly limited to the protection of important facilities, escorting valuable cargo or protecting VIPs. However, over the past decades, this type of business has reached a fundamentally new level, demonstrating that PMCs are an effective unit that can perform atypical operations and even form the backbone of an occupation army. The interest in PMCs becomes relevant when there is a need to engage a convenient tool for special (covert, sensitive) operations where it is necessary to avoid identification of the unit (uniform, weapons, official recognition of participation in the conflict). It is the PMC that is an ideal cover tool for employees of a special purpose unit, which will provide an opportunity to legitimize and develop operational cover documents, rather than the ability to identify the company's affiliation.

Recent events in the international arena show that the strategies of aggressor countries no longer rely on military force, and their combat potential does not affect the achievement of strategic goals. A new type of war is entering the arena of interstate confrontation, where long-term and targeted information gathering requires the involvement of special specialists who can operate in a conflict sector that lacks the concept of front and rear.

Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Egypt, Ukraine, Syria, Libya. None of these conflicts goes on without the participation of PMCs. Today, PMCs have become a significant means of influencing international relations. According to a study by scientists and journalists from the United States and Western Europe, there are currently more than 1.5 million employees of private military entities in the world. Today, several hundred PMCs of various profiles (military services companies, consulting companies, logistics companies, etc.) operate in 50 countries [153], many of which are part of large global corporations.

Modern wars are more often considered within the framework of the theory and practice of unconventional warfare, where open aggression is unacceptable, and influence on the enemy is exercised by destabilizing the political and social situation, blocking the information activities of public authorities, undermining the authority and discrediting the actors of socio-political relations, provoking social, political, national, religious clashes - to the point of unleashing a civil war. The main goal is to create an atmosphere of general instability, fear and uncertainty, to distract the opponent's attention through non-standard technologies of influence. The main principles of such a war strategy would be as follows:

- Principle of asymmetry;
- Principle of maneuverability;
- Principle of interaction;

- Principles that have a guerrilla movement vector or unconventional warfare vector;
- Principle of chaos;
- Principle of special training;
- Principle of secrecy and non-affiliation with any state.

In fact, all of the above means and principles have been tested by developed countries and the Russian Federation through front private companies. Private military and security companies are private business entities that provide consulting and other specialized services, with the characteristic feature of using irregular armed groups or private armies. Most firms that specialize in personnel protection and do not participate in hostilities call themselves private security companies [154]. According to the definition of one of the first specialized international agreements, the Montreux Document, these are private business entities that provide military and/or security services, regardless of how they self-identify. Military and security services include, inter alia, armed guarding and protection of people and assets, such as convoys, buildings and other locations; maintenance and operation of military facilities; custody of prisoners; and advising or training of local military personnel and guards [155].

The downsizing of the armed forces in Western countries that began after the Cold War gave an additional impetus to the development of PMCs. Armed forces became smaller, but the tasks remained. To perform special tasks that used to be carried out by career military personnel, it was decided to involve private firms - a kind of military "outsourcing".

In the early 1990s, PMCs became a respectable and very attractive business. PMCs began to operate quite actively in Africa. 90 private firms "provide security", 80 of which perform tasks in Angola, where they protect Western oil and mining companies. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq gave impetus to the growth of the number of companies that received contracts directly from the ministries and departments of the United States and Great Britain (Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, Department of Defense), UN agencies (UNICEF, UNHCR, UNDP), and the World Health Organization.

The legal framework for PMCs is established by the national legislation of a small number of countries, in particular in the USA, Iraq, and South Africa [156-158]. In the United States, the Department of Defense has adopted a procedure for the interaction of US Army personnel and PMC employees in the combat zone - FM 100-21 [159].

Today, all states, international and non-governmental organizations, humanitarian and support agencies, and individuals conclude contracts with PMCs for "military" services. PMCs are becoming a convenient tool for foreign military operations. PMC activities are often associated with training local security forces in countries where conflicts are ongoing.

We will not list all the known names of PMCs that operate abroad today. A large number of studies have been conducted on the activities of foreign PMCs and security companies. Let's focus on why PMCs are a relevant and effective tool for departmental intelligence services today and what tasks PMCs can perform.

4.2. Advantages and Drawbacks of Using Private Military Companies

The main factor in the use of PMCs is that the state authorities of different countries can use PMCs to circumvent the restrictions that govern existing control mechanisms (for example, the legal framework limits the number of military personnel abroad, and PMCs do not count as such). They can be included in any operation as an adapted unit to perform specific (covert, sensitive) functions. In many countries, PMCs are not required to provide information on their activities or profit items. Their employees mainly perform their activities as consulting specialists, not military personnel.

Also, the effectiveness of PMCs lies in the fact that there is no dissatisfaction among the local population where the operation is conducted (these are not regular armed forces of another country, but other multinational companies for the protection of important facilities (entities)). There is no discontent among its own population (there are no official wounded or losses among the armed forces, the state does not need to pay the family for the death of their relative).

Another major efficiency argument is that PMCs can operate in the so-called "blind spot of jurisdiction" of all countries and carry out special (covert) operations. It is the secrecy and the ability to conduct latent politics that are of interest to most nations. The legislative framework regulating PMCs is not yet fully developed, especially abroad, which makes it impossible to control them. The UN Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries has been ratified by only 35 countries and is largely unsuitable for countering new challenges. In most cases, national legislation of individual countries also lacks effective mechanisms for holding mercenaries accountable for their crimes. Therefore, the denial of any ties between PMCs and the state (latent politics) and national and departmental intelligence services is a powerful argument.

PMCs are an opportunity to exercise leadership, conduct special (covert, secret) operations and be in the center of events, as there is no need to build an agent network to obtain real information. PMCs allow veterans and fighters to realize their professional skills and abilities in a legal way, thus preventing the outflow of competent personnel outside the country.

In addition, the expenses for PMCs are more cost-effective than those for army units. The main arguments for this may be that private companies employ

civilian (veteran) specialists who are paid more than military personnel. However, PMC personnel do not have any social insurance guarantees from the state or an organization. PMC employees already have the necessary education and skills. PMCs do not need to train specialists, and they are limited to courses that can be obtained independently. In addition, international practice shows that in many countries, PMCs successfully operate and employ people, thereby filling the budget of their own country rather than a foreign one.

PMCs do not need to create their own internal security services and monitor the social life of PMC employees and their discipline. Most of them understand that this is a special kind of work, and not all customers (individuals or legal entities) of their services want to be "visible" on social media. And if such cases are detected, large monetary penalties (or even contract termination) will be imposed, which the company's employees do not want. In addition, today the image of the PMC is legal within the framework of the law.

Currently, PMCs provide a wide range of services. These services include: search for professionals for military operations; paramilitary protection of people and facilities (e.g., embassies, energy systems, or oil pipelines); protection of transport convoys; protection of humanitarian missions; participation in peacekeeping missions (e.g., under the auspices of the UN; demining; reconnaissance and assessment of the security situation in the region); maintenance and use of sophisticated combat systems and equipment (e.g., advanced artillery or drones); counter-piracy - escort and protection of ships, negotiations with pirates; evacuation of people from hot spots; logistical support of troops; providing analytical services; providing military interpreters; controlling prisons; training local police or military forces (e.g., snipers, rangers); performing police functions where law enforcement agencies do not operate; detaining and escorting detainees or prisoners; training civilians to deal with extreme conditions; full participation in combat operations - together with regular units or separately, conducting information operations, conducting analytical operations, supporting and financing disgruntled populations, uprisings. The list is not exhaustive - it is generally about all types of special operations (forceful, informational, analytical), including financial operations to support certain actors in the socio-political process of a particular region or foreign state [160].

The distribution of the range of PMC services is shown in Fig. 4.1 As we can see, the main share is the implementation of a set of professional military activities, security and intelligence operations.

It cannot be denied that the world practice confirms the existence of negative aspects of the use of PMCs. The problem of PMCs is primarily related to the activities of large companies (corporations) that are able to influence the political situation and actively engage in direct hostilities. There are also other issues, such as the "legal vacuum of PMCs", which relates to the status, duties and rights of employees of these companies, as such nuances remain not fully defined, and rarely does an employee understand them. For example, when does an

artillery or sniping instructor have the right to correct the actions of his or her students on the battlefield? On the one hand, it can be defined as direct participation in combat operations, on the other hand, it is only a test of knowledge, skills and abilities by an instructor of a private military firm that provides consulting and educational services [161].




Figure 4.1 - Distribution of the Range of PMC Services

Some experts and specialists highlight the problem that PMC employees come to perform their tasks for money and they do not take an oath because they do not have a Motherland. In fact, in today's realities and in the context of specific (atypical, unconventional, covert) operations, this is only a positive aspect. An example is the French Legion, which is part of the French regular army, but staffed almost entirely by foreigners. The creation of the legion allowed to find the number of troops necessary for the colonization of Algeria and at the same time to get rid of a large number of criminals for whom service in the legion was a chance to start a new life. And today, thanks to the legionnaires, France defends its geopolitical interests in different parts of the world without shedding the blood of its own citizens.

In modern wars, PMCs are the most adapted unit in this hybrid environment. The use of corporate soldiers (bypassing military protocols and ceasefire agreements) is an inevitable reality.

4.3.Experience and Features of the Use of Private Military Companies as a Means of Influencing the Socio-Political Environment

Today, the war in our country continues. In the initial stages, when Ukraine seized the initiative on the battlefield, another truce was signed, and then the Russian PMCs came into play, seizing the initiative on the battlefield, shooting

down airplanes with paratroopers, etc. Therefore, the benefits that Ukraine's special services could gain from the creation of PMCs under their control are obvious, at least in this area.

It becomes clear that the main international experience is a specific form of PMC application. It is the creation of such controlled corporations that is inherent in all countries involved in wars and conflicts, and their secret diplomacy is not able to promote national interests without the involvement of such companies [162].

The world experience shows that the range of PMCs' use in different regions is quite wide. They are entrusted with the construction of military infrastructure, protection of cargo and diplomatic institutions, training and education of military personnel, introduction of military technologies and production of weapons, intelligence or counterintelligence activities, as well as participation in combat operations and counterterrorism operations, and certain "specific" assignments in which the state cannot be officially involved.

Specific operations and assignments, unconventional means of influence (special actions) are also the practice of using PMCs to disguise the full-fledged activities of the state's IAs and are fully consistent with the realities in Georgia, Ukraine, Sudan, Libya and Syria. It is an ideal basis for creating a true order subordinate to one's own forces and avoiding responsibility for unconventional means of influence against peace and other international crimes. In his publications, V. Kovalchuk argues that PMCs are an effective tool both in the realities of the war in the East of Ukraine and in the future foreign policy, where Ukraine's interests will not always coincide with the legal framework of international law [163].

The following groups have been identified in the war unleashed by Russia in the East of Ukraine: Cossacks (a cross between police and soldiers); regular army soldiers ("little green men"); Chechen mercenaries (units created by A. Kadyrov); other mercenaries (representatives of Arab countries and some EU countries); former Berkut officers (a disbanded special unit of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine); local ethnic Russians living in Ukraine; Russian "tourists" (former military personnel acting as mercenaries); real actors (used for propaganda purposes or deliberately seeking Western cameras to play a dramatic role and contribute to the falsification); former Ukrainian soldiers and officers (who deserted the Ukrainian army or are serving in it but are traitors/spies); local criminals who received military training and weapons; local residents who were forced to fight (through money, coercion or propaganda); Russian criminals or prisoners who were granted amnesty in exchange for mercenary service in the war in Ukraine; FSB agents; Russian generals and senior officers who "coordinate the ceasefire" on the Ukrainian side of the front; foreign journalists who collect valuable information and create negative stories about Ukraine.

As we can see, the aforesaid groups that operated on the territory of Ukraine before the annexation of Crimea include non-governmental private

companies that cannot be identified as part of the Russian security sector and that provided a number of typical services: recruitment of personnel, protection and assault of important facilities, escorting convoys, providing training services, spreading false information, participating in strikes, rallies, etc.

It is worth noting that the ambiguity of PMCs' status allows not only to identify the organization's affiliation, but also to "bypass" international law, quickly expand the geography of its operations (including special operations), increase its influence in the region of instability, allow special services to be present in the conflict zone, and provide reliable intelligence information.

In Western countries, the activities of such private military units are strictly regulated and controlled by law. In Russia, the specificity of their activities lies in the Kremlin's personal leadership.

Given all these circumstances and the international experience of PMCs, there is a need to rethink our own existing forms and methods of performing specific operations that will affect the socio-political environment in a particular region or foreign country. The PMC's activities are not perfect, there are subtleties and shortcomings. Still, from a professional point of view, the experience of the United States, the United Kingdom, China, and Israel should be taken into account in this aspect, where large amounts of money and effort were unlikely to be allocated to such projects without confidence in their effectiveness. PMCs are a very effective tool for changing the global political landscape, and besides, "corporate warriors" help to fulfill a range of special (secret, sensitive) tasks if it is necessary to circumvent legislative aspects.

That is why the state must control the activities of PMCs and the provision of reliable intelligence information to the state authorities as defined by the Law of Ukraine "On Intelligence Agencies of Ukraine" and the implementation of special measures aimed at supporting the national interests and state policy of Ukraine in the economic, political, military, military-technical, environmental and information spheres. Strengthening defense capabilities, economic, research and development, and the protection and defense of the state border are the basis for the creation of such companies.

Accordingly, among the tasks that may be assigned to the IA in the future to influence the socio-political environment in a foreign country is the need to involve already experienced IA specialists in the future campaign (the selection of personnel will be carried out exclusively by the IA representative with appropriate personnel checks). The personnel who will be part of the PMC and carry out specific tasks of the IA will be selected from among veterans who have served in special bodies and have experience in operational, security and specific work.

The structure of the PMC itself should have two official branches, as shown in Fig. 4.2.




Figure 4.2 - PMC Structure

The first branch will be responsible for military activities, and the second branch will be responsible for security and consulting services. It is clear that the above are the official services that PMCs can provide. They can be conceptually understood as a set of coordinated activities that will be carried out in a neighboring state through branches or partnership programs. At the same time, the unofficial functions (tasks) of the IA will include:

- Long-term and purposeful collection of information about the socio-political situation and processes of a foreign state by intelligence, operational, technical and legal methods;
- Information-analytical and prognostic support of the top state leadership regarding socio-political processes in a foreign country;
- Creating stable positions of direct or indirect influence in the socio-political, military, economic, administrative and other sectors of a foreign state;
- Engaging citizens from the political elite of a foreign state in cooperation, who, by their status, can be used to influence the socio-political environment of a foreign state;

- Engaging specialists in coups d'état, riots, mass protests and other actions that can lead to changes in the socio-political system of a foreign state;
- Participating in the creation and management of organizations, movements, mass media, training units, whose activities can influence the socio-political processes of a foreign state;
- Participating in the creation of a structure, mental training of personnel to influence the subjects of the socio-political process of a foreign state;
- Establishing and maintaining channels of illegal financing of anti-state forces (structures), including combat and terrorist formations, transfer of weapons, sabotage means, information products, etc. to ensure their illegal activities;
- Organizing professional training and education of specialists (organizers) of reconnaissance and sabotage, terrorist actions, propaganda and other destructive actions, their illegal transfer to the conflict theater;
- Creating anti-government groups to find vulnerabilities in their own socio-political system, etc.

Thus, the use of PMCs as an instrument of influence on the socio-political environment in a particular foreign country or a particular region is very attractive in modern hybrid wars. Such companies exclude the possibility of identifying the customer of certain special actions that will influence a particular socio-political environment. Such an effective tool as a PMC will allow to operate in gray areas, to cooperate with the criminal and terrorist sector, extremist, religious, ethnic movements, etc. In addition, the use of such companies will make it possible to use veteran movements that have extensive experience in waging wars abroad and on our territory, and will prevent the outflow of professionals to foreign PMCs. It is easier to legitimize them, since they are already civilians, and their experience in waging wars will be applied in the right direction of influence for the IA. Most importantly, PMC activities as a tool of operational cover do not need to be reflected in the public information space, which is a very important issue of secrecy today and fits organically into the system of corporate superpower.

Conclusion to Chapter Four

Given the main trends in the transformation of the essence of modern confrontation, the growing importance of non-military and unconventional means that will be able to influence the socio-political processes of a foreign state, and, ideally, to force its own population to influence its own socio-political environment, there is a need to create such an instrument as a PMC. It is the process of privatization of military and security functions that prompts the creation of its own "private" instrument that will be able to perform official and unofficial functions to influence the socio-political situation.

At the same time, the created PMC should be governed exclusively by the governmental IA and have a single hierarchical management system. This will allow for full control by the top management of the company. Operational officers, the communication system, intelligence and counterintelligence, diplomatic steps, processing of public consciousness, psychological operations, and ethnopsychological construction, science, and the religious sphere will have interconnected elements of a single IA network. Further development of the non-state control system will lead to the fact that private military firms will be the determining forces in modern unconventional warfare.

Therefore, it is necessary to create controlled PMCs to ensure Ukraine's national interests and security and increase the effectiveness of the IA's implementation of special measures during delicate special operations.

CHAPTER 5

METHODS OF CONDUCTING SPECIAL INFLUENCE OPERATIONS

The main function performed by IA operatives in the course of special operations to influence the socio-political situation is to conduct covert operations. The U.S. CIA defines covert operations as special operations aimed at influencing governments, events, organizations, or individuals to support the foreign policy of their own country in a way that is not always acceptable to the highest authorities. The United States considers such covert operations to include propaganda activities, support for political or military movements in a particular country, technical and other support to various governments to solve problems in their countries, actions to neutralize illegal activities that threaten its own national interests (terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking), etc. Covert operations are carried out in accordance with the defined goals of foreign policy and in cases where official, open activities cannot produce the desired results [164].

Thus, from the foreign experience of conducting unconventional wars, we can identify the main special operations that will be conducted for the successful conduct of this type of war. The whole essence of unconventional warfare depends on the implementation of special influence operations. There are a large number of ways to conduct special (covert) operations to influence the socio-political situation in a foreign country or a particular region. These include:

- A special operation to organize support for separatist movements and opposition;
- A special operation to organize support for a resistance movement;
- A special operation to organize support for radical, terrorist organizations (religious);
- Agent-based information and psychological influence operations (disinformation, lobbying, manipulation, propaganda, intimidation, blackmail, etc;)
- Special operations of political technologies of influence through the media;
- A special operation of an organization of hard power agent technologies;
- Special operations to organize strikes and protests;
- Special operations to organize a coup d'état, military rebellion, popular uprising or national revolution;
- Unconventional warfare (guerrilla and underground movements).

Let us consider each of the above special operations in more detail.

5.1. Organization of Support for Separatist Movements and Opposition

If you ask any Ukrainian citizen today what separatism is, the answer will be unambiguous. However, until 2013, the majority of the population of our country did not pay attention to this concept.

Modern scientific conceptions of separatism, as well as the degree of substantiation of the phenomenon of separatism by domestic and foreign scholars, allow us to define the concept of separatism as an ambivalent phenomenon of the modern era, which, on the one hand, can lead to disintegration of the state and disruption of the balance of geopolitical security, and on the other hand, is one of the means of realizing the economic, political, social, and cultural interests of an ethnic or territorial community subject to political, economic, and cultural discrimination.

K. Lytvynenko notes in his academic works that separatism as a concept has come a long way in its development and is now quite broad and multifaceted. It can be understood as an aspiration, a movement, and a belief in the need to separate a certain territory from the state in order to create a new independent state, to join another state, or to acquire the status of broad autonomy [165].

Separatism is a complex multifaceted phenomenon that does not have an unambiguous normative definition and qualification, so its specific manifestations do not always receive an unambiguous assessment both in theory and in practice. International law emphasizes that the basis for separatist movements is the principle of equality of peoples and their right to self-determination. Discussions on what characteristics a group should have to legally exercise this right, as well as the lack of an unambiguous interpretation of how this right should be consistent with the principle of territorial inviolability of states, contribute to separatist sentiments. Separatism and its manifestations can be classified according to various criteria that allow distinguishing their types and forms. Proper qualification of the separatist movement makes it possible to assess the validity of its demands and find ways to resolve the conflict or ways to conduct special operations to influence the causes that will lead to dissatisfied manifestations of the population.

Analysis of possible strategies for conducting special operations of influence to incite separatism and development of relevant recommendations can be carried out only after theoretical understanding and adequate interpretation of significant factors of the socio-political process in a foreign country and a separate region by relevant operatives who will have the proper knowledge and skills to identify possible causes of separatism.

A separatist movement can be defined as a social form of realization of separatism, which is manifested in the purposeful activity of certain actors in socio-political relations (individuals or social groups) aimed at separating a certain territory from the state in order to create a new independent state, transfer

to another state or acquire the status of broad autonomy. Thus, a separatist movement carried out by another state's IA is usually the moment of conducting a set of special operations to influence the subjects of the socio-political process, which will be aimed at separating from the current state power to another state or creating their own autonomy.

A special operation of influence on the socio-political environment through the formation of an opposition has differences. The term opposition should be understood as movements, parties, groups and individuals who oppose the existing state authorities and the course they are pursuing. And, accordingly, they seek to replace the government and pursue their own course.

The main institutional element of opposition structures are parties that acquire the status of opposition or governing parties in the course of the competition for power through elections. The effectiveness of the political opposition depends on many factors, including:

- Legislative definition of the status of the opposition;
- Guarantees of its rights;
- Cohesion of forces;
- Having an authoritative leader;
- Adequate funding, etc.

Thus, the main differences between the separatist movement and the opposition are the subjects of influence and the degree of influence at the state level. It is also necessary to emphasize that a set of measures that can be taken by the IA to influence the socio-political environment through information and psychological operations that will form the very causes of disagreement is of particular relevance.

The main reasons that will facilitate the conduct of a special operation to influence the socio-political environment in a foreign country include:

- Creation of separatist and opposition movements;
- Numerical prevalence of a foreign-speaking population, cultural heritage and traditions;
- Nostalgia for the past or a better future (the myth that things were better before);
- Absence of a systemic ethnic policy and humanitarian policy of a foreign state that shapes the national identity of its citizens;
- Clan-oligarchic system of resource distribution;
- Deliberate misrepresentation of ethnic and cultural issues by political parties and their leaders;
- Purposeful and multifaceted influence of propaganda and political technologies;
- Strong and numerous interfamilial ties of the population, economic relations, etc.

All this is the basis for enabling the IA of another state to influence the socio-political processes in another state or a particular region.

Thus, the spread of separatist and opposition sentiments, which are associated with a number of internal factors, the attitudes of the actors of socio-political processes in a foreign country or a separate region, can affect the environment as a whole. Today, it is obvious that in the public life of any foreign state, relations between political opponents are built on the line between the government and the opposition. Political opposition is an indispensable component, an indicator where the IA can conduct special operations to influence the socio-political environment in a foreign country or region for the main reasons mentioned above, which will contribute to the formation of separatist and opposition movements.

5.2. Organizing Support for a Resistance Movement

Certain aspects of organizing a resistance movement against the current government are discussed in many scientific works: G. Bystrukhin, D. Vedenieiev, O. Vorona, I. Holynskiy and others. The main forms of the resistance movement are civil disobedience, propaganda, disinformation, sabotage, subversion, guerrilla warfare and uprisings.

According to the experience of developed countries (USA, Canada, Germany, Great Britain, China), resistance movements are supported by a third party (usually the special services of another state), which influences the main actors of the socio-political process in foreign countries (population, statesmen, political elite, etc.). This creates irregular armed groups of disgruntled citizens in a foreign country with a clear hierarchy that oppose the current government. It is at this point that IAs can engage operational officers of special forces units to cooperate with the dissatisfied population in order to create a resistance movement in another state, thereby furthering their own national interests.

With the help of various forms of propaganda, the resistance movement becomes active. It is not always manifested in the active actions of guerrilla units and various underground groups in the form of sabotage. The resistance movement can manifest itself in the form of low-quality products, defective goods, assistance to fugitives, influence on political actors in socio-political relations, which, in turn, creates unreliable conditions in the domestic policy of a foreign state and enables third countries to conduct special operations on the territory of other states.

It should be emphasized that the IA studies, analyzes, and evaluates the socio-political environment in a foreign country and sends operational officers with the appropriate competence (experience in management, training, and explanation of the nuances of fighting) to organize a system of resistance movements in the territory of that state. Such specialists also provide information to the IA about the possible consequences that may occur when the resistance movement turns into an uprising. Resistance movements are not always a reliable

tool for achieving their own national interests. A real resistance movement in general is a clash of interests of different social forces, which depend on circumstances and factors.

A false conflict of interest that has no objective basis (linguistic, religious, cultural, material and financial, sanitary, etc.) can be suppressed by the existing government. Therefore, when organizing support for a resistance movement, it is always necessary to have the support of the population, as well as the support of the opposition at the state level of a foreign country, which, in the event of victory, will determine the legitimacy and justice of the resistance movement against the current government. It is their reciprocity in competition within the framework of existing socio-political processes that will reduce the growth of a dangerous polarization of forces that may arise in international society.

It is also necessary to emphasize that the very essence of the relations between the actors of the socio-political process is closely related to the level of satisfaction of the political elite. It is necessary to take into account the fact that the population elite (political, business, criminal authorities, etc.) can take the side of the resistance movement, but they can also support the current government. As the historical experience of resistance movements in Europe shows, any opposition to the current government is impossible without the intervention of authoritative elites. The only exception is the moment of occupation, where the resistance movement unites all dissatisfied segments of the population (workers, peasants, middle class, intellectuals, church leaders, people of different political views and beliefs) who are not indifferent to their fate, and is called a people's liberation movement, which has significant differences.

For the IA, a special operation to influence the socio-political environment through the support of the resistance movement is interesting because it is possible to: permanently stay on the territory of another state in order to support the resistance movement, organize the resistance movement in the right direction, have the opportunity to contact all actors in the socio-political process, test new methods of warfare at the expense of someone else's manpower, constantly study the socio-political environment of a foreign state or a particular region, provide practical recommendations to special services of one's own country to shape the tools to counteract the resistance movement in one's own country.

5.3. Organizing Support for Radical and Terrorist Organizations

Terrorism is not a new form of confrontation between social groups of different natures and organizations, including religious fanatical actors of different scales and orientations, political and ethnic associations, general political elites, and individual radical groups.

In today's realities, it is no secret that most terrorist, radical, and religious groups are supported by certain states in order to influence the environment in a

foreign country in the cheapest way possible. By supporting terrorists, states ostensibly acquire an additional tool to influence the socio-political environment of a foreign country [166].

It is not for nothing that Anthony Ben noted that "faith is something you die for, a doctrine is something you kill for". Therefore, in modern times, those who want to manage socio-political processes should use the faith of the actors in the socio-political process as a means of influencing the situation in a foreign country. There are technologies of influence through religious or ideological influence. A good example is national terrorism with religious support, which aims to create a separate state for its ethnic group with its own interests, ideas, values, and hierarchy. The broad ideological basis of religious terrorism makes it possible to actively use terrorist forms and methods in various socio-political conditions of a foreign state, which is positive for the influence of the IA on the socio-political processes in the internal environment of a foreign country. The most successful example is the concept of Islamic extremism, which has a significant impact on different groups of the population, including the existence of various contradictions between the population and political elites of Islamic states. This fact is also a good example, characterized by the fact that Islamic terrorism has spread beyond the Middle East and Africa to the international arena.

State support for various forms of terrorist, radical, extremist, fanatical, religious associations is an effective tool for implementing the foreign policy of a state. The main principle of such support is power and financial support, which makes it possible to interfere in the internal socio-political processes of a foreign state. The main reasons for the manifestation of such associations are: the existence of sharp contradictions - political, economic, social, ideological, ethnic and legal; unwillingness of individuals, groups and organizations to obey state power or a conscious choice of terrorist violence for mass propaganda of their efforts as the most effective weapon in the struggle for power; change of concepts of order and justice, establishment of new forms of behavior, within which violence becomes a "legitimate" means of achieving goals; awareness of national and religious

Thus, one of the most effective ways for the IA to influence the socio-political environment is to support the organizations discussed in this subparagraph. This will make it possible to identify vulnerabilities and subjects of the socio-political process in a foreign country, where not only religion, but also political, social, ethnic, cultural, and ideological contradictions become the basis for destabilization in a foreign country or a separate region. The success of terrorist organizations is actually a combination of the ability of another state to support these organizations (sponsorship) and the correct distribution of control over management (participation of operational officers of the special IA unit).

Today, terrorism stands alongside such concepts as conflicts and instability around the world, where in many senses the activities of individual intermediaries are central. To successfully conduct strategic influence operations

through religious or ideological factors, an ideology is needed that will contain conceptual beliefs. IAs that will try to influence the socio-political environment in a foreign country or a particular region need to impose a faith with clear convictions, to develop an understanding that the violence of radical and terrorist organizations should be oriented towards achieving a lasting psychological effect. Before 2011, there was religious terrorism, which was characterized by the defense of religion, suicide attacks, and the Internet was the main channel of communication. After 2011, terrorist semi-states became the main voice of terrorists, characterized by the seizure of some territory to implement a political project "here and now," a combination of suicide bombings, guerrilla warfare, and sabotage attacks was used, and social networks and proprietary media platforms became not only communication channels but also platforms for psychological operations.

All new forms of radical and terrorist organizations position themselves as religious. However, at the same time, they have clear political goals, the main one being to create their own state "here and now." Organizations such as the Islamic State or the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan use terrorism not only to "propagandize by action" or to weaken the state. For them, terrorism is just one of the tools to seize and maintain control over a certain territory and further form their own state on it. This political phenomenon is called a "terrorist semi-state" (TSS) among Western researchers.

A terrorist semi-state is an organization that, on the one hand, controls a part of an existing state, and, on the other hand, continues terrorist attacks against both citizens of that state and citizens of other states. The main reason for the emergence of the phenomenon of a terrorist semi-state is the weakening of the power of the existing state apparatus over a certain territory or social/ethnic/religious group that pursues its own political project for various reasons (war, revolution, environmental disaster).

Typical examples of terrorist semi-states include Hezbollah (Lebanon), the Islamic State, Boko Haram (Nigeria), the Taliban (Afghanistan), the Tehrik-e-Taliban (Pakistan), al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and the DPR and LPR (Ukraine). A non-religious example is the Kurdistan Workers' Party, which not only controls territories in the mountainous regions of Turkey, but is also closely connected with Syrian Kurdistan.

The advantage of organizing support for terrorist semi-states by the IA of one's own state to influence the socio-political environment of a foreign state is the potential that will be obtained for one's own state in the form of a training camp for hundreds or thousands of specialists. In addition, a short-lived instance of the existence of a radical or terrorist organization gives rise to new, more radical and determined terrorists and organizations.

The latest information technologies, privatization of war, availability of weapons, combined with millions of refugees and billions of impoverished people, all mixed with a simple ideology of hatred and radicalism, create fertile

ground for new forms of terrorism. In order to effectively counter this danger, we must first realize the complexity and scale of the problem and find ways to use the positive aspects of terrorism. Rethinking the experience of Western experts and the Russian Federation forms a new toolkit for conducting special operations to influence the socio-political environment, using radical and terrorist organizations that advocate the introduction of new ideas of world order.

5.4. Agent-Based Information and Psychological Influence Operations

The effectiveness of methods and means of information influence is an essential factor in all modern conflicts. The main goal of agent-based information and psychological influence operations is the destabilization of socio-political life, its disintegration from within, which, in turn, will ensure the successful implementation of political, economic and military actions. Today, agent-based information and psychological operations are divided into strategic and tactical. While tactical operations include influencing the enemy and the population of the zone near the frontline using various tools, strategic operations include organizing propaganda targeting the entire foreign state or several states at once.

The targets of information and psychological influence operations at the strategic level are persons (actors in the socio-political process) who are authorized to make decisions at the level of their competence and authority, such as the president of the state, parliament, prime minister, minister, government, military commander, general staff, board of directors, a person (citizen) as a consumer or voter, a group of persons, non-governmental organizations, unions, etc. The ultimate goal (planned result) of information and psychological influence operations is to achieve certain benefits as a result of favorable behavior (action or inaction) of the target of information and psychological influence. In particular, such a result may be the regrouping of enemy troops in the direction of an imaginary attack, or the defeat of a politician in elections due to being compromised by disinformation, or destabilization of the situation (financial, ethnic, religious, biological) in the country through large-scale disinformation in the media, etc.

The choice of methods, means and channels for conducting information and psychological operations to influence the target is always determined by the specific situation. As a rule, the degree of confrontation between the parties, the purpose and timing of the operation, the characteristics of the target, the ability of the target's counterintelligence to counteract, etc. are taken into account. For more effective implementation, disinformation and propaganda can be disseminated simultaneously through several channels. Any information and psychological influence operation depends on the ability to isolate the area of the operation.

Modern media platforms and special manipulation technologies are used to organize the dissemination of certain information. The main means of special services for information and psychological influence operations are disinformation, lobbying, manipulation, propaganda, blackmail, sending provocative SMS messages, etc. The influence of the IA on the socio-political environment in foreign countries through information and psychological influence operations in today's hybrid wars is a powerful and effective tool that relies on information and psychological influence technologies.

In his research, O. Vorona identified the main technologies of information and psychological influence: technology of information blockade, technology of using mediators, technology of information primacy, technology of creating the effect of presence, technology of feedback, technology of false analogy, technology of psychological shock, technology of information intimidation [61].

Thus, information and psychological operations of influence in foreign countries are interesting for the IA in order to influence the socio-political environment due to the following regularities: first, modern information and psychological operations of influence are PR companies that have a clearly defined and limited role of influencing a particular actor of the socio-political process in a foreign country; second, modern technologies of information and psychological operations of influence can cause more problems to the political system than conventional technologies of the political system; third, the political system is unstable due to the high quantity of actors of the political feedback system; fourth, information and psychological operations of influence do not require reality but instead can be satisfied just with the illusion of what needs to be achieved; fifth, information and psychological operations of influence are cheaper than conventional military operations.

An example is the COVID-19 information operation against China and European countries. Scott Bennett, a retired officer, analyst, psychologist, and counterterrorism expert at the US Psychological Service, provides facts that COVID-19 is a serious epidemic, but the United States, without wasting a moment, has conducted a large-scale information and psychological operation to spread fear, panic, and intimidation about the impact on China's economic stability and its foreign strategic course. The main goal is to destroy the Sino-Russian-Iranian alliance, which was established informally during their patrols in the Persian Gulf and their solidarity in defending Syria from the regimes of Recep Erdogan in Turkey, Mohammed bin Salman in Saudi Arabia, and Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel. There is also information suggesting that the United States is helping various elite clans in China and Chinese President Xi Jinping to weaken the current Chinese government. Regarding the epidemic in Europe, it is also likely that this is an information and psychological operation aimed at making Chinese millionaires and billionaires withdraw their funds from China to the United States rather than Europe, thereby worsening the internal situation in the country [167].

As you can see, after analyzing the situation in the country and the world, developed countries immediately conduct information and strategic operations of influence to destabilize the socio-political situation in foreign countries or certain regions in order to improve their own status. An information and psychological operation is of interest to the IA that will influence the socio-political environment because it has a clear PR scenario aimed at achieving a PR effect on a particular socio-political phenomenon in a foreign country.

5.5. Political Technologies of Influence Through the Media

The information space is undergoing a significant change, as the war continues in the information field. Moreover, based on the experience of the United States, France, Germany and other countries, the media is the easiest way to influence the actors in the socio-political process of a foreign country. The main tasks of the IA, which will try to influence the socio-political environment in a foreign country, are: influencing the information environment of the population of a foreign country; modernization of its own infrastructure along the border with a foreign country; development of information and telecommunication technologies of influence; use of modern media platforms to achieve a particular effect of influence, etc.

The information policy should influence the socio-political environment in conjunction with the conflict situation in a foreign country that has arisen or been artificially created. It is necessary to use all state institutions of a comprehensive information strategy aimed at creating a critical situation in a foreign country. That is, manipulation, creation of false facts and their interpretation constitute the information field. The information field itself will consist of the official position and policy of neighboring states (coalition of states), as well as expert assessments (scientific publications, theses, consulting), opinion pieces, journalistic information and news that appear in a foreign country. V. Solovey in his academic works emphasized that modern information technology is not just one of the means of confrontation, it is an "absolute weapon" [168].

Modern means of mass information and communication technologies allow creating both permanent and temporary social structures on the Internet, associations that are united by a common interest and communication capabilities. The transfer of the process of asserting social interests to the virtual space has led to significant adjustments in the traditional understanding of the functioning of information exchange mechanisms in society. The capabilities of social networking technologies also make new adjustments to the idea of the possibilities of influencing the social actors [169].

Experts note that social networks, which are actively expanding, are becoming a channel for the actor of influence to provide the mass information it

needs. At the same time, it has the ability to form a clear differentiation of targets of influence and reach large audiences, reduce the ability of the target to block information, and organize counteraction in the information sphere not only against recognized enemies but also against declared partners both at the interstate level (for example, coalition or bloc allies) and in the political or business plane (political blocs, business associations, etc.) [170].

Thus, the IA can effectively influence the actors of socio-political relations of a foreign state through social networks from its own country, and specialized experts in the territory of a foreign state can influence the actors of the socio-political process using special media manipulation techniques. In addition, it should be noted that due to the controlled nature of social networks, there is a great opportunity to analyze and predict future developments, which is crucial for decision-making.

Thus, the IA creates a single field of interconnected information, with self-sustaining feedback based on public discussion, which is instigated by specially trained operational officers of a special IA unit. Such a unit was created in the CIA's Special Activities Division (SAD) and is called the Political Action Group (PAG). It has already been discussed in the previous sections of this research.

It is this unit that is responsible for information policy that will influence the socio-political situation in a foreign country. The composition and main subdivisions will depend on the number of countries of influence and their regions. A characteristic feature of this unit will be that they will evaluate, analyze and provide recommendations to the IA High Command on the main directions of influence on the social situation through special operations that will use technologies and techniques of information manipulation, which will achieve the desired effect on the actors of the socio-political process in a foreign country or a separate region.

5.6. Organizing Agent-Based Hard Power Technologies

Technologies of direct action on the actors of socio-political processes are not a new tool of influence of the special services of any state. In the Western intelligence school of thought, there is the concept of targeted elimination of a high value individual (HVI or HVT) [171]. There is also the concept of targeted killing, which is one of the unconventional methods of special services [178]. In his monograph, O. Vorona provides a tentative classification of technologies for the implementation of special tasks to neutralize actors in socio-political processes: direct action technology (physical elimination, capture, illegal transportation to their own territory), intimidation and blackmail technology (damaging information, hostage exchange, etc.), paramilitary operations (riots, guerrilla movement, protests, uprisings) [61]. We do not agree with this

categorization because we separate direct action technologies and technologies of intimidation and blackmail from the technology of paramilitary operations.

In our opinion, special operations that will use agent-based technologies of hard power will be based on technologies of physical neutralization of individuals, and the elimination (removal from activity) of the actor-subject of the socio-political process may affect a particular socio-political environment and the balance of political forces of the state power. The technology of direct action itself is not a new form of influence on the actors of socio-political relations. The technology of direct action (hard power) includes physical elimination, seizure, illegal transportation to other territories, intimidation, demonstrations, and blackmail.

A good example from our Ukrainian history can be cited from a century ago. On June 30, 1918, a militant group of left-wing Social Revolutionaries (Social Revolutionaries of the Russian Party) led by I. Kakhovska (a former convict terrorist) arrived in Kyiv to conduct a routine direct action to assassinate and physically eliminate German General Field Marshal Hermann von Eichhorn, then commander of the Allied German forces in Ukraine. The assassination attempt on Eichhorn was additionally authorized by the All-Ukrainian Committee of the Party of Left Social Revolutionaries, which was then located in Odesa and, of course, was organized by the Socialist Revolutionaries, who did not want to recognize Ukraine as an independent state. The combat group was provided with explosives, weapons, financial resources, safe houses, and legalization documents. I. Bondarchuk participated in the group as a technician. The group's liaison was initially M. Zaluzhna, and later a member of the All-Ukrainian Committee, E. Terletskyi. Socialist-Revolutionary sailor B. Donskyi was chosen as the performer. Initially, B. Donskyi bought a white horse and turned into a coachman, which allowed him to observe the target. For several weeks, they tracked the field marshal's daily routine and routes. On July 30, 1918, at lunchtime, when Eichhorn was returning to the Uvarov palace at the corner of Katerynska Street and Lypskyi Lane, B. Donskyi threw a bomb at him. The field marshal and his aide Walter Dressler were seriously injured and died in the hospital. The German soldiers immediately captured the terrorist, who said that the Central Committee of the PLSR had passed a death sentence on Eichhorn, and thus he had completed the special operation to the fullest. As a result, the Germans accused Ukrainian activists of the murder, and Russian troops escalated Ukrainian repressions against the Germans and quickly seized power in Kyiv [173-175]. It should also be noted that representatives of the UPR visited the German Consul General and tried to convey information that the harsh action of influence was carried out by a "Great Russian." In response, the diplomat noted that the investigation had information about the ties between the Moscow Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Odesa Socialist-Revolutionaries. It becomes obvious that German intelligence was already aware that the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Left Socialist Revolutionaries had approved the terrorist attack. Thanks

to the exchange of information between the intelligence services, the German intelligence services were provided with false and fabricated information that the attack was organized by Ukrainian nationalists, and the connection with Odesa was used as evidence.

As we can see, a single direct action cannot influence the situation in the entire system of the socio-political process, but only a set of measures that must be planned in advance. It is obvious that the physical elimination of one actor can affect the course of events in the future, but not always in the desired direction. An example is the attempts to eliminate the leader of world tyranny, Fidel Castro. As you know, he survived 637 assassination attempts. But we, as scholars, know that "accidents are not random." An accident is a pattern not detected in time. The banal assassination of a tyrant does not allow the matter to be completed, because it is not the only condition for a special operation to influence the socio-political environment. The leader will be replaced by another one, and the death of the previous one will not lead to the necessary changes.

Physical elimination, capture, illegal transportation to another territory, intimidation, demonstrations and blackmail are all technologies of direct action actions that require the participation of intelligence officers who will determine which technology will be used. It is clear that illegal transportation to another country requires more people involved and more resources in the foreign country, and has high risks of disclosure. The brutal seizure of the target of influence in socio-political processes is also effective only if it is carried out in a short-term manner. Demonstrative actions require a longer period of time, a good moment to influence the target, and by their psychology have a short-term effect. Blackmail is one of the ways to influence through manipulation.

Based on the technologies of direct action campaigns and the targets of direct action, there is a ranking by the ultimate goal of such influence and the duration of the influence. While the term of influence is clear (short-term, long-term, indefinite), the classification of targets is more complicated. It all depends on the IA and the purpose of its impact on the socio-political environment. Some targets already pose a threat to the conduct of a special operation, while other targets pose an indirect threat to the progress of a special task to influence a particular socio-political environment in a foreign country.

Obviously, it is not cost-effective to use IA operatives to carry out such tasks of direct action. In civilized countries, this "dirty" work is performed by freelance covert employees under the strict control of current employees who are legitimized as private companies (PMCs, consulting and recruiting front agencies, etc.).

The positive thing about IA is that it is possible to conduct special direct action (hard power) actions in a short period of time, for example, those that needed to be done "yesterday" or those that pose a real threat "today." The creation of a combat group to neutralize the subject of the socio-political process is carried out in advance, and when the time comes, it will already be in a foreign country,

and, if there is complementary material, will carry out intimidation or demonstrative actions or physical elimination. It should be noted that world practice shows that the special services of developed countries rarely dare to capture and bring the object of direct influence to their territory because of the high risk, so physical elimination has been and remains the most effective way to carry out direct action.

5.7. Organizing Strikes and Protests

In order to understand how the IA can influence a particular socio-political environment in a foreign country or a particular region through special operations to organize strikes and protests, it is necessary to differentiate and understand their definitions.

It should be noted that a strike as a social phenomenon is one of the forms of protest action, which has certain criteria that distinguish it from other social protest actions.

A protest action is, as a rule, a massive, public event of citizens or a separate category of citizens held to draw the attention of the authorities, the public, and employers to unresolved problems in various spheres of society and accompanied by slogans, in some cases visual aids (posters, symbols), audio and video equipment. Protest actions take different forms. It can be in the form of a rally, demonstration, strike, street march, march, gathering, picketing, hunger strike, etc. Why is a strike of interest to the IA? The difference between strikes and rallies, demonstrations, marches, picketing, gatherings, etc. is as follows: first, a strike is organized by a group of persons who are in an employment relationship with a legal entity or individual entrepreneur under an employment contract (i.e. not only employees, but also pensioners, students, unemployed, etc.); second, in most cases, they have the form of legality and are prescribed in the legal framework of most foreign countries; third, strikes take place during business hours, which causes deterioration and escalation of the unstable situation in a foreign country; fourth, it is the most legitimate way to influence the socio-political environment in a foreign country or a particular region.

Thus, after analyzing the characteristic features of a strike that allow it to be separated from other acts of protest of a social and public nature, we can come to a simple conclusion that any strike is a protest, but not every protest is a strike. For the IA, it is the act of protest that is of interest because it involves real actors in the socio-political process, where operatives of a special forces unit can be deployed to steer the action in the right direction, which in the future, if resources are available, will develop into strikes, rallies, picketing, revolutionary movements, etc. Also, the technology of organizing a strike is a positive aspect for the IA in that the effect of influence on the actor of the socio-political process

(the state government) is long-lasting and can develop into more strategic measures.

A good example of a special operation aimed at organizing strikes and protests is the actions of the Russian special services after the physical elimination of German Field Marshal Hermann von Eichhorn, then commander of the allied German troops in Ukraine. Ten days after the general's elimination, B. Donskoi (the assassin who killed the German general) was executed in public by a German military court. Immediately after the execution, the Russian propaganda machine began to incite the disgruntled Ukrainian population against the German administration. In a short time, strikes and protests broke out, which later enabled the Russians to seize power in Kyiv.

Another example of a special operation to organize strikes and protests is the participation of French IA operational officers in actions in Libya against the regime of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. It was the operational officers who participated in the organization of strikes and protests, which later grew from protest to physical action (persecution of Colonel M. Gaddafi). Thanks to these operative officers, the protesters were given the coordinates of the colonel's satellite phone number, after which he was captured and killed by disgruntled protesters. In short, as you can see, there is nothing complicated or new. It is necessary to change or influence the subject of the socio-political process through direct action or protest actions that can escalate into strikes and revolutions.

5.8. Organizing a Coup D'état, Military Rebellion, Popular Uprising or National Revolution

Based on the name of this method of achieving IA's influence on the socio-political environment, we can understand that organizing a coup d'état, military rebellion, popular uprising, or national revolution is an important tool. The technology of organizing strikes and (mass) protest actions can grow into a full-fledged revolution throughout the state or in a particular region, which is a strategic level of influence on the situation of another state or individual region.

The main purpose of a coup d'état, military mutiny, popular uprising, or national revolution is to radically change the socio-political system of the state with a radical change in the vector of politics and the type of economy [176]. For the IA to influence a particular socio-political environment through the organization of a coup d'état, military rebellion, popular uprising or national revolution, it is necessary to define a clear pattern of logical stages with ready-made scenarios for the development of future events. According to the British scholar J. Laughland, in today's realities, a revolutionary movement is impossible without three important factors: controlled media, non-governmental organizations and their activities, and the support of the local population [177].

The organization of a coup d'état, military rebellion, popular uprising, or national revolution in a foreign country is resource-intensive for both organizers and perpetrators. The main activities that will be carried out by the special services of other countries are: information policy to form a revolutionary ideology, define the main slogans, attract as much of the population as possible; interaction of special services with the political elite (diplomatic meetings, business conferences, etc.); formation of an agent network of influence among both the political elite and security forces; work in mass media resources to degrade the effectiveness of the current government; attraction of hidden and unofficially legal financial resources; organization, support, training in mass protest (with special attention paid to student, youth movement); unofficial work with all civil movements; shaping high motivation with national liberation ideas, demands, etc.

The main players involved in the organization of a coup d'état, military rebellion, popular uprising or national revolution should be well-informed professionals who clearly understand the purpose and procedure of the strategic event, have coordinated, managed and controlled operational groups with a coordination council, have significant financial resources and human (force) resources. As practice shows, the coordination council is the main speaker of television reports and broadcasts about the event, and subsequently takes over the state power with the subsequent distribution of powers. The main conditions for any coup d'état, military rebellion, popular uprising or national revolution are the desire or promise of revenge for the situation in the country, the hope for improvement of the situation in the country and the appearance of those who are able to fix it.

The main goal of any strategic measure of influence is to weaken the current government and strengthen another. An armed revolution is a special type of political struggle that takes into account the realities of today and is achieved through the activities of a third party. It is the third party, such as the intelligence services of other states, that manipulates information and incites the majority of the population to radical action.

The most important point of success of the organization of these activities is to determine the moment when the state power is weakened and has difficulties. The effectiveness of strategic rebellions depends on the ability to attract a large number of supporters (local population) or fictitious non-governmental organizations, parties, to attract at least part of the army and to have financial resources. Also, the organization of local revolutions in certain regions of a foreign country depends on the ability of neighboring regions to intervene without interference. A good example is the annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, where the current Ukrainian government was unable to use the full range of force because it was morally paralyzed and locally inaccessible. The maximum of the population and the power spectrum of the Russian Federation were involved under the guise of obscure Cossacks, "little green men" and people's parties.

An IA that will organize a coup d'état, military rebellion, popular uprising or national revolution to influence the socio-political environment in a foreign country should take into account the basic rule that the most difficult task is not to conduct a special operation, but to maintain the situation (status quo) after seizing power [178].

It should be borne in mind that any current state power will try to demoralize revolutionary events at the nascent stage. An example is the revolution in Turkey on July 16, 2016, which was suppressed in 4 hours. Experts concluded that this coup had two alternative scenarios: the first - the coup was organized by the special services of the current 12th President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan, with the aim of conducting a psychological operation on its own population, and the second - the revolutionaries failed due to poor preparation and loss of support from their own population, although it was carried out by a group of high-ranking officers using their powers, weapons and equipment.

The organization of a coup d'état, military rebellion, popular uprising or national revolution has its logical stages. They are described in numerous analyses of the French, American, Soviet, Chinese and many other revolutions, each of which had a similar process. On the basis of unmet expectations, those who promise a quick solution to all problems and establish special technologies for manipulating the subjects of the new society come to power [179].

A. Ferrand was the first in the history of public thought to propose a classification of political revolutions by means of implementation: on the basis of previous changes; by legitimate authority; by violence. The first two methods actually merge. "Revolutions of the first type are always beneficial, sometimes necessary, because they are the mature result of previous changes. Revolutions of the second type are carefully thought out, strengthen the government, and last as long as the government adheres to them and supports them. Revolutions of the third type are always undesirable, rarely beneficial, never last, and are desirable only to third parties [180].

The strategic goal of organizing a coup d'état, military rebellion, popular uprising or national revolution of a large-scale nature throughout the territory of a foreign state is to create a zone of instability, which is mainly carried out through an information and psychological operation of influence on the entire population of a foreign state, as well as through incitement by some specially trained specialists in certain sectors, which subsequently form protests with a transition to an uprising.

Among the many rules for implementing strategic influence measures, it is necessary to pay attention to specialists who determine the peculiarities of the socio-political process, study the vulnerabilities of the zone of influence that has developed within a foreign state. Such knowledge about the "critical points" of vulnerability of the socio-political system cannot be obtained through a general analysis of the socio-political situation while sitting in warm offices with a glass of coffee. An example is the use during revolutions of not only torches, acts of

provocation and Molotov cocktails, but also more effective spectacular actions, such as playing national instruments, singing patriotic songs, theatrical national productions (ideological concerts, performances), attracting beautiful women to the revolutionary process, intimidating or physically eliminating opponents, etc. It is the operational officers who will organize special influence operations who must constantly be in the center of revolutionary events and determine and coordinate their own IA for special influence operations that will keep the situation stable or artificially worsen it.

All of the above makes it possible to conclude that the organization of a coup d'état, military rebellion, popular uprising or national revolution includes a wide range of influence operations conducted by special services with a large number of qualified employees who are well aware of the internal situation of a foreign state and have all the technologies of influence on the actors of the socio-political process.

5.9. Organizing Guerrilla and Underground Movements

According to Western theorists, guerrilla and underground movements are one of the forms of unconventional warfare. O. Vorona notes in his monograph that a guerrilla movement and a revolutionary movement have differences [61]. The guerrilla movement aims to resist the current government by force, while the revolutionary movement seeks to change it to its own. Basically, it all depends on the resources of the interested party. When there are enough resources, a revolution is organized, when there is a lack of resources, guerrilla and underground movements need to be created [181]. But these are all unconventional ways of warfare.

A state that plans to wage unconventional warfare through its own special services must take into account four factors: the actions of the most dissatisfied population (guerrillas, insurgents); the actions of the local population living in the territory; the actions of the existing state authorities; and the actions of the international community.

While the operations of influence on the local population, the current state authorities and the international community were discussed in the previous paragraphs, it is necessary to focus on operations of influence in the format of guerrilla and underground movements. If we analyze the world experience of such operations, we can cite many similar operations where guerrilla movements are organized and supported by other countries in order to influence a particular situation.

A good example of an influence operation in the format of a guerrilla and underground movement is the guerrilla movement in Afghanistan in the 80s, where the CIA operation (Operation Charlie Wilson's Real War) organized a guerrilla movement to withdraw the 40th Army from Afghanistan [182]. It is in

such operations of influence in the format of a guerrilla movement that representatives of the special forces (from the CIA Special Activities Division) take part.

The main difference between conducting unconventional warfare through influence operations in the format of guerrilla and underground movements is the presence of a cover story (front organizations: PMCs, recruiting institutions, consulting companies, non-governmental organizations of military-patriotic nature, etc.) and legalization documents for representatives of the special forces.

Undoubtedly, an IA that influences the socio-political environment in a foreign country or a particular region through unconventional warfare in the format of guerrilla and underground movements aims not to identify itself as the organizer of the event. For example, the US Armed Forces have developed a number of field manuals (FM 3-24, JP 3-24) that regulate counterinsurgency activities [183], but they are intended for the Special Forces and have the main purpose of countering. It is clear that no state will advertise its support for guerrilla movements, let alone create such field manuals.

There is a certain gradation of influence operations in the format of guerrilla and underground movements: by the level of participation and by the format of participation of a foreign state's IA. There are three levels of participation: minimal, partial, and maximal. And the format differs by the organizers of guerrilla and underground movements, as presented in [61] (Fig. 5.1).




LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION		FORM OF PARTICIPATION
Minimal involvement of operational officers (coordination and guidance)		Clandestine work and partisan movement are organized by agents of influence
Partial: involvement of own special forces		Underground struggle and partisan movement are organized by special forces instructors
Maximal: conducting a paramilitary operation with involvement of the Armed Forces		The guerrilla movement is directly led and comprehensively supported by foreign armed forces

Figure 5.1 - Gradation of Influence Operations

Conducting unconventional warfare through influence operations in the format of guerrilla and underground movements involves the Armed Forces and the Special Forces, which will function under the direction of IA operational officers. It is the combined use of both forces that is the toolkit for inciting the disaffected population and guerrillas.

A good example from Ukraine's own history is the spring events of 2015 in the Odesa region. The Russian Federation, with the help of "militias", pro-Russian organizations "Orthodox Cossacks" and "Youth Unity", which at that

time were coordinated by a GRU officer of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, tried to conduct a special influence operation called the "Bessarabian People's Republic". The essence of the special operation was to incite the population to seize district state administrations in Bessarabia with the help of the Transnistrian population and the border population of the Odesa region, and in the absence of Armed Forces units in the region. After that, using a special unit, blow up two bridges in Zatoka and Mayaki, which are strategic communications with Ukraine. After that, to conduct an information and psychological operation to instill the "Russian world" with the help of Bessarabia TV, Nova Hvilya, Glas, and the websites Naspravdi, Infotsentr, and Timer. Then, with the help of Sberbank of Russia, they received cash to bribe business and criminal elites and finance local mercenary semi-criminal elements. To send "little green men" across the Black Sea from Crimea and Transnistria (a peacekeeping contingent of the Russian Armed Forces) to suppress the disgruntled population. However, with the help of the Security Service of Ukraine, the key perpetrators who were supposed to organize the underground movement and provide funding were detained, and all protests were severely suppressed, thus thwarting the larger Operation Novorossiia.

As you can see, conducting unconventional warfare through influence operations in the format of guerrilla and underground movements involving the Special Operations Forces and the Armed Forces is a reality today, but it requires more fruitful work to create reliable conditions for unconventional warfare. The right moment was chosen, when there was destabilization in the country, but some peculiarities of the region and the attitude of some actors in social and political relations were not taken into account. According to unconfirmed reports, the main reason for the failure to implement this scenario was the effective confrontation of the criminal world in Odesa region with the support of the society's elite. All the peculiarities of the agent-operational situation were not taken into account, and the organizers failed to gain one hundred percent support from the population, as well as to form a national and religious idea. Another difficult problem for the organizers of the underground movement is the covert involvement of special services in their own territory.

Conclusion to Chapter Five

This chapter discusses methods of conducting special influence operations. In order to understand what constitutes a modern unconventional war with corresponding influence operations at all levels of the socio-political environment, it is necessary to create a comprehensive plan for conducting unconventional warfare based on the presented model of IA influence on the socio-political environment. This plan will consist of four phases and will be based on a special operation with the use of information and psychological

influence. The effectiveness of the influence of the IA on the socio-political environment in a foreign country or region depends on the ability to identify weaknesses in the socio-political processes taking place in the country of influence, as well as on the ability of the IA to conduct hybrid agent operations abroad. Influence operations are an effective tool for countering hybrid warfare, which is a non-standardized mixture of various technologies, means and methods of influencing the socio-political environment of foreign countries, competing countries and aggressor countries.

CONCLUSION

The monograph examines the transformation of intelligence activities in the context of modern international relations and hybrid military-political conflicts, as well as the impact of the IA on the socio-political environment in a foreign country or region. New theoretical, methodological and practical results have been obtained:

- The main components of the socio-political environment that determine its level are identified;
- A model of the relationship between the actors of socio-political relations is built;
- A technology for analyzing, evaluating and forecasting the socio-political environment in a region or a state is proposed;
- A structural model of the IA hierarchy is formulated;
- A functional model of the IA as a complex organizational system is developed;
- Functional and cybernetic models of the IA management system are developed;
- A model of the impact of IA special-purpose units on the socio-political environment is developed;
- The technology of IA influence on the socio-political environment and the algorithm for its implementation are proposed;
- The expediency and necessity of creating PMCs and their use for special operations in the international arena are substantiated;
- Methods of conducting special influence operations are presented;
- It is demonstrated that IA can be an effective instrument of assistance, both in diplomatic initiatives and in unconventional influence on the socio-political environment.

Altogether, the results obtained in the form of models, methods, and technology of IA influence on the socio-political environment create a methodology that provides a general vision and understanding of the possibilities of active use of own special bodies to defend national interests.

AFTERWORD

The monograph examines the main trends in the development of modern international relations and presents conceptual approaches to the transformation of international relations actors in the current environment. The main emphasis is placed on intelligence activities as a phenomenon of modern international relations. With the emergence and rapid development of innovative information and communication technologies that transform the relationship between global actors in the socio-political process in the international arena, the study of these issues is becoming increasingly difficult.

Taking into account the peculiarities of the subject area and the formulated tasks, the study of the socio-political environment was based on a systematic approach, as well as the main provisions and methods of system analysis and decision-making theory. In analyzing and assessing the socio-political environment, the author used such general and special methods and techniques of cognition as factor analysis, expert methods, forecasting, scenario analysis, prediction, comparison, generalization, and analogy.

The practical significance of the results obtained lies in the implementation of the main provisions of the study to increase the effectiveness of the IA's impact on the socio-political environment in foreign countries or certain regions by developing models, technologies, and methods of unconventional warfare in order to defend one's own interests and values. In particular, this is done by studying the technologies of special influence operations in three areas: classical (legal) active measures of influence on the socio-political environment, semi-military operations of influence on the socio-political environment (through front organizations, SOF, Armed Forces), operations of political influence on the socio-political environment (specific foundations, institutions, forgery of documents). The results of the study can be used by IAs to influence the socio-political environment of a foreign state, the Security Service of Ukraine during operational activities, and the SOF.

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